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Zusammenfassung 
 
Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht den Einfluss sozialer und traditioneller Medien auf 
den Kapitalmarkt. Im Vordergrund der empirischen Analysen steht hierbei die Stimmung der 
Investoren (nachfolgend Investor Sentiment genannt), die z. B. direkt durch Beiträge auf sozi-
alen Plattformen, aber auch mithilfe innovativer Datenbanken und der digitalen Textanalyse 
traditioneller Printmedien gemessen werden kann. Mit dieser Ausrichtung werden implizit die 
Annahmen der traditionellen Finanztheorie in Frage gestellt und neue empirische Erkenntnisse 
mit den Erklärungsansätzen der verhaltensorientierten Finanztheorie (auch bekannt als Beha-
vioral Finance) in Verbindung gebracht. 
Eine der grundlegenden Elemente der traditionellen Finanzmarkttheorie stellt die Effizienz-
markthypothese dar. Die Verfügbarkeit von Informationen ist in dieser Betrachtung eine 
Grundvoraussetzung für die Funktionsfähigkeit effizienter Märkte. In solchen Märkten werden 
neue Informationen bezüglich einer Anlagemöglichkeit vom Kapitalmarkt schnell und exakt 
verarbeitet. Der neue Preis der Anlagemöglichkeit spiegelt damit jene neue Information und 
ihren fundamentalen Wert unmittelbar wider (Fama, 1969; 1970). Verschiedene Beobachtun-
gen haben jedoch in der Vergangenheit gezeigt, dass Preisbewegungen am Kapitalmarkt nicht 
immer eindeutig auf rationale Informationen zurückzuführen sind. Über- und Unterreaktionen 
von Anlagepreisen auf Nachrichten oder ein vermeintliches Muster in vergangenen Gewinn-
entwicklungen schrieben dem Forschungszweig der verhaltensorientieren Finanztheorie seit 
den 1990ern daher eine zunehmende Bedeutung zu. 
Eine wichtige Rolle spielte hierbei die sich verändernde Verfügbarkeit und der teilweise 
leichtere Zugang zu Informationen für sowohl institutionelle Investoren aber auch für Klein-
anleger. Abbildung 1-1 (S. 3) beschreibt zum Beispiel die Reichweite traditioneller Print-
medien zwischen 1970 und 2017 in den USA. Von mehr als 60 Millionen US-Haushalten in 
den 1970er sank die Zahl der mit traditionellen Printmedien erreichten US-Haushalte auf nur 
noch rund 30 Millionen in 2017. Dieser Trend ist jedoch nicht nur in den USA, sondern auch 
in anderen entwickelten Ländern zu beobachten. Auf der anderen Seite hat sich mit der Etab-
lierung des Internets und der damit einhergehenden digitalen Dynamik ein paralleler Trend 
entwickelt. Abbildung 1-3 (S. 5) beschreibt die Entwicklung der weltweiten „Social Media“-
Nutzer seit 2010.  
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 Waren es 2010 noch rund 1 Milliarde globale Nutzer, werden bis 2021 rund 3 Milliarden Nut-
zer sozialer Netzwerke erwartet. Dies beeinflusst nicht nur die Gesellschaft, sondern auch eine 
spezielle Zielgruppe der vorliegenden Arbeit: die Investoren.  
Die Art und Weise der Informationssammlung, -verarbeitung und -verbreitung hat sich mit 
den letztbeschriebenen Trends für Investoren in den letzten Jahrzehnten stark verändert (Puppis 
et al., 2017). So wird die Aufmerksamkeit für einzelne Anlagemöglichkeiten und das vorherr-
schende Investor Sentiment nachhaltig durch den vernetzten Einsatz digitaler Medien beein-
flusst. Hieraus ergeben sich vier grundlegende Forschungsfragen, die auch die empirischen 
Analysen dieser Dissertation durchweg begleiten: 
 
1. Welche Rolle nimmt Investor Sentiment in Kapitalmärkten ein? Spiegelt Investor Sen-
timent vergangene Marktdaten wider oder beeinflusst Investor Sentiment zukünftige 
Preisentwicklungen? 
2. Welche Bedeutung haben (soziale) Medien für den Kapitalmarkt im alltäglichen Um-
feld und in besonderen Unternehmenssituationen, wie beispielsweise Gewinn- oder 
Übernahmeankündigungen?    
3. Welche Unternehmen sind besonders sensibel gegenüber Investor Sentiment? 
4. Inwiefern stabilisieren Arbitragegeschäfte rationaler Investoren Kapitalmärkte in der 
Gegenwart von „Noise Tradern“? 
 
Um diese Fragen bestmöglich beantworten zu können, ist die vorliegende Dissertation wie 
folgt strukturiert und aufgebaut: Das erste Kapitel leitet den Leser in die Relevanz der Thematik 
und die führenden Forschungsfragen der Dissertation ein. Das zweite Kapitel legt den theore-
tischen Grundstein dieser Arbeit und beschreibt grundlegende Ansätze der traditionellen als 
auch verhaltensorientierten Finanztheorie. Insbesondere werden verhaltensorientierte, theore-
tische Modelle beschrieben, die in Ihrer Gesamtheit ausgewählte Marktanomalien zu erklären 
zu versuchen. Zudem werden psychologische Ansätze und Konzepte dargelegt, die begründen 
warum Investoren teilweise irrational handeln und mit ihrem unbestimmten Handeln Unsicher-
heiten in den Markt tragen und Anlagepreise von ihrem inneren, tatsächlichen Wert abweichen 
lassen. Literaturüberblicke zum Thema Investor Sentiment im Bezug zu traditionellen Print-
medien und sozialen Medien runden das Kapitel ab.  
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Das dritte Kapitel umfasst die erste empirische Arbeit dieser Dissertation und untersucht pri-
mär den Einfluss sozialer Medien auf den Kapitalmarkt. Hierfür greift diese Arbeit insbeson-
dere auf mehr als 4,5 Mio. Beiträge zurück, die auf dem führenden, finanzbezogenen Internet-
forum HotCopper in Australien im Zeitraum zwischen Januar 2008 und Mai 2016 veröffent-
licht wurden. Mithilfe umfassender empirischer Methoden (z. B. Eventstudien, vektorautore-
gressive Modelle, „Impulse-Response“-Funktionsanalysen oder multivariate „fixed-effects“ 
Regressionen) zeigt diese Studie die Finanzmarktrelevanz von Beiträgen in sozialen Medien. 
Zum Beispiel zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass positives Investor Sentiment unmittelbar und signi-
fikant mit abnormalen Unternehmensrenditen korreliert. Dieser Effekt ist jedoch nach einem 
Monat nicht mehr zu beobachten. Arbitragegeschäfte, die besonders von informierten Anlegern 
durchgeführt werden, wirken diesem Effekt gleichzeitig nur teilweise entgegen. Diese Be-
obachtungen deuten darauf hin, dass Internetbeiträge von Kleinanlegern den Markt kurzfristig 
beeinflussen, auch wenn die positiven Beiträge vermeintlich keine werthaltigen Informationen 
beinhalten und der Markt kurzzeitig auf diese Informationen überreagiert.  
Die Folgen negativer Beiträge in Internetforen lassen jedoch andere Rückschlüsse zu. Nega-
tives Investor Sentiment ist stark signifikant mit zukünftigen abnormalen Unternehmensrendi-
ten im Zeitraum von einem Monat korreliert. Zudem deutet eine zunehmende Übereinstim-
mung von negativem Sentiment auf, über der Erwartung hinaus, negative Gewinnankündigun-
gen hin. Beide Ergebnisse befürworten damit die Werthaltigkeit negativer Investorenbeiträge 
in sozialen Medien. Auf die Frage, inwiefern Beiträge in sozialen Medien sich auf Markt-
schwankungen auswirken, findet diese Arbeit mehrdeutige Ergebnisse. Insgesamt zeigen Gran-
ger-Tests und die Reaktionen einer „Impulse-Response“-Funktion eine bilaterale Beziehung 
zwischen Rendite-Volatilitäten und der Anzahl von Internetbeiträgen. Jedoch zeigt sich in die-
sem Zusammenhang, dass Kleinanleger in Internetforen mit ihrer Anzahl an Beiträgen stärker 
auf Marktschwankungen reagieren als umgekehrt. Zusammen zeigen die Ergebnisse der ersten 
empirischen Studie die ökonomisch, signifikante und asymmetrische Bedeutung von Investor 
Sentiment in sozialen Medien für den Finanzmarkt.      
Im vierten Kapitel der Dissertation erweitern wir unsere empirischen Analysen und untersu-
chen den Einfluss traditioneller und sozialer Medien auf Kursreaktionen von Übernahmezielen 
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vor offiziellen Übernahmeankündigungen. Die Literatur hat in der Vergangenheit oftmals be-
reits 2 Monate vor einer offiziellen Übernahmeankündigung einen Kursanstieg des Übernah-
meziels beobachtet (z. B. Keown und Pinkerton, 1981). Dieses Phänomen wird auch als „Tar-
get Run-up“ bezeichnet. Erklärungen hierfür bieten zum einen die Insider-Hypothese (Insider-
informationen werden im Vorfeld ausgenutzt) oder die Markterwartungshypothese (auf Basis 
öffentlicher Informationen erwartet der Markt ein bevorstehendes Übernahmeangebot). Die 
zweite empirische Arbeit untersucht 2.765 Übernahmeangebote in Australien im Zeitraum von 
Januar 2008 und August 2015. Dabei greifen wir auf mehr als 15 Tsd. Zeitungsartikel, 80 Tsd. 
Beiträge im Internetforum HotCopper, diverse Analystenempfehlungen, sowie auf Daten be-
züglich der relativen Suchhäufigkeit auf Google zurück, die in den Vorzeitraum der Übernah-
meankündigung gefallen sind. Dadurch prüfen wir im Speziellen den unterschiedlichen Ein-
fluss der Aufmerksamkeit unterschiedlicher Investorengruppen (institutionelle und individu-
elle Investoren) auf „Target Run-ups“.  
Die Ergebnisse lassen den Rückschluss zu, dass Target Run-ups kleinerer Wachstumsunter-
nehmen, die in der Vergangenheit operativ schwache Margen aufwiesen, im engen Zusammen-
hang mit Beiträgen auf dem sozialen Medium HotCopper stehen. Ähnliche kleinere Wachs-
tumsunternehmen ohne Medienberichterstattung erfahren hingegen keinen signifikanten An-
stieg der Aktienpreise im Vorfeld einer Übernahmeankündigung. Target Run-ups größerer Un-
ternehmen sind dagegen besonders sensibel gegenüber Analystenempfehlungen. Diese Ergeb-
nisse stehen mit der Beobachtung im Einklang, dass kleinere Unternehmen nicht durch Ana-
lysten gedeckt werden. Soziale Medien füllen in dieser Hinsicht diese Lücke. Google-Suchan-
fragen nach den Übernahmezielen zeigen auf der anderen Seite keinen ökonomisch signifikan-
ten Zusammenhang. Insgesamt befürworten die Ergebnisse der zweiten empirischen Arbeit die 
Markterwartungshypothese. Soziale Medien tragen in dieser Hinsicht zu einer höheren Markt-
effizienz bei und füllen teilweise Informationslücken, die beispielsweise aufgrund ineffizienter 
Ressourcenverteilung oder zu kostenaufwendigen Recherchearbeiten existieren.    
Das fünfte Kapitel schließt die empirische Arbeit der Dissertation ab und untersucht den Zu-
sammenhang zwischen Stimmungen in Printmedien (News Sentiment nachfolgend) und Kapi-
talmärkten. Im „Asset Pricing“-Kontext prüfen wir den Einfluss aggregierter News Sentiment 
Indizes auf den Querschnitt von Unternehmensrenditen. Im Fokus der Asset Pricing-Literatur 
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steht insbesondere die Ermittlung von Risikoprämien, die Unternehmensrenditen erklären sol-
len. Eine zentrale Frage dieser dritten empirischen Arbeit ist demzufolge, ob bestimmte Ren-
diten im Zusammenhang mit dem eingebrachten Risiko stehen, oder jene Renditen als Resultat 
irrationaler Marktbewegungen hervorkommen. Mithilfe der Datenbank von RavenPack News 
Analytics berechnen wir auf Basis von mehr als 120 Millionen klassifizierten Nachrichtenarti-
keln im Zeitraum von 2000 und 2017 monatlich aggregierte News Sentiment Indizes und testen 
ihre Zusammenhänge mit Unternehmensrenditen. Dabei bilden wir in unserer Analyse monat-
liche „Zero-Investment“-Portfolios, die Unternehmen mit einem im Vormonat durchschnittlich 
positiven (negativen) News Sentiment kaufen (verkaufen). Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass jene 
Portfolios eine jährliche Rendite von 7,5% erzielen, auch wenn wir in unseren Regressionen 
um die bekannten Risikofaktoren Markt, Unternehmensgröße, Momentum, Liquidität, Profita-
bilität und Investitionen kontrollieren. Die Resultate werden insbesondere vom positiven News 
Sentiment beeinflusst. Das hieraus resultierende Premium bezeichnen wir in dieser Arbeit als 
„premium on optimism“. Eine Begründung könnte in der generell positiven Berichterstattung 
im untersuchten Zeitraum liegen. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass positive Nachrichten erschei-
nen, ist insbesondere höher, wenn in den vergangenen Monaten bereits positiv über jenes Un-
ternehmen berichtet worden ist. Die Ergebnisse der dritten empirischen Studie sprechen insge-
samt für die Sichtweise, dass News Sentiment als Risikofaktor angesehen werden kann.  
Die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit haben damit weitreichende Implikationen für Unternehmen, In-
vestoren, Regulatoren sowie die weitergehende Forschung in diesem Umfeld. Unternehmen 
müssen in der heutigen Zeit lernen, Bewegungen in (sozialen) Medien frühzeitig zu antizipie-
ren und mit vermeintlichen Falschmeldungen umzugehen. Eine stärkere inhaltliche und kom-
munikative Auseinandersetzung der Investor Relations-Abteilung mit diesem Thema könnte 
diesem Problem Rechnung tragen. Zudem können Unternehmen gezielte Kommunikationsstra-
tegien für besondere Unternehmensereignisse entwickeln, um einer womöglich negativen öf-
fentlichen Wahrnehmung frühzeitig entgegenzuwirken. Falschmeldungen und volatile Märkte 
sind zudem für Regulatoren von besonderer Bedeutung. Die Identifizierung von manipulativen 
Aktivitäten oder die Stabilisierung von Märkten im Umfeld mehrdeutiger Informationen sind 
hier vom speziellen Interesse. Gerade in aktuellen Zeiten der digitalen und vernetzten Kom-
munikation nimmt diese Aufgabe daher eine essentielle Rolle ein. Umso wichtiger ist daher 
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das Verständnis um die Finanzakteure und deren Aktionen für einen effizienteren Kapital-
markt. Die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit stellen schlussendlich für die weitere Forschung neue An-
knüpfungspunkte. Die asymmetrische Rolle von Investor Sentiment und deren dahinterliegen-
den Mechanismen sind weiterhin umstritten. Insbesondere bleiben aktuelle Forschungen be-
züglich der Langzeitauswirkungen von direkt gemessenem Investor Sentiment Antworten 
schuldig. Diese Arbeit stellt daher mit ihren Ergebnissen eine fundierte Basis für zukünftige 
empirische Arbeiten. Auch konnte diese Arbeit nicht vollständig erklären, in welchen Situati-
onen unterschiedliche Investorengruppen zu bestimmten Medien greifen und hierauf basierend 
Investitionsentscheidungen treffen. Eine Lösung könnte beispielsweise eine Intraday-Betrach-
tung unter Berücksichtigung einzelner Medieninstrumente darstellen. 
Zusammenfassend zeigt diese Dissertation, dass Investor Sentiment ein wichtiger Bestandteil 
von heutigen Finanzmärkten geworden ist und ihre Bedeutung auch in der traditionellen Fi-
nanztheorie nicht mehr vernachlässigt werden darf.  
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 Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the impact of social and traditional media on capital markets. The 
empirical tests focus on investor sentiment which, for example, can be captured by postings on 
social media platforms, innovative news databases and the textual analysis of traditional media 
press. The research direction of this dissertation implicitly questions the assumptions stated by 
the traditional finance theory. Our new empirical findings and their explanations are, hence, 
closely linked with the behavioral finance theory. 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis constitutes one of the fundamental pillars of the traditional 
finance theory. In this concept, the availability of information is the basic requirement for the 
functionality of efficient capital markets. New information is quickly and correctly incorpo-
rated into an asset’s price. The new price of an asset, therefore, immediately reflects the up-
dated fundamental value (Fama, 1969; 1970). However, various studies have recently shown 
that stock market movements are not always associated with rational information about an as-
set’s value. The observation of over- and underreaction of asset prices to news signals or dis-
tinctive return patterns gave reason for the gaining importance of the behavioral finance theory 
since the 1990’s. 
The changing availability and the easier access to information for institutional and individual 
investors play an important role in this recent development. For example, Figure 1-1 (p. 3) 
depicts the circulation of US newspapers between 1970 and 2017. The number of households 
covered by traditional media press decreased from more than 60 million to around 30 million 
households in 2017. The establishment of the internet, on the other hand, parallelly accelerated 
the digital development in the media landscape. Figure 1-3 (p. 5) describes the global develop-
ment of social media users since 2010. The number of social media users is expected to increase 
from 1 billion users in 2010 to around 3 billion users in 2021. This development not only affects 
the society but also a specific focus group of this dissertation: the financial investors. 
The way investors gather, process, and disseminate information also experienced a significant 
change in recent decades (Puppis et al., 2017). In this connection, the development of investor 
attention and sentiment for individual assets is sustainably impacted by the digitalization of 
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 media channels. Consequently, we derive for fundamental research questions, which accom-
pany the empirical analyses of this dissertation:  
 
1. What role does investor sentiment play in financial markets? Do investors solely follow 
the market, or do beliefs of investors predict future returns or other market variables? 
2. How does (social) media relate to financial markets in the general daily context and 
specifically around news events, such as earnings or M&A announcements? 
3. What kind of firms are more sensitive to investor sentiment than others? 
4. Does arbitrage stabilize financial markets against noise traders? 
 
The following structure of this dissertation aims to answer these questions in the best possible 
way: The first chapter introduces the reader to the relevance of the topic and the leading re-
search questions of the dissertation. The second chapter lays the theoretical foundation and 
describes the fundamental concepts of the traditional and also the behavioral finance theory, 
which aims to comprehensively explain selected market anomalies. Also, we summarize se-
lected psychological concepts that help to explain irrational actions of investors, which poten-
tially cause market volatility and asset prices to deviate from their fundamental value. Litera-
ture reviews on investor sentiment in close relationship with traditional and social media com-
plete the second chapter. 
The third chapter encompasses the first empirical work of this dissertation and primarily ex-
plores the impact of social media on capital markets. The empirical analysis falls back to more 
than 4.5 million posts on the leading Australian financial internet message board HotCopper 
between January 2008 and May 2016. The findings suggest that social media activity is price 
relevant for capital markets. Positive investor sentiment, for example, is in this connection 
contemporaneously and significantly correlated with a stock’s abnormal return. However, the 
effect diminishes after one month. Arbitrage of presumably informed investors only partially 
countervail this effect. Postings by individual investors on social media, hence, cause capital 
markets to overreact to potentially non-relevant information in the short-term. 
However, negative investor sentiment expressed in internet message boards provides a dif-
ferentiated picture. Negative investor sentiment is significantly related with the next month’s 
abnormal returns. Also, an increasing rate of agreement on negative investor sentiment before 
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 earnings announcements forecasts negative earnings surprises. Both findings support the infor-
mation hypothesis that negative internet message board postings contain value-relevant infor-
mation. The question whether social media activity induces market volatility remains ambigu-
ous. The Granger-tests and the reactions of the impulse-response functions show a bilateral 
relationship between return volatility and the number of internet message board postings. How-
ever, we find in this context that individual investors react more sensitive to market volatility 
on social media than the other way around. In summary, the results of the first empirical work 
provide evidence for the economic significance of investor sentiment measured on social media 
and its asymmetric role in capital markets. 
We extend the empirical analysis in the fourth chapter of this dissertation and investigate the 
impact of traditional and social media on target price run-ups before bid announcements. The 
literature previously documented an increase in the target stock price two months prior to the 
official bid announcement (e.g., Keown and Pinkerton, 1981). This phenomenon is also re-
ferred to as the target run-up. One group of researchers find explanations within the insider 
hypothesis (leakage of insider information prior to the bid announcement). Another group ar-
gues based on the market expectation hypothesis (the market anticipates publicly available in-
formation to predict upcoming mergers). Our second empirical work considers 2,765 bid an-
nouncements in Australia between January 2008 and August 2015. We use more than 15 thou-
sand news articles, more than 80 thousand posts on the internet message board HotCopper, 
analyst recommendations, and Google search queries to analyze their relationship with target 
run-ups before official bid announcements. Thus, we specifically examine the varying impact 
of investor attention of different investor groups (institutional and individual investors) on tar-
get run-ups. 
The results let us conclude that target run-ups of smaller, unprofitable, and growth firms are 
significantly related with social media coverage on HotCopper. On the contrary, similar firms 
that lack media coverage do not experience a significant target run-up prior to a bid announce-
ment. Target run-ups of larger capitalization stocks are, on the other hand, more sensitive to 
analyst recommendations. The results are consistent with the anecdotal evidence that smaller 
firms are usually less covered by analysts. Social media closes the information gap for small 
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 firms in this perspective. Google search inquiries for target firms are not found to be signifi-
cantly related to target run-ups. The overall findings of the second empirical work support the 
market expectation hypothesis. In this regard, social media contributes to the increase of market 
efficiency and partially closes informational blind spots for smaller firms which might exist 
due to inefficient allocations of resources or costly information sourcing for smaller firms. 
The fifth chapter comprises the last empirical work of this dissertation and explores the rela-
tionship between media press sentiment and capital markets. We specifically examine the im-
pact of aggregated news sentiment indices on the cross-section of returns in the asset pricing 
context. The literature around asset pricing especially focuses on the determination of risk 
premia that help to explain stock returns. A central question of our third empirical work is, 
therefore, whether stock returns are associated with their underlying risk or whether these re-
turns are just a result of irrational market movements in the spirit of the behavioral finance 
theory. We calculate monthly aggregated news sentiment indices based on more than 120 mil-
lion unique classified news articles from the Ravenpack News Analytics database between 
2000 and 2017. Thus, we construct monthly zero-investment portfolios that go long on (sell) 
stocks which exhibit on average positive (negative) news sentiment in the previous month. The 
portfolio yields an annual return of 7.5% even if we control for widely-accepted risk factors, 
such as market, size, momentum, liquidity, profitability, and investments. The results are 
mainly driven by positive news sentiment. Hence, we refer this premium to the “premium on 
optimism”. One possible explanation could be the persistent positive news coverage in the re-
spective time period. The probability of the publication of good news is in particularly higher 
if a firm experienced positive news in the prior months. The total results of our third empirical 
work support the view that news sentiment reflects a risk factor. 
The overall results of this dissertation have several implications for firms, investors, regula-
tors and researchers in the field of behavioral finance. Firms must learn today to early anticipate 
crowd movements on (social) media and to deal with putatively fake news. The investor rela-
tions department of a firm must engage in this topic more sophistically content-wise and in the 
communicative interaction with its stakeholders. Selective communication strategies for spe-
cific firm events are required to early prevent a potentially negative public perception of the 
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 firm. Fake news and volatile markets are also gaining in importance for regulators. The identi-
fication of manipulative activities or the stabilization of financial markets in the presence of 
ambiguous information is of special interest for regulators. This task is even more relevant in 
the time of increased digitalization of media channels and the networks behind them. The more 
important is, hence, a better understanding of the stakeholders in financial markets and their 
actions for the functionality of efficient markets. Finally, the results of this dissertation create 
new connection points for future research. The asymmetric role of investor sentiment and its 
underlying mechanism are still controversial and elusive. Current studies especially fail to shed 
light on the long-term impact of investor sentiment on capital markets. This dissertation, hence, 
provides a substantiated baseline for future empirical work. Also, this work could not fully 
answer the question in which situation investors specifically use different media channels for 
information sourcing and dissemination. An intraday-based analysis on various media channels 
could provide new answers to this question.  
In summary, this dissertation shows that investor sentiment is an integral part of today’s fi-
nancial markets and its important role cannot be anymore neglected by advocates of the tradi-
tional finance theory. 
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Investor Sentiment and Attention  
in Capital Markets  
 A (Social) Media Perspective 
1. Introduction 
This dissertation aims to shed light on the elusive link between the traditional finance theory 
on efficient markets and well-documented market anomalies, such as stock price over- and 
underreaction to news signals, propagated by advocates of behavioral finance. In this disserta-
tion, behavioral finance theory complements the traditional perspective in which the market 
processes information quickly and efficiently. As financial research comprehensively examines 
theories and concepts about return patterns, risk-adjusted asset pricing models, and market 
anomalies, no behavioral research stream could definitely claim to explain the variances of 
future returns unambiguously. 
Within the connection of efficient market theories and the concept of behavioral finance, this 
dissertation mainly attempts to address three distinctive goals in different empirical setups. 
First, we evaluate how investor sentiment disseminated on internet message boards convey 
value-relevant or noisy information in financial markets. By extending existing literature but 
also applying new approaches and broader test samples, we test the informativeness of the 
crowd in a dynamic digital environment. Second, we empirically evaluate whether media at-
tention of financial investors is related to wealth effects associated with merger and acquisition 
announcements (M&A or bid announcements forth on). The combination of distinctive media 
channels (incl. traditional media press, social media and internet search queries) allows us to 
differentiate the impact of attention spent by different investor types, such as (un-)sophisticated 
individual and institutional investors, on financial market activity.  
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Third, we extend the traditional asset pricing theory by behavioral elements and introduce a 
news sentiment measure for investor sentiment, which presumably captures a behavioral risk- 
factor in the theory of capital asset pricing.1 In this connection, prior literature mainly relied on 
investor sentiment proxies, constructed from market output variables due to only limited pos-
sibilities to directly measure investor sentiment in a real-time setting. Hence, the application of 
self-disclosed and extracted investor sentiment from social media platforms and media press 
releases enables us to analyze direct measures of investor sentiment and its relation to financial 
markets. The previously mentioned goals of this dissertation follow four specific research ques-
tions, which are all somehow addressed throughout the dissertation:  
1. What role does investor sentiment play in financial markets? Do investors solely follow 
the market or do beliefs of investors predict future returns or other market variables? 
2. How does (social) media relate to financial markets in the general daily context and 
specifically around news events, such as earnings or M&A announcements? 
3. What kind of firms are more sensitive to investor sentiment than others? 
4. Does arbitrage stabilize financial markets against noise traders? 
These are only a few but the most important questions this dissertation aims to answer.  
 
The basic foundation of the traditional finance literature had been established in the 1950s 
and 1960s with the seminal work on portfolio theory by Markowitz (1952) and pioneering, 
theoretical models on asset pricing (e.g., Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965). In all these theories, the 
access to information is elementary for the functionality of efficient markets (Fama, 1970). The 
general efficient market theory asserts that available information about an asset is quickly 
processed by financial markets and thus reflected in its returns. However, the availability and 
accessibility to new (it is the question whether this information is found to be exact) infor-
mation have changed rapidly with new technologies and the digitalization of the media. For 
example, Figure 1-1 demonstrates meticulously, how traditional and especially printed news-
paper circulation diminished dramatically in the United States with the rise of the internet. 
                                                 
1 Traditional asset pricing models refer, for example, to risk premiums associated with market risks, size effects 
(smaller firms generate higher returns compared to larger firms), or valuation effects (value stocks experience 
higher returns than growth firms). See Fama and French (1993). 
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This figure describes the total circulation (print and digital) of US newspapers in week- and 
Sundays. The data only includes newspapers that report numbers to the Alliance for Audited 
Media (AAM). Source: http://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/newspapers/   
 
In 2017, only 31 to 34 million US newspapers were circulated daily compared to the peak of 
around 63 million in the 1970’s. On the other hand, digital coverage of US newspapers gauged 
from 8 to nearly 12 million unique daily visitors only in the period between 2014 and 2017 as 
shown in Figure 1-2. This corresponds to an increase of more than 40% of monthly unique 
visitors of US newspaper websites and should not only reflect a local but global development. 
As a consequence, the mechanisms of information dissemination not only changed for the 
broader population but also for a distinctive group of interest for this dissertation: the financial 
investors. 
Nowadays, individual but also institutional investors gather information from internet search 
queries, have easier online access to financial databases, and exchange investment opinions or 
results on financial analysis on online investment platforms. Figure 1-3 depicts the global de-
velopment of general social media users between 2010 and 2021. During this period, it is 
expected that the number of social media users will triple from 1 to 3 billion users worldwide, 
yielding an annual compounded growth rate of 11%. This trend not only reflects the general 
dynamics of social interaction but also points to the conclusion that financial markets are also 
affected by the connectivity of its users. To further underpin the importance of social media in 
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This figure presents the average monthly unique visitors for the top 49 US newspapers between 
2014 and 2017. The average is based on the period between October and December. Source: 
http://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/newspapers/   
 
financial markets, we show the number of US people using online investing or stock trading 
services in Figure 1-4. Starting from 11.6 million people in the US in spring 2008, the number 
increased by almost 50% to 15.8 million in summer 2017, corresponding to a compound annual 
growth rate of 3%. Another global example of the increasing number of financial investors 
entering financial, social media platforms is shown in Figure 1-5. HotCopper is one of the 
leading financial internet message boards embedded in the highly regulated financial market 
of Australia. Internet board discussions on stocks, derivates or foreign exchanges regionally 
focus on Australia but also cover international markets. HotCopper was able to triple its unique 
monthly visitor number from 200 to nearly 600 thousand between June 2014 and July 2016. 
We will further explain the relationship of internet message board activities this board and the 
Australian financial market in section 3. Another trend, which we mentioned earlier, is the 
facilitated access to information in particular for individual (or retail) investors. Internet search 
engines enable its users to quickly and efficiently find information within a short amount of 
time. In 2012, Google recorded more than 1.2 trillion internet search queries on the global level 
(see Figure 1-6). All the presented numbers comprehensively underline the increasing im-
portance of (social) media and internet trends and its sustainable impact on financial markets.   
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Figure 1-2. Unique Visitors of US Newspaper Websites 
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The figure depicts the number of worldwide social media users between 2010 and 2021 with 
projections starting in 2017. Internet users who access a social media site at least once a month 
are considered for this statistic. Source: Worldwide, eMarketer on https://www.sta-
tista.com/statistics/278414/number-of-worldwide-social-network-users/ 
 
 
This figure describes the number of people living in US households who used an online invest-
ing/stock trading service in the last 12 months in the period between 2008 and 2017 (S=Spring, 
A=Autumn). Source: Nielsen Scarborough on https://www.statista.com/statistics/228118/peo-
ple-in-households-with-an-online-investing-stock-trading-service-usa/  
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This figure illustrates the number of monthly unique visitors of the website HotCopper. 
Source: http://www.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20160913/pdf/43b4y2tn62t46v.pdf 
Consequently, it is the goal of this dissertation to provide insights on investor sentiment and 
attention deducted from media and internet channels and its relation to financial market activ-
ities. Our results offer a variety of implications for financial practitioners, researchers, and reg-
ulators regarding the relevance of information disseminated via social media platforms and 
news media. We summarize our main contributions and findings of the dissertation in the fol-
lowing structure: 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of traditional finance theories and creates a link to the con-
cepts of behavioral finance. To do so, chapter 2 comprehensively describes the basic ideas of 
the efficient market theory, the noise trading theory on irrational and informed market partici-
pants, and psychological concepts in finance, which together help explaining well-documented 
market anomalies, such as stock price overreaction (e.g., De Bondt and Thaler, 1985) and return 
momentum (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993).  
Chapter 3 examines the informativeness of positive and negative investor sentiment expressed 
on the Australian internet investment platform HotCopper. Several studies are discordant, 
whether investor sentiment on social media platforms are related to capital market activities 
(stock returns, trading volume, volatility). 
Figure 1-5. Unique Monthly HotCopper Users   
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This figure depicts the number of Google search inquiries per year. Source: http://www.inter-
netlivestats.com/google-search-statistics/ 
Since prior literature claim that either online investor sentiment provides no predictive power 
(Antweiler and Frank, 2004) or that only negative sentiment has the power to explain stock 
returns in the future (Chen et al., 2014), we demonstrate in our work that positive sentiment 
leads to overreaction in the short-term. However, short selling activity of informed traders 
partly mitigates overreaction. Then again, negative investor sentiment seems to convey value-
relevant information. Also, we provide evidence that internet message boards possess predic-
tive power before earnings announcements and thus convey fundamental information. We 
demonstrate that the divergence (convergence) of opinions predict lower (higher) earnings sur-
prises at the date of the earnings announcement.  
In chapter 4, we evaluate how investor attention, directly measured as the coverage of tradi-
tional news media, internet social media, and internet search queries, affect the well-docu-
mented phenomenon of target price run-ups before bid announcements. Controlling for the 
attention of (un-)sophisticated individual and institutional investors, our results show that ded-
icated internet investment platforms contribute to identifying run-ups of small enterprise M&A 
targets. The fundamental characteristics of these firms covered only in internet message boards 
do not economic meaningfully differ from other small firms (market capitalization, market-to-
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book, EPS, equity ratio, EBITDA) that receive no (social) media attention. Contrarily, analyst 
recommendations primarily influence investment decisions from institutional investors who 
usually cover large stocks. Altogether, the results are consistent with the market expectation 
hypothesis around M&A announcements.  
Chapter 5 completes the third empirical analysis of the dissertation and explores the relation-
ship between news sentiment and cross-sectional returns. More specifically, we examine the 
media tone of more than 120 million unique US news stories between 2000 and 2017 and its 
relation to the cross-section of stock returns. Our results provide evidence that an equally-
weighted long-short portfolio of stocks sorted by the tone of the news media coverage (in other 
words news sentiment) earn significant returns of 7.5% per year even after controlling for mar-
ket, size, book-to-market, momentum, liquidity, profitability, and investment factors. Separat-
ing the effect of positive and negative media tones reveals that results are mainly driven by 
positive media tone which we refer to as a “premium on optimism.” 
The last chapter 6 concludes the empirical findings of this dissertation and summarizes the 
main findings and implications for researchers and practitioners who deal with the topic of 
investor sentiment and attention in financial markets. 
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2. From Traditional Finance Theories to Behavioral Finance 
The traditional (neoclassical) finance theory rests on the efficiency of capital markets and 
leaves no room for irrational explanations of stock movements associated with investor senti-
ment (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2006) or noise driven transactions (e.g., De Long et al., 1990). 
Both concepts are referred to as non-informational and thus irrational. However, critiques on 
the efficient market perspective increased with the gauging number of observed market anom-
alies which could not be explained rationally. For example, the overreaction of stock returns 
(e.g., De Bondt and Thaler, 1985) refers to positive short- but negative long-term autocorrela-
tion of stock returns, resulting in non-rational return reversals after immediate price reactions. 
It is noticeable at this point that there exists no uniform or comprehensive theory which jointly 
explains all aspects and market anomalies observed by advocates of behavioral finance.  
Hence, we summarize the different behavioral research streams and concepts in Figure 2-1. 
In this dissertation, explanations for the occurrence of market anomalies are mainly categorized 
into three concepts or approaches: 1) Behavioral Biases, 2) Investor Sentiment and 3) Noise 
Trading.2   
 
 
                                                 
2 The sequence of the three theories should not reflect the order of importance. 
Neoclassical
Finance Theory
Efficient markets Behavioral Biases: 
Beliefs & Preferences
Investor
Sentiment
Noise Trading
Market
Anomalies
• Portfolio Theory (Markowitz, 1952)
•Capital Structure and Cost of Capital 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1958/1963)
•CAPM (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965)
• Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 
1965/1970)
•Option Pricing (Black & Scholes, 1976)
• 3-Factor-Model (Fama & French 1993)
• Limits of Arbitrage
•Conservatism (Edwards, 1968)
• Availability, Anchoring, 
Representativeness (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1974)
• Prospect Theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979)
• Loss Aversion and Endowment
Effect (Kahneman et al., 1990)
•Disposition Effect (Odean, 1998)
• A Model of Investor Sentiment 
(Barberis et al., 1998)
• Retail Sentiment and 
Comovements (Kumar & Lee, 
2006)
• Baker & Wurgler Sentiment 
Index (Baker & Wurgler, 
2006/07)
•Overreaction and 
Underreaction (De Bondt
and Thaler, 1985; Daniel 
et al., 1998; Hong & 
Stein, 1999)
•Momemtum effect
(Jegadeesh & Titman, 
1993)
• Selling Winners to Quickly
and Holding Losers to
Long (Shefrin & Statman, 
1985)
•Noise in Eifficient Markets (Black,1986)
•Noise Risk Factor (De Long et al., 1990)
Behavioral 
Finance
Ch. 2.1 – 2.3 Ch. 2.4.2 Ch. 2.6
Ch. 2.5 Ch. 2.4.3
Figure 2-1. Overview of Theoretical Components of Behavioral Finance 
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Some researchers perceive the behavioral finance view as a short-term phenomenon. Early 
on, Graham (1965) shared the view that stock markets act like voting systems in the short-term 
but become a weighting system in the long-term. In this connection, the fundamental value of 
a firm should hold in the long run and overcome short-term behavioral shocks (Malkiel, 2003). 
It is consequently a goal of this dissertation to provide further clarity on the short- and long-
term role of behavioral finance in capital markets. We provide details and implications on the 
underlying theories and concepts of traditional and behavioral finance in the following sections 
to set the theoretical foundation for later analysis and discussions in this dissertation. 
 Traditional Finance Theory and Efficient Markets  
In the early 1950’s, Markowitz (1952) set the foundation for the traditional finance theories 
with his seminal work on portfolio selection and the interaction of expected returns and asso-
ciated risks. Modigliani and Miller (1958) further extended the basic foundation by providing 
theoretical evidence on the independence of a firm’s capital structure from its capital costs. The 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), mostly attributed to Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), 
combines both cornerstones of traditional finance theory and sets a framework on the 
relationship between risk, capital structure and expected stock returns. Even until now, the 
widespread research on asset pricing and the associated explanation of cross-sectional return 
patterns uses the CAPM as the starting point of the so-called risk-factor models. 
The random walk theory propagated by Fama (1965) dissents the assumption that informed 
investors might exploit return patterns. In this context, price changes today are random devia-
tions from previous prices and therefore independent. Furthermore, Fama (1970) formulates, 
according to the random walk assumption, the efficient market hypotheses in which stock 
prices reflect all available information so that price changes are unpredictable, similar to the 
information content (such as news or company announcements) itself (Malkiel, 2003). In an 
efficient market, security prices accurately provide information on a firm’s resource allocation, 
firms can make decisions on production and investments, and investors can arbitrarily choose 
between stakes of firm ownership in the form of securities (Fama, 1970). The efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH) formally tests three different states of market anticipation of information. 
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First, the weak form posits that information incorporated into security prices only reflect his-
torical prices. In the second form, the semi-strong form tests how capital markets process pub-
licly available information (e.g., earnings announcements). Lastly, the strong-form tests 
whether investors possess unique access to information that is not available to another group 
of investors (Fama, 1970). 
  Also, Fama (1970) states three sufficient conditions that help capital markets to adjust to 
new information efficiently. An ideally frictionless market does not contain transaction costs 
for securities, public information is freely available to all market participants, and there is a 
collective agreement on the implications of new information for future return adjustments. For 
an efficient market, it is not necessary that these conditions are all fulfilled as long as investors 
consistently and rationally outperform irrational investors. For example, disagreement amongst 
investors does not necessarily imply market inefficiency as long as one group of investors can 
consistently make better investment decisions based on available information. Transaction 
costs, information that is only limited to a selected group of investors, and disagreement among 
investors are thus no reasons for market inefficiency but potential sources for market ineffi-
ciency (Fama, 1970).  All of these three sources of market inefficiency exist in the real world 
and are hence subject to many empirical tests on market efficiency. 
Shleifer (2000) discusses EMH from the perspective of rationality. According to him, in an 
efficient market, investors act rationally and hence securities should be valued rationally. Irra-
tional investors who trade on non-informational news or events may exist, but their trades are 
somewhat random and cancel each other, not affecting security prices in the end. Furthermore, 
irrational investors are met by rational arbitrageurs who trade on superior information and thus 
eliminate non-informational trades which might affect security prices.  
In another groundbreaking work by Black and Scholes (1972), the authors examine whether 
buying undervalued and selling overvalued price contracts (options) with all available infor-
mation would result in excess returns according to an efficient market.3 They find that the 
options market seems not to be efficient. However, transaction costs hinder traders to exploit 
the mispricing in options markets.  
                                                 
3 The option contract gives the right to buy or sell another asset at a pre-determined price within a specific period 
of time (Black and Scholes, 1972).   
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Empirical tests on the semi-strong form of market efficiency gained in popularity with so-
called event studies, as propagated by Fama et al. (1969). The methodology in particular tests 
how stock returns react to given news events and if stock prices quickly and correctly adjust 
over a period. Such events might, for example, include corporate news announcements, takeo-
ver announcements or stock splits. The term quickly mainly refers to the fact that stale news 
read by investors do not move stock prices and traders could not exploit this kind of infor-
mation. The resulting price changes should on average reflect the fundamental value of the 
news. There should be no under- or overreaction of stock returns to specific news stories. As a 
consequence, stock prices should not react to non-informational news (Fama et al., 1969).  
In summary, the efficient market hypothesis constitutes the quick and exact reflection of se-
curity prices to fundamental information and the non-reaction to noise (Shleifer, 2000). The 
next section describes in more detail the market mechanism of supply and demand for rational 
investors in efficient markets. The better understanding of market mechanisms in financial 
markets provides the foundation for discussions on deviations of rational market behavior and 
hence creates the link to trading patterns observed in the behavioral finance literature. 
 Market Demand and Arbitrage of Rational Investors  
The demand and supply of investors determine security prices. In the controversy discussion 
on traditional and behavioral finance theories, the literature offers numerous distinctions of 
investor groups. For example, Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) describe two general types of 
investors, arbitrageurs, and non-arbitrageurs, who differ in two main dimensions. First, arbi-
trageurs have homogeneous and accurate beliefs about the fundamental value of an asset in the 
long-term, whereas non-arbitrageurs on average disagree in their beliefs on the fundamental 
value. Second, arbitrageurs invest in arbitrage portfolios, which require no upfront capital. This 
portfolio is also commonly known as a zero-net-investment portfolio.  
Black (1986) offers another distinction from the informational perspective. He divides inves-
tor groups into information and noise traders. The former group bases their trading decisions 
on fundamental information about an asset, considering the fact that information traders cannot 
be sure if their information is noisy (non-informational) or correct. Noise traders, on the other 
hand, trade even though objectively their action might be considered as irrational. They might 
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mistakenly evaluate their noisy information as fundamental, or they just want to trade. Further-
more, Shleifer (2000) refers irrational to unsophisticated investors and denominates rational 
traders as smart investors. 
Altogether, most categorizations of investor groups have in common that one group profits 
from informational advantages since information asymmetry and disagreement amongst inves-
tors exist even in efficient markets. The efficient market theory described in the previous 
section relies on the informed group of investors who drive asset prices to its fundamental 
value. To make use of the informational advantage, informed investors can fall back to a finan-
cial instrument, called arbitrage. Sharpe and Alexander (1990) define arbitrage as the purchase 
and sale of a similar security at the same time in different markets. In this connection, the 
arbitrageur generates profits from different prices for the essentially similar security in different 
markets. Since efficient markets, in the end, must fulfill the law one price, arbitrage is 
commonly seen as one of the central elements to enforce the law of one price. Assets of similar 
risks must, therefore, yield similar expected rates of returns. Hence, over- or undervaluation of 
assets create profit opportunities and investors would arbitrage on these opportunities (Scholes, 
1972). In its basic theory, arbitrage only exists in perfect capital markets, is risk-free and re-
quires no upfront capital. In reality, however, market frictions induce costs related to arbitrage 
and create risks (Mitchell et al., 2002). We discuss these limitations at a later stage in this 
dissertation. 
In the following, we describe the general market mechanisms of supply and demand for cap-
ital markets and the impact of arbitrage on security prices in the market equilibrium. This 
theoretic foundation on how security prices settle in the equilibrium is necessary to create the 
link to behavioral finance, where security mispricing deviate from the traditional understanding 
of finance theory. 
 Miller (1977) describes the price mechanism of financial markets in a simple two-period 
model. According to Miller (1977), investors strive to maximize the net present value of their 
investment and decide to invest if the expected returns of the investment exceed the returns of 
a risk-free one-year government bond. Given the risk of an investment, investors have 
heterogeneous beliefs on the expected returns of the investment. The curve ABC plotted in 
Figure 2-2 depicts the cumulative distribution of the number of investors with different beliefs  
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The figure describes the cumulative distribution of the quantitative number of investors with 
beliefs above a certain value for the proceeds from their investments. Alternatively, one can 
interpret the figure as the number of shares investors are willing to hold given a security price. 
Curve ABC describes the base scenario for the demand curve. A greater (lower) divergence in 
investor opinion results in replacement of the curve ABC to FBJ (DBE) (Miller, 1977, p. 1152). 
 
in the value of the investment’s proceeds. It is evident that N investors with the highest 
evaluations (beliefs) will own the shares at price R if investors are only able to buy one single 
share from the total universe of N shares. If the selling price would fall below R, then more 
than N investors would be interested in the stock and thus bid up the price back to R. In the 
case that the selling price exceeds R, less investors would be interested in the seemingly 
overvalued security and seek to sell the security, driving prices downwards to R. The curve 
ABC, thus, reflects the demand curve for the security. The vertical line depicts the supply curve 
and is defined by the number of available shares. The intersection of the demand and supply 
Number of investors
E
st
im
at
e
o
f
v
al
u
e
N*N
R*
Figure 2-2. Price Distribution of a Security   
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curve determines the security price R. Holding the number of investors constant, a surge (de-
crease) of divergence in opinions increases (lowers) the market clearing price from R to Q (M). 
In the extreme case that all investors share the same opinion, the demand curve would result in 
a straight line GBH. In this situation, the market clearing price is equal to the average security 
price evaluation of all existing investors (Miller, 1977).4 
What implications does arbitrage have on the market clearing price? Short selling activity 
constitutes one particular case of arbitrage. Short sales allow investors to sell shares of stocks 
that they do not own by borrowing a stock from the owner and agreeing to the owner of the 
stock to compensate any dividends paid by this stock. The investor further commits himself to 
redeem the borrowed stock upon request and a predetermined date. The effect of short selling 
on the supply curve is comparable to the effect of money supply by banks. A bank borrows 
currencies and agrees to pay back the amount upon request. The bank simultaneously lends the 
currency to a third party. Hence, short sales increase the supply of stocks by the number of 
open short positions (Miller, 1977). Consequently, short sales move the vertical supply curve 
horizontally to N*, resulting in a lower market clearing price of R* as shown in Figure 2-2.  If 
arbitrageurs, in this case short sellers, possess access to perfect substitute securities and com-
pete against each other for profits, the price of a security should converge to its fundamental 
value in the long-term (Shleifer, 2000). Short sales only mitigate excessive speculation for 
price increases and are thus not beneficial for price declines. The market imperfection that 
investors cannot reinvest the proceeds from short sales (the proceeds are deposited with the 
lender of the stock or an associated broker as a security) prevent short sale activity to contribute 
in market efficiency if investors share different opinions on future expected returns on a 
security (Miller, 1977).  
Another implication of arbitrage is that irrational or noise traders diminish from the market 
in the long-term. If irrational investors purchase overpriced securities and sell undervalued se-
curities on average, then one must expect these group of investors to lose money in the long-
term. As a result, competitive selection and arbitrage trades banish irrational traders from cap-
ital markets in the long run (Shleifer, 2000). Without any doubt, arbitrage activity exists in real 
capital markets, but limitations seem to hinder arbitrage and thus the existence of perfectly 
                                                 
4 For more details, please refer to Miller (1977), p. 1152 ff. 
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efficient markets. One issue is that individual securities do not have perfect substitutes. Ac-
cordingly, arbitrageurs who trade on misevaluated securities and hedge the opposite position 
with non-sufficient substitutes bear the so-called “arbitrage risk” that both return profiles do 
not cancel each other out. Invalidating the hedging mechanism, an arbitrageur trades more pas-
sively in the presence of arbitrage risk (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002).   
It remains open to debate whether the exploitation of price differences can be linked to the 
existence of mispricing in inefficient markets (market anomalies) or whether resulting profits 
must be treated as a fair compensation for risk-bearing. Hence, exploiting return patterns is not 
itself evidence for market efficiency. Earning profits from such an investment strategy, there-
fore, might just be a result of risk-taking (Shleifer, 2000). One possibility to model a fair rela-
tionship between risk and return was established with the well-accepted Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM forth on), commonly ascribed to Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). However, 
measuring and modeling risk is up to now a controversy yielding hundreds of different risk 
factors. The vast number of risk factors enticed Cochrane (2011) to coin the famous term “fac-
tor zoo”.  
 Asset Pricing and Return Patterns 
Pricing mechanisms, arbitrage activity and few potential limitations of arbitrage5 in capital 
markets were explained in the previous section. This section of the dissertation, consequently, 
addresses basics of asset pricing theory and the drivers of well-known return patterns. 
2.3.1. Asset Pricing Theory 
The asset pricing theory aims to provide explanations for asset prices associated with uncer-
tainty. Consequently, implicitly high rates of return should follow low prices. More generally, 
the theory explains why certain assets earn more profits than others. In this context, the valua-
tion of assets must account for two dimensions: time effects and the risk of its underlying pay-
ments. At this juncture, the price of time is reflected by the pure interest rate, usually repre-
sented by the risk-free interest rate. The price of risk translates into the additional expected 
return per unit risk born (Sharpe, 1964).  
                                                 
5 Further details on limitations of arbitrage are explained in Section 2.4.1. 
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There are two competing views on the role of asset pricing: the normative and the positive. 
From the normative perspective, asset pricing theory determines the true value of an asset so 
that investors can determine which assets might be mispriced. This practically creates oppor-
tunities for the investor to trade and earn adequate risk-adjusted profits. The positive perspec-
tive, on the other hand, sees the world as it is so that asset prices are assumed to be accurate. 
Deviations of asset pricing models must, therefore, be erroneous so that corrections of the mod-
els need to be applied (Cochrane, 2001). The normative perspective has prevailed especially 
for practitioners since this view allows for derivations of asset pricing theory-based investment 
strategies.  
The beginning of asset pricing theory is most commonly credited to Sharpe (1964) and 
Lintner (1965) summarized with the Sharpe-Lintner-CAPM. As of now, the application of the 
CAPM is widely-spread, such as for the estimation of a firm’s cost of capital and the perfor-
mance evaluation of a managed portfolio. The CAPM signifies that a firm’s risk must be meas-
ured relative to an efficient market portfolio, which as a matter of principle must not only con-
sist of financial assets but also consumer durables or real estate (Fama and French, 2004). The 
CAPM builds upon the portfolio theory credited to Markowitz (1952). In his model of portfolio 
choice, the investor selects a “mean-variance-efficient” portfolio so that either the portfolio 1) 
minimizes the variance of the portfolio return at an expected return or 2) maximizes the ex-
pected return at a given variance (Markowitz, 1959). The Sharpe-Lintner-CAPM rests on two 
additional assumptions to the mean-variance-efficient portfolio selection. First, investors in a 
capital market fully agree on the statistical distribution of asset returns in the future. Secondly, 
investors have unrestricted opportunities to borrow or lend at a risk-free rate (Fama and French, 
2004). The Sharpe-Lintner-CAPM finally describes the linear relationship between an ex-
pected return and risks born by the security. Thus, an investor expecting high returns must, 
therefore, accept higher risks expressed as the volatility of a security. The CAPM can be 
formally expressed as follows: 
 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖) = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀(𝐸(𝑅𝑀) − 𝑅𝑓) (1) 
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where E(Ri) is the expected return for security i, Rf is the risk-free interest rate, E(RM) is the 
expected market return, and βi,M is the market beta of security i. The market beta of a security 
can be determined with the covariance of the return of security i divided by the variance of the 
market return as shown in the following equation: 
 
𝛽𝑖.𝑀 = 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖,𝑅𝑀)
𝜎𝑀
2  (2) 
 
Hence, the market beta measures the sensitivity of a security’s return to the variation in market 
returns. In other words, the market beta reflects the covariance risk of a security relative to the 
covariance risk of all securities of the market portfolio, which equals the variance of the market 
return. Referring back to the two dimensions of asset pricing, the price of time and risk, Rf, 
therefore, reflects the price of time whereas (E(RM) - Rf) denotes the price (or premium) per unit 
of market beta risk (Fama and French, 2004). 
The unrealistic assumption of free borrowing and lending in the CAPM prompted Black 
(1972) to develop an extended CAPM model with limitations on risk-free borrowing and lend-
ing. He further assumes unrestricted short selling opportunities for investors of risky assets and 
that the market portfolio results from the weighted portfolio chosen by each investor. The 
baseline of his results implies that his extended model only differs to the CAPM regarding the 
treatment of the risk-free rate. The Black-CAPM requires the risk-free rate to be smaller than 
the expected market return, which is necessary for a positive premium for the market beta. 
One of the major critiques on the CAPM is the empirically appropriate consideration of the 
market portfolio, which must not be limited to financial assets. Roll (1977) and Roll and Ross 
(1980) demonstrate the sensitivity of CAPM to financial securities but also all other individual 
assets. Roll and Ross (1980) formulate the following equation as the central conclusion of the 
so-called Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT): 
   
𝐸𝑖 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝛽𝑖,1 + ⋯+ 𝜆𝑘𝛽𝑖,𝑘    (3) 
 
where Ei is the expected return of asset i, λ0 is the return for a riskless asset and βi,j (j = 1, …, 
k) is the coefficient vector for the risk factor premium λj. Roll and Ross (1980) argue that fun-
damental economic variables, such as the Gross National Product, must be a component of 
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systematic risk and as such part of the model (3). However, the authors do not finally resolve 
the issue which economic variables must finally be included in such an asset pricing model to 
fully capture the systematic risk required to explain the expected returns of an asset. 
An enduring challenge of asset pricing models is to consistently explain returns independent 
from time regimes. The validity of asset pricing models is prone to price fluctuations in the 
short run. Some researcher argue that returns indeed can be deducted from past behavior. If 
historical prices repeat themselves in patterns, they also should occur in the future, contradict-
ing the random walk theory and the associated independence of successive price changes 
(Fama, 1965). Hence, one must differentiate between historical patterns which might predict 
future returns as propagated by behavioral finance theory or risk premiums which compensate 
the investor's risks born with the investment. The following section provides an overview of 
return patterns observed in the past which potentially contradict the understanding of the effi-
cient market hypothesis.   
2.3.2. Return Patterns 
2.3.2.1. Patterns Based on Valuation Parameters 
The empirical literature provided several indications that initial valuation parameters can pre-
dict future returns. Valuation ratios, such as dividend yields or price-earnings-ratios, are found 
to forecast future returns. In this connection, Fama and French (1988) and Campbell and Shiller 
(1988) formally conducted statistical tests whether dividend yields (ratio of dividends paid per 
stock to stock price) predict future returns. 
 
Dividend Yields 
 
Fama and French (1988) study the predictability of dividend yields for a New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) market portfolio for the period between one month and four years. In their 
study, only less than 5% of return variations could be explained by dividend yields in the period 
up to three months. However, dividend yields explain more than 25% of the return variances 
in the long run. In another study, Campbell and Shiller (1988) confirm the former results and 
find a higher explanatory power of dividend yields for returns in particular for the long run. 
Dividend yields explain a variation of returns of up to 27% in ten years. Both studies, therefore, 
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jointly find implications for the return predictability of dividend yields and hence a confutation 
of the efficient market hypothesis. 
 In a more common asset pricing test design, Malkiel (2003) presented double sorted decile-
based portfolios according to initial dividend yields and the following ten-year total returns of 
firms in the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index. He reports that investors earned higher future 
returns with purchasing portfolios of high dividend yield stocks and low returns with low div-
idend yield stocks. In his argumentation, the results do not refute the efficient market hypoth-
esis since high (low) dividend yields are correlated with high (low) interest rates. Hence, initial 
dividend yields might just reflect the general macroeconomic conditions in which firms oper-
ate. He asserts that the predictability of dividend yields diminished since the mid-1980s. In 
summary, the literature provides no consistent proof of the traditional nor the behavioral fi-
nance theory regarding the return predictability of dividend yields.    
 
Price-Earnings-Ratios 
 
Similar implications on return predictability were reported for price-earnings (P/E) ratios of 
US firms. Basu (1977) documents higher returns for stocks with lower P/E ratios even control-
ling for transactions costs and taxes. He concludes that security prices are biased and the P/E 
ratio is a proxy for this associated bias. Campbell and Shiller (1988) find that up to 40 percent 
of future return variation can be explained with initial P/E ratios. Consentaneously, Malkiel 
(2003) describes in his paper how stocks with low P/E ratios on average outperformed high 
P/E ratio stocks in a ten-year horizon. However, in the joint consideration of P/E ratio and 
dividend yield implications on return predictability become self-contradictory as argued by 
Malkiel (2003). The next ten-year market returns following years of higher P/E valuations but 
low dividend yields were remarkably high in the late 1980s averaging nearly 17 percent. How-
ever, similar valuations in the early 2000s yield lower future market returns together with 
higher fluctuations. The interpretation of return predictability must, therefore, be evaluated 
cautiously when considering the variety of relationships in time (Malkiel, 2003). 
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2.3.2.2. Patterns Based on Firm and Valuation Parameters 
Eventually, researchers document a flat relationship between returns and the systematic risk 
of market betas (Black and Scholes, 1972; Fama and MacBeth, 1973). This raises the question 
which factors really capture risk. Consequently, several prominent studies evaluated the valid-
ity of the capital asset pricing model and established two well-accepted risk factors known as 
the size effect and the valuation effect of book-to-market ratios. This section details the findings 
for these risk factors and summarizes the implications for the traditional and behavioral finance 
theory. 
 
Firm Size 
 
One of the most prominent effects researchers documented is the outperformance of small-
capitalization compared to large-capitalization stocks (Malkiel, 2003). As one of the first re-
searcher, Banz (1981) investigated the size effect between the period of 1936 and 1975. In his 
study, stocks of small firms earned on average higher risk-adjusted returns than stocks of large 
firms. Hence, he concludes a misspecification of the CAPM and yet cannot fully explain 
whether size itself reflects a risk factor or just serves as a proxy for another unknown risk 
factor. One possible explanation for the size effect is the lack of information available for 
smaller stocks. Thus, investors claim a compensation for an estimation risk on return distribu-
tions since only little information is available for smaller stocks (Klein and Bawa, 1977). In 
another study, Keim (1983) provides further empirical evidence on the validity of the size ef-
fect. He reports consistent negative correlations between abnormal returns and size in the pe-
riod between 1963 and 1979. However, nearly fifty percent of the premium can be attributed 
to a seasonal effect in January. Following the most prominent asset pricing test setting, Fama 
and French (1993) sorted stocks according to market capitalization and returns into deciles with 
a broader dataset between 1963 and 1990. Decile-portfolios constructed for smaller stocks gen-
erate on average higher monthly returns compared to larger stock portfolios. In this connection, 
the critical question is the extent to which higher returns of small stocks are related to return 
patterns that create opportunities for investors to earn excess risk-adjusted returns. If the capital 
asset pricing model accurately captures the total systematic risk of a stocks market beta, then 
the additional size effect might be referred to a market anomaly embedded in an inefficient 
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capital market (Malkiel, 2003). Furthermore, double-sorted portfolios by market betas and mar-
ket capitalization imply resilient size effects but flat market betas. As a consequence, Fama and 
French (1993) argue that size may better capture systematic risk than market betas, and their 
findings are consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. Possible concerns on the validity 
of the size effect are, for example, addressed by the survivorship bias, which neglects the per-
formance of smaller firms that went bankrupt. Researchers would, thus, only measure the re-
turns of firms that survive (Malkiel, 2003). Altogether, it remains discussable in the literature 
whether size may serve as a proxy for risk or explains returns in excess to risk-adjusted expec-
tations consonant to the behavioral finance theory.        
 
Value Stocks and Growth Stocks 
 
Another popular pattern discussed in the literature is the above average performance of stocks 
with higher book-to-market ratios also coined with the term “value” or “value stocks”. The 
associated overpayment of “growth stocks” (stocks with lower book-to-market ratios), there-
fore, results in lower future returns by the view of behaviorists (Malkiel, 2003). The positive 
relationship between average returns of US stocks and the ratio of book-to-market were 
documented by Stattman (1980) and Rosenberg et al. (1985). In addition to the market risk and 
size effect, Fama and French (1993) created the well-established Fama-French three-factor 
model in which the market premium, size and book-to-market ratio jointly measure the extent 
of systematic risk. Seeking further evidence on the validity of the three-factor model, Fama 
and French (1998) extended their empirical tests from the US to a global study and find con-
firmation on the universal explanatory power of their model.  
As a whole, many findings in the literature question the validity of the standard capital asset 
pricing model in its purest form. The general implications, however, do not allow to finally 
draw the conclusion on market inefficiency but intensify discussions on the role of risk and 
excessive risk-adjusted returns within historical return patterns. It is indisputable that the 
mispricing of securities does occur in reality even if only in the short-term. The next sections 
provide theoretical explanations (market frictions and psychological approaches) for the oc-
currence of mispricing independent from the question if capital markets are efficient in the long 
run.      
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 The Transition to Behavioral Finance 
As Shleifer (2000) pointed out, “At the most general level, behavioral finance is the study of 
human fallibility in competitive markets” (Shleifer, 2000, p. 23). This theory not only acknowl-
edges the existence of irrational, confused, or biased investors in capital markets. Beyond that, 
the theory describes the ubiquitous interaction of those and rational investors in a complex 
financial market setting. Behavioral finance, therefore, investigates the outcome of such inter-
actions on asset prices or other financial market-related performance dimensions, such as return 
volatility (Shleifer, 2000).   
Asset price deviation from the fundamental value, in fact, exist as a result of market imper-
fections. Two commonly named foundations of behavioral finance theory, and thus the expla-
nations for deviations of asset prices from fundamentals, are 1) limited arbitrage and 2) the 
concept of investor sentiment (Shleifer, 2000). Non-perfect substitutes, direct and indirect costs 
of arbitrage, time and capital restrictions of rational investors, or portfolio specialization are 
widely discussed reasons for limited arbitrage activity. De Long et al. (1990) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) moreover theoretically attribute limitations on arbitrage to the basic concept of 
the noise trading theory. They argue within a theoretical framework that noise trader risks pre-
vent rational arbitrageurs from trading against mispriced positions and thus converging asset 
prices to fundamental values.   
Closely linked to the former theories is the concept of investor sentiment or in other words 
the concept on how investors form their beliefs in future asset prices (Barberis et al., 1998; 
Shleifer, 2000). More specifically, Baker and Wurgler (2006) define investor sentiment as ei-
ther the propensity to speculate or investor optimism/pessimism about stocks in the general 
context. The behavioral finance theory relies on both dimensions to explain the mispricing of 
assets. In financial markets with unlimited arbitrage, informed investors could quickly coun-
teract noise traders and cause otherwise unjustified prices to converge to their fundamental 
values. With the absence of investor sentiment, arbitrageurs would ascertain the efficiency of 
financial markets. In combination, both theories of limited arbitrage and investor sentiment 
enable researchers to forecast future stock returns (Shleifer, 2000).  We further describe the 
above-mentioned foundations of behavioral finance theory in more detail in the next sub-sec-
tions.  
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2.4.1. Limitations on Arbitrage in Imperfect Markets 
According to the efficient market hypothesis arbitrage against mispricing does not require 
capital upfront and entails no risk (Shleifer, 2000). In a perfectly competitive market, each 
arbitrageur might take an infinitesimal small position against the mispricing and pushes prices 
towards the fundamental value. Capital constraints, therefore, do not exist for such small arbi-
trage positions and arbitrageurs would be risk-neutral (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
The real world, however, looks different. Capital constraints cause arbitrageurs to act risk-
averse, and arbitrage trades are as a matter of fact risky. In a seminal work on limitations of 
arbitrage, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) formalized a theoretical model on limited arbitrage con-
sisting of three time periods and three market participants: irrational noise traders, rational ar-
bitrageurs, and rational investors who allocate their funds to arbitrageurs. In this model, arbi-
trageurs are specialized in trading only whereas investors do not trade on their own but delegate 
portfolio management decisions to arbitrageurs. As of now, noise traders are associated with 
non-informational transactions.6 A misperception of noise traders causes prices to deviate from 
the fundamental value of an asset. Arbitrageurs, on the other hand, are aware of the true fun-
damental value of the asset. The valuation of arbitrageurs and noise traders converge in time 
period 3, assuming that there is no fundamental risk in the long run. The model asserts that 
arbitrageurs aim to maximize their profits (which in this model equals the total funds in time 
period 3) according to the following statement: 
 
𝐸𝑊 = (1 − 𝑞) {𝛼 (
𝐷1 ∗ 𝑉
𝑝1
+ 𝐹1 − 𝐷1) + (1 − 𝛼)𝐹1} +  𝑞 (
𝑉
𝑝2
)
∗ {𝛼 (
𝐷1 ∗ 𝑝2
𝑝1
+ 𝐹1 − 𝐷1) + (1 − 𝛼)𝐹1}       
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝛼 ≥ 1 (4) 
 
where EW denotes the arbitrageur’s third period funds, q is the probability that the noise 
trader’s misperception intensifies in period 2, D1 is the investment value of arbitrageurs in an 
asset in t = 1, V is the fundamental value of the asset, pt is the price of the asset at time t, Ft is 
the limited cumulative amount under management for the arbitrageurs, and α describes the 
sensitivity of assets under management against historical performances. If arbitrageurs lose 
                                                 
6 Details on noise trader theory follow in the next section. 
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money on their positions, investors will not provide more funds and α takes the value of 1. α is 
greater than 1 if investors withdraw money as a consequence of poor historical performances. 
An important assumption is, hence, the allocation of funds based on historical performances of 
arbitrageurs.    
The main implication of the model is that performance-based arbitrage, which is the sensitiv-
ity of investors to refuse/provide more capital or to even withdraw capital from the fund under 
management as a result of poor historical performances, causes inefficiencies in particular in 
extreme situations. This is the case when prices significantly deviate from its fundamentals and 
arbitrageurs are fully invested. Facing the risk of high short-term losses, arbitrageurs withdraw 
from the market when arbitrage would be most profitable. Arbitrageurs, thus, face limitations 
in the moment of their best opportunities.7 
  The former model on limited arbitrage includes dimensions such as the specialization of 
arbitrageurs and capital constraints as potential reasons for limited arbitrage. Furthermore, the 
literature offers several different reasons for limitations on arbitrage which potentially cause 
market inefficiencies. One explanation refers to the lack of perfect substitutes in the real world. 
A riskless hedge of assets requires perfect securities, implying a certainty that both, the relative 
prices of the underlying asset and the hedge, converge. Yet, imperfect markets are character-
ized by statistical likelihoods as opposed to certainty (Shleifer, 2000). Arbitrage costs are other 
prominent obstacles that deter arbitrage opportunities. Direct trading costs, for example, incur 
for short selling activity associated with arbitrage. To borrow a stock, the short seller must pay 
a fee to the stock lender or an intermediary. In addition, indirect costs incur if short positions 
are closed due to the recall of the stock by the lender. Furthermore, stock borrowers must post 
collaterals if the price of the shorted stock increases and payouts are due if brokers call out the 
margin-call.  Another indirect cost can be attributed to costs related to finding a stock lender in 
non-centralized shorting markets. Hence, arbitrage is costly and risky in an imperfect financial 
market (Jones and Lamont, 2002). Other reasons for limited arbitrage are found in the special-
                                                 
7 Please refer to Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 38 ff, for more details on the theoretical model. The authors describe 
in four distinctive propositions the implications of specific extreme situations on the ultimate arbitrageur’s goal 
to maximize the funds under management in period 3. 
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ization of arbitrageurs and time constraints. An arbitrageur’s portfolio might lack diversifica-
tion as a result of high specialization, which causes the arbitrageur to bear idiosyncratic risks. 
If prices further deviate from their fundamental value, then specialized arbitrageurs are not able 
to diversify that risk. Additionally, if prices deviate temporarily and arbitrageurs do not own 
enough capital to engage in further arbitrage trades, they are forced to close the position and 
realize losses (De Long et al., 1990; Shleifer and Summers, 1990 and Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Facing the losses reduces the willingness of the arbitrageur to invest additional amounts 
(Mitchell et al., 2002). Furthermore, institutional and cultural inhibitions could also potentially 
deter arbitrage since underlying guidelines might prohibit short selling or partly limit the extent 
of arbitrage activity (Jones and Lamont, 2002). 
The literature documents several implications of limited arbitrage for financial markets. For 
example, one might assume that high volatility in financial markets attract arbitrageurs because 
mispricing would frequently exist in such an environment. However, arbitrageurs rather avoid 
short positions in highly volatile financial markets in particular in the presence of high funda-
mental risks. If risk-adjusted excess returns (often called alpha) do not increase proportionally 
to the volatility, arbitrage becomes less attractive. In addition, higher volatility increases the 
likelihood of losses, which, given time and capital constraints, deters arbitrage for risk-averse 
arbitrageurs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Moreover, the literature argues that stocks with high 
short selling costs often tend to be smaller growth firms with higher market-to-book valuations 
(Jones and Lamont, 2002). This goes hand in hand with the view on overpriced stocks which 
tend to be owned by only a few optimistic investors. Arbitrageurs, or more specifically short 
sellers, avoid buying overvalued stocks (Miller, 1977). Based on their theoretical model, 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) conclude that the absence of trade is a bad signal for financial 
markets. In their argumentation, abnormal low trading activity may be a result of situations in 
which informed traders with bad news face short selling constraints and thus cannot trade based 
on their information. Engelberg et al. (2012), on the other hand, find evidence that short selling 
activity and advantages from such trades substantially result from an arbitrageur’s ability to 
analyze publicly available information. However, arbitrageurs rarely anticipate informative 
news events. The authors do not finally answer the question whether this weak anticipation 
results from limited arbitrage or other factors.  
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In summary, systematic and idiosyncratic risk matter both for professional arbitrageurs. Ar-
bitrageurs or informed investors are in reality often reflected by only a few highly specialized 
investors, refuting the view on a perfectly competitive market with homogenous views on asset 
prices. In imperfect markets, hedging is not costless and risk-free. The classical view on the 
positive correlation between risk and returns thus changes with limited arbitrage. The antago-
nists of arbitrageurs in financial markets are the so-called noise traders. They are mostly re-
ferred to the group of uninformed investors. The underlying noise trading theories and concepts 
are detailed in the next section.    
2.4.2. Noise Trading in Efficient and Inefficient Markets 
Noise trading induces a particular risk that, in addition to transaction costs or imperfect sub-
stitutes, deters arbitrage. The literature offers several definitions for noise or noise traders. In 
one of the fundamental work on noise, Black and Scholes (1972) interpret noise traders as 
investors who falsely trade on information which they believe is correct. Shleifer (2000), on 
the other hand, states that noise traders conduct transactions based on their erroneous beliefs 
on future distributions of returns on risky assets. Yet, most definitions have in common that 
noise traders are considered irrational and objectively uninformed. 
In one of the first theoretical studies on formal models of informed and uninformed trading, 
Grossman (1976) developed a pricing model which first included noise. In this model noise 
ultimately prevents informed traders to observe the true fundamental value of an asset. He 
concludes that a market equilibrium, where prices reflect all aggregated and available infor-
mation, might break down in the presence of noise. In another study, Black (1986) offers eco-
nomic reasonings for noise traders and their role in financial markets. In his argumentation, 
noise does exist in different dimensions. Noise provides substantial liquidity to a financial mar-
ket, but in interaction with arbitrageurs, prices would ultimately be pushed back to their fun-
damental value. Noise trading is in this perspective a complementary element in efficient mar-
kets and a foundation for liquidity in financial markets. 
Another view on noise is the risk perspective of noise. Mispricing resulting from noise trading 
might occur in the short-term but diminishes in the long run as long as informed traders exploit 
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the arbitrage opportunities. However, there is a risk for arbitrageurs that a noise trader’s mis-
perception persists or even increases before prices return to the mean. For example, if the noise 
trader’s optimism drives up prices, arbitrageurs should (short-)sell this asset, assuming that 
prices reverse in the future. Yet, there is a risk that noise traders become even more optimistic 
and push prices further away from its fundamentals. Fearing additional losses or receiving 
pressure from their investors, arbitrageurs liquidate their positions and realize losses. The fear 
of loss, hence, limits the original amount invested by risk-averse arbitrageurs. This risk of ad-
ditional losses is subsumed under the noise trading risk (De Long et al., 1990). 
In a constitutional work on noise trader risk, De Long et al. (1990) developed a theoretical 
model on asset prices as a function of exogenous variables, which in its purest form is stated 
as follows: 
 
𝑝𝑡 = 1 + 
𝜇(𝜌𝑡 − 𝜌
∗)
1 + 𝑟
+ 
𝜇𝜌∗
𝑟
− 
(2𝛾)𝜇2𝜎𝑝
2
𝑟(1 + 𝑟)2
                   (5) 
 
where pt is the asset price at time t, μ is the share of noise traders present in the model, r is the 
dividend of the asset, ρt is a random variable reflecting the misperceived expected price of the 
risky asset, ρ* is the measure of the average bullishness of the noise traders, γ is a coefficient 
describing the absolute risk-aversion of investors, and 𝜎𝑝
2 denotes the variance of the noise 
trader’s misperception of expected returns per unit of the risky asset.8 The model in its simplest 
form provides three main implications of noise trading for financial markets. First, a shift of 
noise trader’s opinions induces fluctuations of prices and hence volatility. Second, the average 
misperception of noise traders is unequal to zero. Deviations of beliefs by noise traders, there-
fore, cause a mispricing of assets. Lastly and the probably most important implication, noise 
trading creates risks. The uncertainty over the noise trader’s belief in the next period makes an 
otherwise riskless asset risky, drives prices down and increases future expected returns. In this 
connection, a total risk-aversion of zero would imply that investors do not sell their assets in 
case of overpricing. As a result, prices remain high and expected future returns are low (De 
Long et al., 1990).  
                                                 
8 Please refer to De Long et al. (1990), p. 707 ff, for details on the model. 
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Based on this model, noise trading creates risks. Hence, if the noise trader’s belief follows a 
random walk, then prices revert to the mean in the long run. An instationary process of noise 
trader’s beliefs, however, results in a persistent deviation of the asset price with continuous risk 
premiums for noise trading.  
Noise trading is commonly associated with transactions based on non-information. The be-
havioral perspective, therefore, argues that noise traders base their decisions on false or inac-
curate information (Black, 1986). Bloomfield et al. (2009) distinguish in their study between 
two types of noise traders. The first group are “liquidity traders” who’s trades are triggered by 
random liquidity shocks (for example, a fund’s investor requires liquidity for some unknown 
reasons and recalls funds without no economic reason). The second group consists of “unin-
formed traders” who trade despite having any advantageous information. We do not differen-
tiate between both groups and refer all non-informative trades to noise traders forth on. 
In summary, noise trading and its associated risk have several implications for financial mar-
kets. With the presence of noise traders, prices of assets are excessively volatile and not corre-
lated to the variance of its fundamentals. If asset prices react to noise temporarily, then asset 
prices should revert to the mean in the long run. Yet, a persistence in noise trader risk might 
force capital constrained investors to withdraw from the market. The expected mean reversion 
of asset prices additionally changes the logic to traditional investment strategies that propagate 
the buy-and-hold-strategy. The noise trading theory creates room for the so-called contrarian 
investment strategy, where the timing of investment decisions is essential. With this strategy, 
arbitrageurs invest in times when noise traders are bearish and reduce their exposure when 
noise traders are bullish (De Long et al., 1990). One can infer that bullishness is one essential 
element in the concept of noise trading and in behavioral finance. Bullishness is highly con-
nected to the concept of “investor sentiment”. Consequently, we discuss the theory and impli-
cations of investor sentiment for financial markets in the next section.  
2.4.3. Investor Sentiment 
The previous section described a formalized model on limited arbitrage that gives implica-
tions on a noise trader’s misperception of asset prices for financial markets. Yet, the model 
missed to further explain how the misperception of asset prices, or investors beliefs, evolve 
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over time. In order to fill this putative gap, Barberis et al. (1998) introduced a theoretical model 
of investor sentiment. The model presented in this section connects empirical evidence on stock 
return predictability and seminal psychological concepts to jointly explain the formation of 
investor beliefs and its return predictability. The observed patterns considered in the model are 
the phenomena of under- and overreactions in financial markets. Underreactions describe the 
slow incorporation of particular news into asset prices. Hence, the average returns of firms 
gradually adjust to fundamentals in subsequent periods. Overreaction, on the other hand, results 
from a string of good (bad) news after which investors become too optimistic (pessimistic) and 
overvalue (undervalue) a stock. Furthermore, the model integrates the psychological concepts 
of conservatism and the representativeness heuristic to form a comprehensive behavioral-based 
financial model.  
Before explicating the model, we first need to clarify the ambiguous understanding of investor 
sentiment. There are several different definitions and understandings of investor sentiment in 
the literature. In the end, most definitions refer to the preferences and beliefs of investors in 
confirmation of psychological evidence rather than the rational normative model. The belief in 
heuristics instead of rational information is thus defined as investor sentiment (Shleifer, 2000).  
Baker and Wurgler (2006) offer two different definitions of investor sentiment. In their first 
possible definition, investor sentiment is an investor’s tendency to speculate. A second more 
general definition describes investor sentiment as the optimism or pessimism about an invest-
ment. The terms optimism or pessimism are commonly related to bullish and bearish sentiment, 
respectively (Brown and Cliff, 2004). The understanding of bullishness, however, is ambigu-
ous and often spuriously used in the literature.  Brown and Cliff (2004), therefore, assert that 
bullishness is a measurement of the discount from an intrinsic value of an asset. A bullish 
(bearish) investor, thus, assumes an undervaluation (overvaluation) based on current prices. In 
this definition, a bullish (irrational) investors would not only expect absolute positive returns, 
but also a relative outperformance of returns compared to rational investors. The measurement 
of the discount on the intrinsic value is hardly feasible so that the term bullish (bearish) is 
commonly associated with an expected price increase (decline) (Brown and Cliff, 2004). This 
dissertation follows the later understanding of bullishness as the directional interpretation of 
investor sentiment. 
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To formally describe the formation of investor sentiment, Barberis et al. (1998) developed a 
parsimonious model to explain asset prices from the behavioral perspective as mentioned be-
fore. The model consists of one investor and one asset. This investor reflects the consensus 
belief of all investors even if they in total have heterogeneous beliefs. The investor, thus, affects 
prices and returns. The future earnings of the asset are independent of previous returns and 
follow a random walk. However, the investor does not anticipate the independence of returns 
in time. Instead, he believes in two different states in which a firm’s earning can move. The 
first state assumes a mean-reversion of earnings. The second state considers an instationary 
process, where earnings follow an autocorrelated trend.  A constant transition probability exists 
between both states so that the investor does not adapt these probabilities based on past expe-
riences. Earnings are more likely to stay in one state than switching to the other. The investor 
regularly and rationally updates his beliefs based on the observed earnings. For example, if 
negative earnings follow previous negative earnings, then investors rather belief that they find 
themselves in a (negative) trending state. However, if positive follow negative earnings, inves-
tors raise the likelihood of being in a reverting state according to state 1. In this model, the 
price of an asset is simply the discounted value of all future expected earnings: 
 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 {
𝑁𝑡+1
1 + 𝛿
+
𝑁𝑡+2
(1 + 𝛿)2
+ ⋯}             (6) 
 
where Pt is the price of the asset, Nt reflects the earnings, and δ is a discount factor.  The authors 
show that in a state switching model, as believed by the model’s investor, the pricing function 
can be expressed as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑡 =
𝑁𝑡
𝛿
+ 𝑦𝑡(𝑝1 − 𝑝2𝑞𝑡)                  (7) 
 
where yt is a shock to earnings at time t, p1 and p2 are constants which depend on model-specific 
transition parameters, and qt is the probability that the shock at time t was induced by state 1.
9  
State 1 assumes a mean-reversion to fundamental values of asset prices. State 2, on the con-
trary, assumes a trend in earnings. According to the random walk hypothesis, however, the 
                                                 
9 Please refer to Barberis et al. (1998) for details on the model specification and proof of the model.  
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expected return should follow E(Nt+j) = Nt. In equation (7), 
𝑁𝑡
𝛿
 denotes the fundamental value 
of the asset whereas 𝑦𝑡(𝑝1 − 𝑝2𝑞𝑡) equals the deviation from the intrinsic value as assumed by 
the investor and the true fundamental value. The implications of this model can be summarized 
as follows. The investor’s belief in state 1 (mean-reversion), which implies a higher value of 
qt, relates to the psychological concept of conservatism, given p1 is small in relation to p2. The 
investor underrates the importance of the news event even though the information is of statis-
tical importance. This ultimately leads to an underreaction of the investor to news, such as 
corporate earnings announcements. On the contrary, if the investor tends towards state 2 
(trend), which implies a lower value of qt, then his decision is closely connected to the psycho-
logical concept of the representativeness heuristic, given p1 is large in relation to p2. The second 
scenario is equivalent to an overreaction of investors to news. An increase in the asset price 
would be followed by another price increase and the investor would consequently overrate past 
information (Barberis et al., 1998).10 
The presented model provided theoretical explanations for the formation of beliefs and the 
interaction of psychological and financial concepts. Yet, the literature has shown that different 
types of stocks are more sensitive to investor sentiment than others. Baker and Wurgler (2007) 
investigate the sensitivity of stock types against broader waves of investor sentiment and find 
that in particular “stocks of lower market capitalization, younger, unprofitable, high-volatility, 
non-dividend paying, growth companies or stocks of firms in financial distress” (p. 130) to be 
more sensitive to shocks in investor sentiment. The findings of their study can be summarized 
in Figure 2-3. Stocks that are harder to value and to arbitrage on are ordered towards the right 
on the x-axis. These are particular smaller, younger, more volatile, unprofitable growth firms. 
Easier to value and to arbitrage stocks are ordered towards the left. An example are regulated 
utility stocks, which are fairly transparent to financial markets with long-lasting earnings his-
tories (Baker and Wurgler, 2007). The y-axis describes the valuation of the stock, with P* 
equaling the fundamental value on a stock. According to this figure, high valuations are related 
to high levels of investor sentiment especially for stocks which are difficult to value  
   
                                                 
10 Please refer to Barberis et al. (1998) for details on models.  
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This figure describes the interaction between investor sentiment, the stock valuation, and the difficulty 
on stock valuation and arbitrage. P* denotes the fundamental value of the stock (Baker and Wurgler, 
2007, p. 133) 
 
 
and arbitrage. The market is assumed to price stocks correctly in the absence of noise or in this 
case investor sentiment (Baker and Wurgler, 2007). 
As stressed out by Baker and Wurgler (2007), “… the question is no longer, as it was a few 
decades ago, whether investment sentiment affects stock prices, but rather how to measure 
investor sentiment and quantify its effects” (p. 130). A variety of literature dealt with the ques-
tion of how to accurately capture investor sentiment from direct or indirect measures. Table 
2-1 summarizes the most commonly discussed proxies or measures for investor sentiment in 
the behavioral finance literature. In narrowing down the variety of sentiment measures for em-
pirical tests, this dissertation mainly focuses on investor sentiment extracted from (social) me-
dia and internet investment platforms for several reasons. A survey on investor sentiment is 
most likely to be the most direct measure on investor sentiment. A major weakness identified 
by economists is the potential gap between how panelists respond and how they actually act 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2007). Moreover, survey-based investor sentiment proxies are often only 
measured in monthly, quarterly or yearly frequency. Explanatory power on micro-trading-level 
is, hence, highly limited (Da et al., 2015). Market-based measures, such as the IPO volume or 
Figure 2-3. Theoretical Effects of Investor Sentiment on Stocks  
From Traditional Finance Theories to Behavioral Finance | 34 
 
  
This table summarizes common proxies for investor sentiment discussed in the behavioral 
finance literature. This extended table includes a summary provided by Baker and Wurgler 
(2007).  
Proxy / Measure Hypothesis / Implications Related studies 
Investor surveys Asking investors about their opinion on 
trends in financial markets, e.g., 
- direct (randomly-selected households) 
- indirect (Consumer Confidence Index) 
Brown and Cliff (2005); 
Qiu and Welch (2006); 
Lemmon and Portniaguina 
(2006)  
Investor mood Extracting sentiment from exogenous 
changes in human emotions, e.g., 
- market returns in different seasons 
(fall, winter) 
- losses in major sports events 
Kamstra et al. (2003); 
Edmans et al. (2007) 
Retail investor 
trades 
Development of sentiment index based 
on micro-level trading data from retail 
investor transactions 
Kumar and Lee (2006)  
Mutual fund 
flows 
Sentiment implications from fund flows, 
e.g., fund pulled out from government 
funds and reinvest in growth stock funds 
Frazzini and Lamont (2008)  
Trading volume Irrational investors add liquidity to the 
market in particular when they are opti-
mistic 
Scheinkman and Xiong 
(2003); Baker and Stein 
(2004) 
Dividend pre-
mium 
Firms pay dividends when dividends are 
at premiums (premium is the difference 
between average market-to-book ratios 
of dividend payers and nonpayers) 
Baker and Wurgler (2004)  
Closed-end fund 
discount 
Low sentiment is related with higher 
closed-end fund discounts (which is the 
difference between the net asset value of 
a closed-end fund and its market price) 
Zweig (1973); 
Lee et al. (1991); 
Neal and Wheatley (1998) 
Option implied 
volatility 
Expected volatility (e.g., calculated by 
back-solving of Black-Scholes-Formula 
for option pricing) is inversely related 
with investor sentiment. The Market 
Volatility Index ("VIX") is often re-
ferred to capture market pessimism 
Whaley (2000)  
IPO volume and 
returns 
First-day returns of IPOs and the general 
demand for IPOs assumed to be sensi-
tive to investor sentiment 
Baker and Wurgler (2006)  
Equity issues 
over total new is-
sues 
Share of total equity offerings over total 
equity and debt issued by all firms is 
positively related to sentiment  
Baker and Wurgler (2000)  
Table 2-1. Proxies for Investor Sentiment 
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Textual analysis / 
Self-disclosed 
sentiment  
Sentiment extraction from (social) media 
and internet investment platforms to di-
rectly capture investor sentiment 
Antweiler and Frank (2004); 
Tetlock (2007); 
Das and Chen (2007); 
Chen et al. (2014) 
Search-based 
measure 
Measurement of search frequency and 
sentiment related words via internet 
search engines 
Da et al. (2015) 
 
IPO first-day returns, on the other hand, bear the disadvantage to explain output variables (e.g., 
returns) with other output variables (e.g., IPO first-day returns) instead of exogenous input 
variables (Qiu and Welch, 2006; Da et al., 2015). The application of investor sentiment directly 
extracted from (social) media outlets alleviates the above concerns.  
This section comprehensively described the theoretical concepts on the formation of beliefs, 
its implications for financial markets, and further provided an overview of empirical measures 
of investor sentiment. So far investor sentiment was mostly discussed as a given outcome from 
psychological driven actions by irrational investors. The next section further explains the psy-
chological concepts applied in behavioral finance to complete the picture on the behavior of 
irrational investors in imperfect markets.     
  Psychological Background on Investor Beliefs and Preferences 
The theories on limited arbitrage and investor sentiment relied primarily on the assumption 
of irrationality, which ultimately causes deviations from fundamental values. This dissertation 
discussed before how behavioral financial related theories consider the formation of beliefs 
and that investors act on noise as if it was real information. The following section provides 
cognitive psychological backgrounds on how investors actually form their beliefs and how 
preferences influence the decision-making process of investments. 
2.5.1. Beliefs 
The formation of investor beliefs is the foundation of the concept of investor sentiment. In 
the following. we summarize selected and the from our view most relevant psychological con-
cepts for this dissertation in the financial context. 
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Overconfidence 
One of the most robust implications on the psychology of people’s judgement is that people 
are overconfident (De Bondt and Thaler, 1995). This phenomenon exists in two types. First, 
people set too narrow confidence intervals in their judgement of an estimate. For example, an 
assumed 98% confidence interval typically only include the true estimate in about 60% of the 
cases (Alpert and Raiffa, 1982). Second, people set poor probabilities on the occurrence of an 
event. Events that people are certain about to occur happen only in 80% of all cases, and per-
ceived impossible events occur about 20% of the time (Slovic et al., 1977). These observations 
apply to many fields of job profiles, such as physicians, engineers, attorneys or investment 
bankers (Daniel et al., 1998). In particular, experts tend to be more overconfident than compa-
rably inexperienced persons (Griffin and Tversky, 1992). In the finance perspective, overcon-
fident investors believe in their superior ability to value a security compared to their true ability. 
Hence, they underestimate the resulting forecast error. The concept of overconfidence is 
adapted by seminal theories of behavioral finance, such as the investor sentiment model by 
Barberis et al. (1998) and Daniel et al. (1998) or excess volatility as propagated by Shiller 
(1981) as discussed in previous sections. 
 
Representativeness 
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1972), representativeness is a heuristic where “… the 
subjective probability of an event, or a sample, is determined by the degree to which it: (i) is 
similar in essential characteristics to its parent population: and (ii) reflects the salient features 
of the process by which it is generated” (p. 430).  The first statement translates into the impli-
cation that selected events are seen as typical or representative, ignoring the laws of probability 
in the overall process. For example, firms with a history of consistent growth are perceived as 
future growth stocks even though there is only a small likelihood that companies keep growing 
(Barberis et al., 1998). This bias is also referred to as the “base rate neglect” (Barberis and 
Thaler, 2003). Hence, people underestimate the true probability that an event or sample belongs 
to a defined population.  The second observation reduces to another bias, called the “sample 
size neglect.” When estimating the likelihood of a process, experimental subjects miss 
accounting for the sample size. In a financial context, a financial analyst with four positive 
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historical recommendations is in this in view perceived as talented despite the limited and un-
representative number of overall observations (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). In summary, people 
see patterns in a random walk process. The heuristic of representativeness is, thus, embedded 
within the concept or market anomaly of overreaction which we discuss in detail in section 
2.6.1.  
 
Conservatism 
The psychological concept of conservatism goes back to Edwards (1968). He defines con-
servatism as the slow update of general models in response to new evidence. Hence, individuals 
only slowly change their beliefs in the presence of new events or information. Edwards (1968) 
tests a subject’s reaction to new evidence against a well-defined piece of evidence where the 
true normative value is known. In his findings, test subjects overemphasize the base rates (com-
pared to the underestimation of base rates as seen by representativeness) in relation to the sam-
ple size (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). In this connection, an investor who is subject to conserv-
atism underestimates the full information of earnings announcements (overemphasis on prior 
base rates) because he only partly believes in the new information and still holds on his prior 
estimate of the earning. As a result, valuations only slowly adjust to the full information content 
of the earnings announcement. Another interpretation is that conservative individuals are over-
confident about historical information (Barberis et al., 1998). This phenomenon is connected 
to the market anomaly of underreaction discussed in section 2.6.1. 
 
Anchoring 
In many situations, individuals form estimates based on initial, random values and then adjust 
their estimates away from it. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) observed in their experiments that 
the adjustments of the estimates are most of the time insufficient and that individuals don’t 
significantly depart away from the initial value. This observation was referred to as the “an-
choring” effect. In their experimental setup, subjects were asked to estimate the percentage of 
African nations in the United Nations. Before estimating, the test subjects were faced with 
random values between 0 and 100, determined by a “wheel of fortune”. It turned out that the 
test subjects tend to cling to the initial value. Those, receiving an initial value of 10 estimated 
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the percentage with 25% while the other group facing an initial value of 60 estimated the 
percentage with 45% (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).      
 
Belief Perseverance 
A similar phenomenon to conservatism and anchoring that once individuals formed their 
opinion, they obstinately hold to this belief for too long, is known as the “belief perseverance”. 
Lord et al. (1979) explain this perseverance through two effects. First, individuals do not strive 
to look for new evidence that contradicts their own belief. Second, even in the case they find 
such evidence, they don’t accept this new information in forming new beliefs. Thus, the differ-
ence between belief perseverance to conservatism and anchoring appears in the long-run ne-
glection of new evidence compared to the slow update or insufficient adjustments, respectively. 
In connection with financial research, individuals propagating the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
may not deviate from their belief in the correctness of the model despite potentially overwhelm-
ing conflictive evidence (Barberis and Thaler, 2003).  
 
Availability Bias 
The availability bias is a judgmental heuristic, applied by individuals when estimating the 
probability of an event or the frequency of a class. In this situation, individuals link their esti-
mation with available information that comes to their mind (e.g., experiences by acquaint-
ances).  As described by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), this estimation procedure is likely to 
be biased because not all information is retrievable or in memory at the same weight. For ex-
ample, when individuals have to judge the probability of getting robbed in a larger city, they 
often recall their own experiences and information and form their estimate based on their lim-
ited own information instead of factual information (Barberis and Thaler, 2003).  
 
Herding 
The herding literature often includes theories on irrational, individual investors who trade 
based on sentiment (Nofsinger and Sias, 1999). The general definition of herding contains the 
tendency of many different independent agents to buy or sell the same security over a defined 
period of time, the herding interval. Such agents include portfolio managers, analysts, retail 
investors or corporate investment managers (Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010). Nofsinger and Sias 
(1999) differentiate agents between institutional and individual investor groups. Shleifer and 
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Summers (1990) argue that individual investors potentially herd based on the same signal (e.g., 
analyst recommendations).  Individual investors are also more likely to be sensitive against 
fashionable trends in their investment decisions (De Long et al., 1990). The role of institutional 
investors in terms of herding is more ambiguous. One group advocates the contribution to mar-
ket efficiency by informed institutional investors. In this case, herding will potentially move 
prices back to fundamentals instead of further away (Lakonishok et al., 1992; Froot et al., 
1992). Another group shares the view that institutional herding causes large price movements 
of individual stocks that are not fundamentally justified (Nofsinger and Sias, 1999). Non-in-
formational, institutional herding, therefore, potentially causes temporary bubbles (Dreman, 
1979; Shiller et al., 1984). The beliefs and heuristics described above are the cognitive expla-
nations for the formation of beliefs. The next section provides further insights on investor pref-
erences that drive investment decisions.   
2.5.2. Preferences 
In the investment decision process, an investor must decide on how much he wants to con-
sume, safe and what portfolio of assets he prefers to hold. Asset prices and trading decisions, 
therefore, rely on investor preferences. In this connection, the expected utility model is most 
commonly referred to the major theory on decision-making under risk, given the individual's 
preference. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (2007) developed the expected utility framework, 
which represents an individuals’ utility function if the preferences satisfy four distinctive axi-
oms (completeness, continuity, independence, and transitivity).  
Due to the systematic violation of the axioms, found in the empirical studies on the expected 
utility framework, a number of non-expected utility theories evolved. These descriptive (how 
the world looks like) studies aimed to answer the questions that normative (how the world 
should look like) models failed in. In the financial literature, one of the most relevant descrip-
tive theories of decisions under risk is the so-called “prospect theory” by Kahneman (1979).  
The prospect theory claims that investors tend to sell winners and hold on to losers which 
contradicts the suggestions of classical theories. The authors describe, in particular, two stages 
involved in the decision process. The first “editing” stage describes the framing of choices by  
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This figure shows the value function by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), p. 454.  
 
decision makers regarding potential gains and/or losses in relation to a fixed reference point. 
In the second “evaluation” stage, decision-makers evaluate the choice based on an S-shaped 
utility function, which is shown in Figure 2-4. The concavity in the gains region and the con-
vexity in the loss region displays the risk-aversion (risk-seeking) in the gains (loss) region 
(Kahneman, 1979). The prospect theory, shortly, concludes that an investor facing a price de-
cline (the reference point) in his asset, chooses in an equiprobable situation of further losses or  
the limitation to the realized loss, the riskier option. In the hope that prices recover, the investor 
clings to loser stocks but is, on the other hand, disposed to sell winners (Shefrin and Statman, 
1985). The greater sensitivity to losses than to gains is referred to “loss aversion”  (Barberis 
and Thaler, 2003). Another closely related phenomenon is the disposition effect by Shefrin and 
Statman (1985). The authors suggest that investors tend to sell winners to quickly and hold on 
losers too long. The prospect theory is in their model an elementary foundation for this behavior 
next to the concepts of mental accounting, aversion to regret, and self-control.11 
This section provided insights on how investor beliefs and preferences potentially lead to 
irrational trades. These irrational trades might occur in the form of patterns or so-called market 
anomalies that might repeat in history. The concepts on belief formation and preferences of 
                                                 
11 Please refer to Shefrin and Statman (1985), p. 779ff, for details on the disposition effect. 
Figure 2-4. Utility (Value) Function  
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decision making are, thus, the foundation for the existence of market anomalies. We briefly 
describe the most common market anomalies that are relevant for this dissertation in the fol-
lowing section.   
 Market Anomalies 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis and the Capital Asset Pricing Model gave rise to the promi-
nent view on rationally priced securities under uncertainty. Consequently, higher returns are 
inevitably related to higher compensation for risks. Price deviations that cannot be explained 
by systematic risk must, hence, result from model misspecifications. However, various studies 
in the finance literature have observed a number of corporate financing and return patterns, so-
called anomalies, that earned higher returns than justified by the underlying systematic risk 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Fama and French (1998) explain these observations with chance 
deviations from rational pricing in the short run.  
Daniel et al. (1998), yet, stress the disagreement amongst researchers on the interpretation of 
asset mispricing and associated return predictability out of such patterns. He summarizes the 
most common market anomalies as follows: “1. Event-based return predictability (public-
event-date average stock returns of the same sign as average subsequent long-run abnormal 
performance); 2. Short-term momentum (positive short-term autocorrelation of stock returns, 
for individual stocks and the market as a whole); 3. Long-term reversal (negative autocorrela-
tion of short-term returns separated by long lags, or "overreaction"); 4. High volatility of asset 
prices relative to fundamentals; 5. Short-run post-earnings announcement stock price "drift" in 
the direction indicated by the earnings surprise, but abnormal stock price performance in the 
opposite direction of long-term earnings changes.” (p. 1839-40). 
These anomalies are potentially the result of preparatory, cognitive-influenced investment 
processes based on the beliefs and preferences discussed in Section 2.5. Ramiah et al. (2015) 
summarize the general links between the psychological concepts of beliefs and preferences 
with market anomalies in Figure 2-5. Common critiques on behavioral related explanations of 
asset prices enumerate the nearly unrestricted universe of behavioral patterns and the limited 
out-of-sample explanatory power of the models (Daniel et al., 1998). In search of the “correct” 
asset pricing model, a vast amount of literature evolved on risk factor and behavioral-related  
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This figure by Ramiah et al. (2015), p. 92, depicts the connections between individual psy-
chological concepts and their resulting market anomalies. The rectangles contain the beliefs 
and preferences whereas the circles describe the market anomalies. 
 
asset pricing models. As a result, Cochrane (2001) coined the term “factor-zoo” to describe the 
bulk of literature aiming to explain the cross-section of returns. In this section, we provide a 
brief overview of the most prominent and, for this dissertation, most relevant market anoma-
lies: Over- and underreaction, excessive volatility, and momentum. 
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Figure 2-5. Beliefs, Preferences and Market Anomalies 
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2.6.1. Market Over- and Underreaction 
The literature documents time-invariant return patterns that several behavioral financial mod-
els comprehensively aim to explain: The over- and underreaction of financial markets. This 
section describes these anomalies in further details. 
 
Overreaction 
A number of studies documented the outperformance of loser stocks (stocks that performed 
poorly in the past) against winner stocks (stocks that performed well in the past) in the long-
run. This observation is referred to as the so-called “overreaction” of asset prices resulting in a 
negative long-term correlation of returns (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985). In the general under-
standing, prices overshoot the fundamental value after a streak of good news and experience a 
correction of the mispricing in the long-term. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) argue in their influ-
ential work on overreaction that investors tend to overweight recent information and underrate 
the (base rate) data. Furthermore, the authors document a (lower) higher overreaction of prices 
when stocks experience (less) extreme returns in the formation period. De Bondt and Thaler 
(1987) find confirming results in a later study, where a zero-investment-portfolio consisting of 
50 extreme losers outperforms another group of 50 extreme winners. 
Several studies aimed to provide a unified behavioral theory on under- and overreaction of 
prices. In this connection, two of the most influential models were developed by Daniel et al. 
(1998) and Barberis et al. (1998). To formally describe overreaction, Barberis et al. (1998) 
defined overreaction as follows: 
 
𝐸(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑧𝑡 = 𝐺, 𝑧𝑡−1 = 𝐺,… , 𝑧𝑡−𝑗 = 𝐺 ) <  
             𝐸(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑧𝑡 = 𝐵, 𝑧𝑡−1 = 𝐵,… , 𝑧𝑡−𝑗 = 𝐵 ) 
            (8) 
 
where G or B denotes either good or bad news z at the time period t , j is at least one or higher, 
and E(rt+1) is the expected return in the subsequent time period. Hence, overreaction occurs 
when the average return following a series of public good news is lower than the average return 
following a series of bad news (Barberis et al., 1998). In other words, prices reach high levels 
because overly optimistic investors believe in good news in the future. Lower subsequent re-
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turns, however, are more likely since following news announcements are on average more pes-
simistic than the optimistic investor opinion. As stated in the previous section, Barberis et al. 
(1998) explain the overreaction with the representativeness bias presented by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974). 
Daniel et al. (1998), on the other hand, ascribe the overreaction to the self-attribution bias, 
where individuals become overly optimistic in the occurrence of public news that confirms 
their private signal or belief. Disconfirming public news, however, will rather be neglected in 
the investment decision process. Therefore, overreaction results, in this view, from public sig-
nals that confirm prior private signals of individuals.  
Also, critics on the validity of the overreaction hypothesis arose. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
described in their own study that some part of the overreaction can be related to the seasonal 
January effect. Furthermore, Chopra et al. (1992) examine overreaction more distinctively and 
ascribe overreaction to the individual rather than to institutional investors. In another critical 
study, Conrad and Kaul (1993) criticize the methodology applied by De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) and claim that buy-and-hold-returns are more appropriate than monthly rebalanced cu-
mulative returns of loser-winners-zero-investment-portfolios. After the adaption of the method, 
Conrad and Kaul (1993) find no confirming evidence for the overreaction hypothesis.  
Baytas and Cakici (1999) repeated the study by Conrad and Kaul (1993) for seven countries 
and generally find support for the overreaction hypothesis. The critics but also the confirming 
evidence on the overreaction phenomenon show the prevailing discrepancy amongst research-
ers on the validity of overreaction of asset prices to news.  
 
Underreaction 
Another market anomaly often jointly discussed with the term overreaction is the “underre-
action” of prices to news announcements. Characteristically, underreaction of stock returns 
refers to the pattern of average stock returns on an event-date that have the same sign as the 
average subsequent abnormal performance in the long-run (Daniel et al., 1998).  Another def-
inition is the slow incorporation of news into asset prices in the short run (typically 1-12 
months), corresponding to a short-term autocorrelation of returns (Barberis et al., 1998).  More 
formally, underreaction can be stated as follows (same denotations as for overreaction): 
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𝐸(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑧𝑡 = 𝐺, ) >  𝐸(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑧𝑡 = 𝐵)             (9) 
 
The equation, therefore, formally describes that stocks underreact to good news, a mistake that 
is corrected with higher subsequent returns (Barberis et al., 1998). Such news can be related to 
a variety of events, such as stock splits, tender offers, analyst recommendations, seasoned is-
sues of common stocks, dividend initiations and omissions, public announcements of previous 
insider trades or venture capital share distributions (Daniel et al., 1998).12 The most prominent 
research on public news announcements in connection with market underreaction, however, 
deals with firm’s earnings announcements and subsequent return drifts (e.g., Bernard and 
Thomas, 1989; Bartov, 1992; Narayanamoorthy, 2006).   
Hong and Stein (1999) further decompose the underreaction of prices into two main groups, 
the 1) unconditional momentum-driven autocorrelation of returns and the 2) conditional auto-
correlation of returns based on public news. First, the autocorrelation of returns, which is inde-
pendent of public news events, seems to appear on a short-term horizon of three to twelve 
months. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) observed this pattern in probably one of the most influ-
ential studies on return momentum. A reason for this unconditional short-term autocorrelation 
might be a slow and gradual incorporation of previously private information. Second, the con-
ditional autocorrelation of momentum goes back to an initial public news event as described at 
the beginning of this section. The close association between underreaction and return momen-
tum requires a further clarification which we attempt to provide in the next section.  
2.6.2. Momentum 
Momentum is commonly associated with positive short-term autocorrelation of returns for 
individual stocks or the market as a whole (Daniel et al., 1998). Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
demonstrated in their seminal work on momentum that a zero-investment-portfolio that goes 
long on winner stocks and shorts loser stocks earns significant returns within a six- to twelve-
month period. The outperformance, however, diminishes more than half in the subsequent two- 
to three-year period. In developing a unified theory on underreaction, overreaction and mo-
mentum, Hong and Stein (1999) relinquished the cognitive-based foundation to explain the 
                                                 
12 Please refer to Daniel et al. (1998), p. 1867ff, for further details on respective literature. 
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respective anomalies but introduced an interaction-based model (HS model forth on) in which 
different agents, news watchers, and momentum traders jointly evoke market anomalies.  
The HS model is based on three main assumptions: 1. Newswatchers forecast future returns 
based on private signals on expected future developments of the asset’s fundamental value, and 
they do not rely on past or current information, 2. Momentum traders only use information 
from past returns, and 3. Private information only diffuses gradually amongst the group of 
newswatchers. The mechanism of the HS model can simply be summarized as follows. The 
slow diffusion of information amongst newswatchers initiates underreaction of prices and 
never overreaction. Momentum traders who only apply simple trading strategies, in that they 
only trade based on information from past returns, anticipate the price change and accelerate 
the underreaction of prices towards its fundamental. However, excessive momentum trades 
lead to prices to overshoot compared to its long-term equilibrium. The HS model, thus, implies 
that early momentum traders can earn significant profits but momentum traders entering at a 
later stage might be exposed to the externality induced by the former group of momentum 
traders and hence realize losses (Hong and Stein, 1999). 
There is a vast literature on momentum and its impact on cross-sectional returns (e.g., Carhart, 
1997; Jegadeesh and Titman, 2002). This dissertation, however, focuses on the behavioral view 
and the link between a variety of behavioral biases and market anomalies. The HS model, 
therefore, helps us to clearly differentiate positive short-term autocorrelation caused by un-
derreaction (gradual diffusion of information) and momentum (non-informational trades only 
based on past returns). The next sub-section describes another well-observed and controver-
sially-discussed phenomenon in behavioral literature: excess volatility in financial markets. 
2.6.3. Excess Volatility and Risk 
A various number of studies investigated the relationship between risk and expected returns 
of individual stocks. In general, the literature measures risk as the covariance between a stock’s 
return and another variable (French et al., 1987). Examples of risk measures applied in former 
studies are the covariance between a stock’s return and the market return (Fama and MacBeth, 
1973) or other factors resulting from multivariate time-series regressions of returns (Roll and 
Ross, 1980).  
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Other studies linked risk with excess volatility extracted from variations of dividends over 
time. Several studies argued that the stability of the present value of dividends in time implies 
excess volatility in the financial market in comparison to the present value suggested by the 
efficient markets model (Shiller, 1981; LeRoy and Porter, 1981).  In this theory, the authors 
assumed dividends to fluctuate around a trend that is known. Based on this assumption, Shiller 
(1981) concludes that real dividends did not fluctuate sufficiently to justify the observed price 
variations in the aggregate market. 
However, the till then traditional assumption on dividends experienced strenuous oppositions. 
Marsh and Merton (1986), for example, assert that dividends do not require to follow a known 
trend since stock issuance or repurchases can cause dividends to deviate from a trend. Further-
more, they argue if a firm’s management uses dividends to smoothen the payout flow of their 
business, then stock prices should fluctuate more quickly. Yet, most studies on excess volatility 
have in common that they do not explain the cognitive or financial mechanisms and drivers 
behind the actual excess volatility. The excess volatility anomaly, therefore, remains more elu-
sive than the formerly described anomalies, such as the over- and underreaction of prices.  
We have learned about the most influential cognitive- and interaction-based theories in be-
havioral finance and the anomalies which traditional and behavioral researchers are still con-
troversially discussing on. The models by Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998), and Hong 
and Stein (1999) set the theoretical foundations for many empirical studies in behavioral fi-
nance. These empirical studies, for example, investigate investor behavior in connection with 
traditional or social media. The next section of this dissertation focuses on the channels inves-
tors use to gather, process and disseminate information from. We, in particular, concentrate on 
the most common and trend-setting financial information channels that are exposed to digital-
ization: analyst recommendations, traditional news media and internet investment platforms as 
part of social media. 
 Information, Agents, and Media in Behavioral Finance  
Information plays a crucial role in financial markets. Investors base their investment decisions 
on information. As such, information as an input variable induces changes in output variables,  
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The figure describes the relationship between media and financial market stakeholders. The 
figure is based on Scheufele and Haas (2008), p. 99.  
 
consequently measured as changes in stock prices. It is necessary, in this context, to clearly 
differentiate between information and news in the financial context. News disseminated via 
mass media provide potential information to the market. News, however, ultimately transform 
to information if the recipient of the news (the investor) is able to process the news. Useful 
news that contains a purpose and thus creates an advantage in knowledge is hence defined as 
information (Stanzel, 2007).  
In financial markets, sources of information can be distinguished into two groups. The first 
group consists of agents, whereas the second group embraces the mass media. In this view, 
financial analysts and firms are considered as agents. Publicly listed firms must publish ad-hoc 
announcements in case of the occurrence of any price sensitive events. Furthermore, firms gen-
erally operate an investor relations department that ensures a transparent and conforming com-
munication with its investors. In addition, the analyst (in particular sell-side) makes further 
information available for individual and institutional investors. Alternatively, investors receive 
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Figure 2-6. Relationship between Media, Analysts, Firms, and Investors 
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information from the second group of sources: the mass media. The mass media receives, pro-
cesses and disseminates information from different agents. In this connection, the impact of 
mass media on financial markets is inversely related to the investor’s ease of access to agents. 
One might infer that especially irrational, uninformed investors refer to mass media in their 
investment decision process (Scheufele and Haas, 2008).  
The term mass media comprises all media channels that reach a broad but an undefined num-
ber of audience with acoustical and/or optical statements (Maletzke, 1963). In this context, 
traditional media consists of mass media covering broadcast and press media, including books, 
magazines, newspaper, or television (Burkart, 2002). In this dissertation, the term traditional 
media will mainly relate to newspaper articles. Furthermore, mass media plays two distinct 
roles in financial markets. First, mass media acts as a pure intermediary of information. Second, 
mass media actively and independently affect financial markets (Scheufele and Haas, 2008). 
In its influencing role, mass media potentially creates or accelerates “social infection” amongst 
investors (Rapp, 2000).  Consequently, one goal of this dissertations is, amongst others, to 
empirically disentangle the two roles of news media as a pure intermediary (in the spirit of the 
efficient market hypothesis) or the potential behavioral impact factor which causes prices to 
deviate from its fundamentals. 
A newer stream of literature deals with the relationship between user-generated content on 
social media platforms with financial markets (e.g., Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Chen et al., 
2014). Due to the additional complexity, this news channel will be separately discussed in 
Section 2.7.3 and forth on.  The information flow between the different informational stake-
holders in financial markets is summarized in Figure 2-6.  
The previous sections explained thoroughly that investors, however, not solely decide based 
on true information. Additionally, it is not only the group of investors who might act irration-
ally. Analysts, as a group of information providers, might also be subject to cognitive biases. 
The following sections consequently examine cognitive biases and empirical findings related 
to analysts, news articles and social media and their impact on financial markets.  
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2.7.1. Analyst Coverage and Herding Behavior 
Financial analysts are important agents in financial markets and primarily serve two different 
functions, the discovery of private information and the interpretation of public information. 
They are reputable providers of information and of high value for a broad base of investors 
(Ivković and Jegadeesh, 2004; Asquith et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2010). The confidence of in-
vestors in analyst recommendations is linked to the better abilities to interpret public infor-
mation due to the better industry-specific knowledge, extensive training or longer experiences 
(Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). The superior abilities might help analysts to better understand 
implications of changes in accounting methods, one-time effects in the P&L, or changes of 
corporate strategies. Such information is particularly disclosed in earnings announcements 
(Chen et al., 2010). The higher complexity of companies, therefore, increases the usefulness of 
analysts in interpreting associated company reports. Complex companies are usually larger, 
have higher R&D costs, and exhibit high-growth opportunities (Chen et al., 2010).  
Former studies often investigated the question whether analyst reports substitute company 
reports (negative correlation of returns) or rather complement/reinforce each other (positive 
correlation of returns). In the probably most influential studies in this area,  Francis et al. (2002) 
and Frankel et al. (2006) rather find support for the reinforcement hypothesis and show that the 
information content of earnings announcements is positively correlated with that of analyst 
reports. The authors, however, point out that the ambiguous relationship between both reports 
cannot be solved, ultimately. 
There are also other studies, however, that doubt the general usefulness of analyst recommen-
dations in financial markets. The randomness of earnings outcome makes forecasts difficult for 
analysts. Therefore, the performance of analysts is rather benchmarked against his consensus 
with other financial analysts. In these situations, conformity of recommendations is found to 
protect the human capital of financial analysts (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Froot et al., 1992). 
Hence, analysts exhibit a tendency to publish recommendations that are in line with that of 
their colleagues (Olsen, 1996). This is also referred to as the herding bias as described in Sec-
tion 2.5.1. As a consequence, the herding of analysts can lead to an overreaction. La Porta 
(1996) demonstrated, for example, that professional analysts are extremely bullish (bearish) on 
stocks that they are optimistic (pessimistic) about. He documents low subsequent returns for 
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stocks with high-growth forecasts but inversely high follow-up returns for low-growth stocks. 
In his results, the overreaction of analysts, therefore, transmits to prices in financial markets. 
In summary, herding potentially leads to an overreaction of analysts, which ultimately trans-
mits to prices in financial markets. According to the efficient market hypothesis, stocks with 
high growth forecasts must earn high returns (Barberis et al., 1998). The empirical evidence, 
yet, showed that financial markets are imperfect, even only in a temporary time horizon. This 
section explained how behavioral biases of agents might impact on financial markets. The fol-
lowing sections provide further theoretical and empirical insights on investor sentiment ex-
pressed by traditional and social media.  
2.7.2. Investor Sentiment and Traditional News Media 
One of the first studies to explore the relationship between media press and financial market 
activity is attributed to Cutler et al. (1989). The authors examine different kinds of news and 
its explanatory power for aggregate stock returns. Their findings, however, do not support the 
hypothesis that the variance of stock price movements can be explained by news related to 
macroeconomic, political or world events. A number of studies followed, which not only ana-
lyzed the relation between financial markets and media press coverage (e.g., Chan, 2003; Fang 
and Peress, 2009) but also the media tone or sentiment expressed in these articles (e.g., Tetlock, 
2007; García, 2013) or even both elements (Hillert et al., 2014).  Shiller (2000) propagates the 
view that news media impacts on financial markets, even if the news is non-informative and 
just evoking a short hype. News content, thus, drives market sentiment in his opinion.  
   The most influential work on media sentiment is probably accounted to the work by Tetlock 
(2007). Tetlock (2007) states three distinctive hypothesis on the role of media sentiment in 
financial markets. First and the main hypothesis of his work, media sentiment and more spe-
cifically media pessimism serves as a proxy for investor sentiment. In this hypothesis, the tim-
ing of media sentiment is crucial due to the question of whether investor sentiment predicts 
media sentiment or reflects past media sentiment. In the former scenario, one might expect low 
returns following media pessimism in the short-run but high returns in the long-run. In the latter 
case, low returns follow media pessimism, but prices reverse to the fundamental value in the  
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This table provides a selected literature overview of news media and sentiment related stud-
ies. News and returns describe the intertemporal relationship of news media and firm or mar-
ket returns, where CT denotes the contemporaneous time period around the news release date 
(+/- 3 days), ST is the short-term horizon of up to 3 months, MLT is the mid- to long-term 
horizon between 3 and 36 months, + (-) describes a positive (negative) correlation in the time 
period, 0 characterizes a return reversal in the time period, +/0 depicts a partial return rever-
sion in the time period, and N/A indicates a missing focus of the study on that time period.  
      News and returns 
Authors and year Print media / 
Data sources 
Time  
period 
CT ST MLT 
Liu, Smith & Syed  
(1990) 
Wall Street Journal 
"Heard on the Street" column 
09/1982 - 
09/1985 
+ + N/A 
Barber & Loeffler  
(1993) 
Wall Street Journal 
"Dartboard" column 
10/1988 - 
10/1990 
+ +/0 N/A 
Tetlock 
(2007) 
Wall Street Journal 
"Abreast of the Market" col. 
01/1984 - 
09/1999 
N/A 0 N/A 
Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky 
& Macskassy (2008) 
Dow Jones News Service & 
Wall Street Journal 
1980 - 
2004 
+ + N/A 
García 
(2013) 
Two columns in  
New York Times 
1905 - 
2005 
N/A +/0 N/A 
Hillert, Jacobs & Müller  
(2014) 
45 national and local  
US newspapers 
1989 -  
2010 
N/A + 0 
Hendershott, Livdan & 
Schürhoff (2015) 
Thomson Reuters  
News Analytics (TRNA) 
2003 - 
2005 
N/A N/A N/A 
Bajo & Raimondo  
(2017) 
Factiva database  
(majority of US newspapers) 
01/1995 - 
12/2013 
+ N/A N/A 
 
long-run. In the second hypothesis, the media press sentiment reflects information that is not 
yet fully incorporated into prices. This effect is in the spirit of underreaction and the assumption 
of gradual diffusion of information amongst newswatchers according to Hong and Stein (1999).  
The last hypothesis states that media press sentiment only conveys stale information and hence 
has no impact on financial markets. The main limitation of this study is that the theory only 
applies to negative sentiment or media pessimism. In a more recent study, García (2013) doc-
uments also significant results for media optimism. The media sentiment effect reported in his 
study is most pronounced in times of economic recessions. 
This dissertation frames the news media related topics around investor sentiment. The com-
prehensive literature on news-related market efficiency tests or the impact of media coverage 
(excluding the tone of the content) is, thus, out of scope of this dissertation. Consequently, we 
Table 2-2. Literature on News Media and Sentiment 
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provide a brief but relevant literature overview of studies related to news media and investor 
sentiment. The main findings are summarized in Table 2-2. 
Liu et al. (1990) examine the impact of low-cost analyst recommendations published in the 
“Heard-on-the-Street” column of the Wall Street Journal on stock returns. Their data overall 
consists of 852 recommendations, thereof 566 buy and 286 sell recommendations, in the time 
period between 1982 and 1985. Their findings indicate a symmetric impact of buy and sell 
recommendations on abnormal returns on the publication day. However, they also find signif-
icant abnormal returns in the two days before publication. Applying the event study methodol-
ogy, the results yield a cumulative abnormal return of 3% in the three-day time window [-2,0] 
relative to the publication date. The absence of return reversals in their results implicate the 
informativeness of recommendations published in news media. Yet, this study only refers to 
second/hand information from analysts and, thus, does not consider the opinion of investors 
expressed in news media.   
In the highly regarded study on the interaction of media sentiment and stock markets, Tetlock 
(2007) studies the media content of the Wall Street Journal column “Abreast of the Market”. 
He specifically tests whether media pessimism predicts daily returns of the Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average Index (DJIA). His US study covers the time period between 1984 and 1999 and 
extracts the fraction of negative words in a news column article with textual analysis based on 
the Harvard psychosocial dictionary. He documents an economic meaningful impact of media 
pessimism on the next day’s market return. The effect, however, reverses after four subsequent 
days.   
In a following but more extensive study, Tetlock et al. (2008) analyze whether textual analysis 
can be applied to not only predict stock returns but also earnings on the individual firm level. 
The authors fall back to a US data set (1980 – 2004) consisting of a variety of news articles 
about S&P 500 firms covered by the Dow Jones News Service and in the Wall Street Journal. 
Following the study by Tetlock (2007), the study focuses on the fraction of negative words in 
news articles based on the Harvard-IV-4 psychosocial dictionary. The data includes more than 
80 quarters of earnings and 6,000 days of returns data. In contrast to the study by Tetlock 
(2007), the authors rather find new support for the information hypothesis. In this hypothesis, 
news articles convey value-relevant information that is not yet fully incorporated into stock 
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prices. Their main finding suggests that news articles contain new information on firm earn-
ings. In other words, news articles convey fundamental information and do not simply repeat 
stale information. Furthermore, the authors find weak evidence for a stock price underreaction 
where prices incorporate new information with a one-day delay. The predictive power for firm 
earnings and returns is even higher when specific news stories report on fundamental infor-
mation. All in all, the findings by Tetlock et al. (2008) support the hypothesis that news media 
contributes to market efficiency.  
In another study, García (2013) explores the interaction between the content of two columns 
in the New York Times and the aggregated US market return. His study falls back to news 
articles covering the time period between 1905 and 2005. The broad database counts 27,449 
trading days in total, and media content was analyzed based on the Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) word dictionary. Other than the former presented studies, García (2013) stresses the 
symmetrical importance of positive and negative tones in news articles. The fraction of positive 
and negative words in news articles predict the next day aggregate return, followed by a partial 
reversal in the subsequent four days. Their results, in total, rather speak for the behavioral 
sentiment hypothesis than for the informational hypothesis with regard to the informational 
quality of the media content. The sentiment effect is found to be more pronounced in times of 
economic recessions, indicating a higher sensitivity to news in bad economic times.  
Hillert et al. (2014) research on media coverage and sentiment from the momentum perspec-
tive. The authors refer to news articles published in 45 national and local US newspapers be-
tween 1989 and 2010, summing up to a total of more than 2.2 million news articles. In inves-
tigating on a buy-and-hold-portfolio that goes long on winner stocks (top 30% stocks with 
highest returns in the past 6 months) and shorts loser stocks (least 30%, respectively) with high 
media coverage, the authors find a significant momentum effect in the first 10 months which 
reverses afterwards. The portfolio return fully diminishes after a time horizon of 36 months. 
When portfolios are, furthermore, sorted by media sentiment (in addition to coverage and past 
returns), the momentum effect is found to be even stronger.  
The former studies primarily studied the impact of news media sentiment on stock markets. 
Hendershott et al. (2015), however, turn the perspective and analyze whether institutional in-
vestors are already informed before the actual date of the news release. The authors, hence, 
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examine the order flow information from institutional investors and its predictive power for 
several news variables, including the respective news media sentiment. In their hypothesis, a 
positive order flow (buy volume > sell volume) forecasts positive media sentiment. For their 
data, the authors refer to the Thomson Reuters News Analytics (TRNA) database covering the 
time period between 2003 and 2005. Their analysis includes more than 1 million observations 
for 1,667 stocks on 755 trading days. In their results, the institutional order flow increases 
(decreases) five days prior to announcements of positive (negative) news. The order flow in-
formation predicts the following sentiment of news announcements and stock returns on the 
announcement days. Hence, Hendershott et al. (2015) suggest that institutional investors are 
well-informed compared to news providers. Potential reasons that the authors mention could 
be related to the direct communication of institutional investors to publicly traded firms and 
brokerage firms, or the greater resources to process available information.    
In an IPO-related study, Bajo and Raimondo (2017) research on the impact of news media 
sentiment on the level of IPO-underpricing, timing effects of news announcements and the 
associated reputation of the news provider. The authors build on US data that covers 2,814 
IPOs and over 27,000 news articles recorded in the Factiva database in the time period between 
1995 and 2013. Akin to other studies, news media sentiment was extracted with textual analysis 
tools based on the Loughran and McDonald (2011) word dictionary. Bajo and Raimondo 
(2017) document in their findings a positive relationship between positive news media senti-
ment and IPO underpricing. The effect is more pronounced for news announcements close to 
the IPO date and for news published by more reputable news providers.  
All the literature introduced above have in common that news media sentiment is somehow 
related to stock returns. Even though many studies find confirmation for the behavioral senti-
ment hypothesis that investors react to non-informative news announcements, researchers can-
not conclude with full evidence that news announcements do not convey fundamental or stale 
information. In reality, it is more likely that all three hypotheses (1. Behavioral sentiment hy-
pothesis of non-informative news announcements, 2. Information hypothesis of underreaction 
to value relevant information that is not yet fully incorporated into prices, 3. Stale information 
hypothesis of old information that has no impact on financial markets) have proven their right 
to exist. The next section introduces the reader to the social media topic which significantly 
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gained in importance in recent years, not only in the general society but also in financial mar-
kets.  
2.7.3. Increasing Social Interaction with Digitalization of Information Channels  
The rising of the internet has changed the way individuals process information, act, and com-
municate significantly in the past decades (Puppis et al., 2017). Different from the style of 
traditional media, the internet enables the society to combine different types of communication 
at once. Amongst others, it changes the directional components of communication, it increases 
the range of recipients and eases the access to information. All of these, on the other hand, 
define the type of communication (Neuberger, 2008). The reporting and announcement of news 
became continuous and permanent, globally accessible and more and more decentralized. Thus, 
the internet eliminates technical limitations heretofore traditional media press was exposed to. 
Traditional news media is commonly seen as a pure information intermediary with only limited 
opportunities for interactions between communities. The internet, however, enables a partici-
pative, interactive communication and reporting of information, which is self-organized and 
often linked globally (Neuberger, 2008). As a consequence, the borders of private and public 
communication disappear with the existence of the internet (Puppis et al., 2017). 
Another term that was coined with this development is the “social media”. Kaplan and Haenlein 
(2010) define social media as a “group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideolog-
ical and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of 
User Generated Content’’ (p. 61). Well-known internet-based applications in which individuals 
share their opinions, pictures, or video contents with the online community are, for example, 
Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010).  Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) 
classify social media internet applications according to two dimensions based on theories in 
the field of social processes (self-presentation, self-disclosure) and media research (social pres-
ence, media richness).  Self-presentation represents the idea that individuals seek to control the 
impression of others of themselves. The conscious or unconscious disclosure of personal in-
formation is associated with self-disclosure. In this connection, the revelation of personal in-
formation is critical for the establishment of a trustful relationship. The media dimension social 
presence describes how media differs in the way individuals communicate based on acoustic,  
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The figure depicts the categorization of internet-based applications into the dimensions of me-
dia research and social processes as proposed by Kaplan and Haenlein (2010), p. 62. 
 
visual and physical contact. Lastly, media richness entails the concept that any type of com-
munication aims to dissolve ambiguity and reduce uncertainty between the communication 
partners (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010). The dimensions and related internet-based application 
types are shown in Figure 2-7.13 The rise of the internet and social media also significantly 
changed the way information is produced, mediated, disseminated and consumed in financial 
markets (Vlastakis and Markellos, 2012). Barber and Odean (2002) describe in their study that 
new online investors increase their trading activity, are more speculative, but performed poorly 
compared to their non-online trades. Also, firms and regulators understand the gaining im-
portance of social media and use this channel as a viable source for the disclosure of price-
sensitive information. Consequently, the SEC announced in 2013 that companies are allowed 
to disclose sensitive information via social media channels (Lee et al., 2015).  
One of the goals of this dissertation is to examine the interaction of social media activity and 
stock markets. More specifically, we aim to disentangle the information- and sentiment-related 
components of potential impacts of social media activity on financial markets. So far, the lit-
erature on social media shares ambivalent opinions and findings on its impact on financial 
markets. Social media applications that originally attracted the broader community instead of 
rather sophisticated individual investors are found to exhibit weak relationships with financial 
markets.14 In this dissertation, we focus on user-generated content in social media applications 
that are highly dedicated to financial markets. Most of the financial studies on social media 
                                                 
13 Please refer to Kaplan and Haenlein (2010), p. 60ff, for detailed descriptions on the internet-based applications 
and the differences in its characteristics. 
14 Sprenger et al. (2014) for example, only find weak evidence for return predictability of Twitter activity. 
Figure 2-7. Classification of Social Media 
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activity and its impact on financial market emerged in the early 2000s. These studies examine 
social media platforms such as internet message boards (e.g., YahooFinance, RagingBull or 
HotCopper), microblogging platforms (e.g., StockTwits), or more dedicated peer-based advis-
ing platforms (e.g., SeekingAlpha). More recently, another stream of literature focuses on in-
ternet search queries (e.g., GoogleTrend) to measure investor attention or sentiment from buzz-
words or the frequency of words people were searching for on the internet. Before we introduce 
our empirical research design and results in chapter 3 to  5, we provide a brief literature review 
on selected and in our view most relevant studies related to the interaction of social media 
activity and financial markets in the next section.  
2.7.4. Investor Sentiment and Social Media 
The interaction of investors on social media takes place in a variety of platforms. In this sec-
tion, we discuss the main characteristics and differences between internet message boards, mi-
croblogging platforms, and peer-based advising platforms before we subsequently provide a 
brief literature review on selected but in our view most relevant studies for this dissertation. 
In one of the pioneering studies on the relation between social media and stock markets, 
Tumarkin and Whitelaw (2001) explored the characteristics of finance-related internet message 
boards. He divides internet messages boards into two categories, namely chat rooms and bul-
letin boards (e.g., Yahoo! Finance, RagingBull, TheLion.com, HotCopper). Chat rooms are 
characterized by live interactions of the chat room members, who discuss on individual stocks 
and the market as a whole. Furthermore, chat rooms lack historical documentation of discus-
sions and do not allow offline users to participate in these discussions. Bulletin boards, on the 
other hand, allow the users to post messages at any time. Bulletin boards usually organize each 
topic separately in a thread. Bulletin board user do not interact “live” but can answer to other 
persons through the bulletin board at a later time. Internet message boards can be categorized 
into public and private sites. The former type, allows a broader base to participate in discus-
sions. Private websites might be preferred by wild speculators (Tumarkin and Whitelaw, 2001). 
This dissertation and many other financial studies on social media mainly refer to internet mes-
sage boards. The nature of postings in internet message boards is fairly simple and short. Most 
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commonly, each message has a time stamp, contains a title and a text with up to 50 words 
(Antweiler and Frank, 2004). 
More dedicated peer-advising platforms (e.g., SeekingAlpha) show opposite characteristics 
to internet message boards. Peer-advising platforms aim to provide opinions and extend anal-
ysis on financials rather than news. The articles and comments, however, are published from 
sophisticated investors rather than a professional analyst. A professionalized peer-advising 
platform ensures a higher quality of the content by reviewing submitted articles by a panel and 
articles are subject to editorial changes. Other users, yet, can comment and reply to articles 
published, sharing their opinion on the recommendation (Chen et al., 2014).  
Another social media platform type used by financial investors are so-called microblogging 
platforms (e.g., StockTwits). These platforms are highly similar to internet message boards but 
most distinctive in three separate ways. First, bulletin boards categories topics in different 
threads. Older messages are, thus, shown prominently as long as no other user replies to the 
comment. Microblogging platforms are characterized by public timelines so that new messages 
are updated quickly and reflect the real-time opinion by topicality rather than a topic itself. 
Second and similar to chat-rooms, microblogging platforms have more a live-chat character 
based on a ticker that users are following. Microblogging users are, hence, confronted with 
new information in real-time and do not need to enter a bulletin board or chat-room actively. 
Third, microbloggers are more exposed to their reputation and have, therefore, a higher incen-
tive to publish valuable information to attract more followers (Sprenger et al., 2014).  
Most studies on social media and its relation to stock markets fell back to data extracted from 
internet message boards. We describe the most important studies in the following. The findings 
are summarized in Table 2-3. 
In one of the first studies in this field, Tumarkin and Whitelaw (2001) explore the impact of 
internet message boards on stock markets. They extract more 181,633 messages from Raging-
Bull on stocks in the US internet service sector with self-disclosed investor sentiment covering 
the time period between April 7th, 1999 to February 18th, 2000. Their results suggest that mes-
sage board activity does not predict returns or abnormal trading activity but is somehow con-
temporaneously related to these market variables. In particular, stock returns and message 
board sentiment appear to be related on days with abnormal message board activity.    
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This table depicts the findings of selected and most relevant studies on the relation between 
social media and financial market activity. The four financial, social media categories consist 
of IMB = internet message boards, FCA = financial commentary and analysis, MBP = mi-
croblogging platforms, and Others. The contemporaneous and predictive relationships be-
tween social media activity and RT = returns, VL = volatility, and TV = trade volume are 
summarized below. + (-) denotes a positive (negative) correlation, no = no significant corre-
lation, 0 = reversal after positive contemp. Correlation, and missing values = no implications.       
Explanatory power of social media 
     
Contemporaneous 
 
Predictive 
Author  
(Year) 
Cate-
gory 
Period Region Index-/  
Firm- 
level 
RT VL TV   RT VL TV 
 
Tumarkin & Whi-
telaw 
(2001) 
IMB 1999 - 
2000 
USA firm + + 
  
no no 
 
 
Antweiler & Frank  
(2004) 
IMB 2000 USA firm + + + 
 
no + +  
Das & Chen 
(2007) 
IMB 2001 USA index 
    
(+) 
  
 
Sabherwal, Sarkar & 
Zhang 
(2011) 
IMB 2005 – 
2006 
USA firm + - + 
 
0 - + 
 
Kim & Kim 
(2014) 
IMB 2005 - 
2010 
USA both no no no 
 
no no no  
Chen, De, Hu & 
Hwang 
(2014) 
FCA 2005 - 
2012 
USA firm 
    
+ 
  
 
Leung & Ton 
(2015) 
IMB 2002 -  
2008 
AUS firm + + + 
 
(no) 
 
+  
Heimer 
(2916) 
Other 2009 - 
2010 
USA firm 
      
+  
Renault 
(2017) 
MBP 2012 - 
2016 
USA index +       0      
 
In the seminal work by Antweiler and Frank (2004), the authors examine how internet message 
board sentiment, disagreement amongst the users and the number of total board messages relate 
to stock returns, trading activity and return volatility. They downloaded more than 1.5 million 
board messages posted on Yahoo!Finance and RagingBull in the calendar year 2000 on 45 US 
firms listed on the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and the Dow Jones Internet Com-
merce Index (XLK).  Using a Naïve-Bayes algorithm, based on an individual training dataset 
of 1,000 messages, the authors classify the board sentiment according to buy, sell and hold 
categories.  In their findings, the level of message posting activity is significantly related to the 
 Table 2-3. Relation between Social Media and Financial Market Activity 
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next day’s return, yet only of small economic impact when considering plausible transaction 
costs. The authors, thus, conclude that investor bullishness exhibit no predictive power for 
stock returns. In according to the no-trade theory, disagreement of internet message board users 
is found to be associated with increased trading on the same day. However, the high trading 
activity is followed by a reversal in the subsequent day. The authors also find that message 
postings predict return volatility, whereas bullishness and disagreement amongst users appear 
not to have a significant influence. 
In another study, Das and Chen (2007) investigate the relationship between internet message 
board activity and stock returns on the aggregate and firm level. The authors apply five differ-
ent machine learning algorithms to classify 145,110 messages according to different sentiment 
categories. The US data covers 24 stocks in the technology sector in the period between July 
2001 and August 2001. Overall, the results of their study suggest that an aggregated sentiment 
index predicts the next day’s aggregate stock index returns. However, the authors cannot find 
a similar relationship on the individual firm-level. Since the stock index, on the other hand, 
does not predict board sentiment, the authors conclude that internet message board sentiment 
offers explanatory power for stock returns at least on the aggregate level. Furthermore, their 
results exhibit an inverse relationship between sentiment and disagreement. When disagree-
ment increases amongst the internet message board users, sentiment appears to drop. 
Additionally, the authors find indications for a positive correlation between message board 
activity and sentiment. Finally, and consistent with the findings of Antweiler and Frank (2004), 
the authors find a strong relationship between message volume and return volatility.  
Sabherwal et al. (2011) examine in another study the impact of internet stock message boards 
on stock returns on days without fundamental news but with high posting volume. The authors 
observe a pump-and-dump pattern which translates into a significant positive contemporaneous 
and a negative relationship in the subsequent two days between a credit-weighted sentiment 
index and the market return. In their study, the internet message board data was extracted from 
TheLion.com, consisting of a total of 12,000 messages between the period of July 2005 and 
July 2006. Similar to the previous studies, the authors fall back to self-disclosed sentiment and 
apply the Naive-Bayes algorithm to classify messages without self-disclosed sentiment. They 
also find that absolute sentiment scores are negatively related with contemporaneous and the 
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next day’s intraday volatility but positively associated with the number of small volume trades. 
Hence, the authors conclude that internet message board activity is a significant predictor of 
financial market activity. However, one can object that the results of their study are mostly 
only of small economic importance. 
In a more recent study, Kim and Kim (2014) examined a broad dataset of 32 million messages 
on 91 firms posted on Yahoo!Finance between January 2005 and December 2010. The authors 
use sentiment information revealed by the investors but also apply machine learning algorithms 
to classify the messages according to sentiment categories. The authors find no contemporane-
ous and predictive relationship between investor sentiment and stock returns on the individual 
and aggregate level. However, the sentiment expressed on the internet message board are found 
to follow prior stock performances. Furthermore, the authors find no evidence for relations 
between message board activity and volatility or trading volume.  
Deviating from the base ground of the previous studies which focused on internet message 
boards, Chen et al. (2014) research on the question whether social media predicts future stock 
returns and earnings surprises. The authors refer to a US platform for investors called Seek-
ingAlpha. The platform contains sophisticated articles and commentaries written by more than 
6,500 and 180,000 users, respectively. The coverage encompasses more than 7,000 firms in the 
period between 2005 and 2012. Similar to Tetlock (2007), Chen et al. (2014) conduct textual 
analysis of the articles and commentaries and focus on the fraction of negative words in the 
overall text.  To disentangle the sentiment and information content of the articles and 
commentaries, the authors differentiate the analysis between the predictability of social media 
for stock performances and earnings surprises. In the case, that SeekingAlpha opinions do not 
contain fundamental information, one should expect no relationship between social media and  
earnings announcements. However, the authors find implications that SeekingAlpha opinions 
include value-relevant information. Consequently, the results endorse the return predictability 
of SeekingAlpha views for both, future stock performances but also earnings surprises. 
Additionally, the authors find no support for return reversals, which speaks against an overre-
action of the market to content disseminated via social media.  
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Leung and Ton (2015) examine how internet message board activity in Australia relates to 
financial market activity. They extract more than 2.5 million messages from the leading Aus-
tralian internet message board HotCopper for the period between 2003 and 2008. The authors 
exclude messages around public price-sensitive announcements which are reported to the Aus-
tralian Securities Exchange (ASX) on a mandatory basis. The data covers more 2,142 stocks 
with more than 1.8 million observations. A positive contemporaneous relationship between 
investor sentiment and stock returns is only found for small capitalization stocks with high 
growth potential. Additionally, posting activity predicts trading volume and bid-ask spreads on 
the next day. The authors also document that bullish small stocks outperform bearish stocks 
with the absence of a return reversal. Overall, Leung and Ton (2015) find that large stocks are 
not affected by internet message board activity. 
Heimer (2016) studies in a recent study, the role of social interaction in social media and its 
relation to the disposition effect, which states that investors tend to sell winners too quickly but 
hold on to losers. The authors refer to the myForexBook database which directly links broker-
age accounts to a social network of retail traders. They rely on trading data between early 2009 
and December 2010 with more than 2.2 million trades conducted by 5,693 traders. After the 
application of distinctive filters, the authors end up with a dataset consisting of trades by 2,598 
traders. Heimer (2016) finds evidence that exposure to the social media platform myForexBook 
doubles the susceptibility to the disposition effect on trading activity. He explains this finding 
at some part with impression management by traders on social media. Efforts to maintain a 
positive self-image on the social media platform translate into trading strategies which enforce 
the disposition effect. Also, the increased social interaction between traders is found to be pos-
itively related to trading volume. Together, a positive self-image and network effects as a result 
of social interaction reinforce each other since the perception of success enables traders to 
interact more persuasively with others socially. 
The previous studies examined the relationship between social media and stock market activ-
ity on the daily time horizon. Renault (2017) studies in his paper the relation between investor 
sentiment and stock returns on the intraday basis. In particular, he explores the sentiment in-
formation extracted from the microblogging platform StockTwits. His dataset consists of more 
than 60 million messages from more than 240,000 distinct users in the period between 2012 
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and 2016. The author compares in this study five different classifiers for sentiment classifica-
tion, including an own investor lexicon (previous studies commonly referred to the word lexi-
con developed my Loughran and McDonald (2011)). He finds that the aggregated sentiment 
extracted from individual messages helps to predict intraday stock index returns of the S&P 
500 ETF. Controlling for past market returns, Renault (2017) documents that the first half-hour 
change in aggregated investor sentiment forecasts the last-half hour S&P 500 index ETF return. 
His results are primarily driven by shifts in the sentiment of novice users with low experience 
levels in financial trading. Furthermore, the results imply a short-term price pressure with a 
return reversal on the following day. All in all, his findings support the sentiment and noise-
trading hypothesis, that views shared in financial, social media do not convey value-relevant 
information. 
The studies presented above show the ambiguity that researchers encounter when exploring 
the role of social media in financial markets. Additionally, most studies in this research field 
only shed light on the topic for a very short time horizon without any long-term implications 
for aggregated sentiment waves. This dissertation, therefore, aims to provide further insights 
and explore new settings in which social media induces noise or conveys value-relevant infor-
mation to the market.   
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 Summary 
This chapter described the main concepts of traditional and behavioral finance theory. We 
summarized in the first step the core elements of the efficient market hypothesis. In this theory, 
financial markets react quickly and efficiently to new information so that prices immediately 
incorporate new information and do not reverse subsequently in the longer time horizon. How-
ever, researchers quickly began to question the basic assumptions of efficient markets. Empir-
ical studies observed return patterns or market anomalies that cannot be explained by the 
actions of rational investors. Moreover, cognitive aspects became more important in explaining 
why financial markets might deviate from fundamentals. The new research stream is commonly 
subsumed and coined under the behavioral finance theory. In this connection, we introduced 
limitations to perfect markets which hinder rational investors to arbitrage away market imper-
fections. These limitations are in particular formalized within the noise-trader model which 
first gave a theoretical framework on risk-perception and behavioral explanations for non-ra-
tional trading patterns. 
Three well-established behavioral models and theories evolved that attempt to provide a uni-
fied theory of behavioral biases and observed market anomalies. First, Daniel et al. (1998) 
provide in their model explanations for market over- and underreactions based on the cognitive 
concepts of overconfidence and biased self-attribution. Second, Barberis et al. (1998) devel-
oped a unified theory of investor sentiment and relate market over- and underreactions to cog-
nitive biases resulting from representativeness and conservatism. Lastly, Hong and Stein 
(1999) created a comprehensive behavioral model to link the anomalies of market overreac-
tions, underreactions, and momentum. Different from the previous two models, which can be 
classified as unified behavioral models, Hong and Stein (1999) refer to an interaction-based 
framework with heterogeneous agents. Hence, their model explains deviations from fundamen-
tal values with the interaction of different agents in the market rather than behavioral biases 
that might provoke investors to conduct uninformed trades. 
After the explanation of market anomalies and possible causes for deviations in market prices 
from its fundamentals, this chapter briefly introduced the informational framework on how 
investors, firms, and analysts interact based on different media channels. We summarized the 
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most important observations of behavioral related financial studies that deal with investor sen-
timent in association with traditional news media as well as social media. This dissertation aims 
to shed light on the elusive role of (social) media in financial markets. We, thus, empirically 
test in different settings how (social) media activity and investor sentiment relate to financial 
market activity. 
Chapter 3 empirically tests the informativeness of investor sentiment in the general context 
and around event-specific situations to disentangle the sentiment and information content con-
veyed by investor sentiment in internet message boards. Hence, we evaluate the impact of the 
level of message board activity, sentiment, and disagreement on market variables such as stock 
returns, volatility, and earnings surprises.  
Chapter 4 specifically deals with investor attention around M&A announcements and ex-
plores how activity in internet message boards contribute to market efficiency. Previous liter-
ature observed the phenomena of target run-ups, where target firms experience a rise in share 
prices before the actual M&A announcements. Some researchers explain this pattern in general 
with market efficiency, others with the leakage of insider information. We consequently exam-
ine how the crowd (individual investors on internet message boards) might discover such tar-
gets upfront or contribute to target run-ups. 
In the last empirical setup, chapter 5 investigates the cross-sectional relation of media senti-
ment and stock returns in the short- and long-term perspective. In a classical asset pricing con-
text, we conduct various empirical analysis to explore whether investors underreact or overre-
act to media sentiment in the short-term or whether media sentiment is perceived as a persistent 
risk factor in the market. 
Chapter 6 finally concludes the findings of this dissertation and discusses the avenues for 
further research on the topic of investor sentiment and its relation to financial markets. 
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3. Agreeing to Disagree: Informativeness of Sentiments in Internet Message Boards15 
ABSTRACT: We study the informativeness of the convergence of sentiments in posts on 
HotCopper, the largest Australian online stock message board. We find that positive sentiment 
is associated with noise-induced (uninformed) trading whereas negative sentiment contains 
value-relevant information about a firm’s performance. Our empirical findings suggest that 
short selling activity reduces overreactions of abnormal returns in a noisy environment on the 
same day. Furthermore, we observe a sentiment convergence pattern around annual earnings 
announcements and low levels of sentiment homogeneity relate to significantly lower annual 
earnings surprise. This supports the view that disagreements amongst sentiments are a signal 
of bad news about firm fundamentals.  
 Introduction 
In the past decade, the growth in the use of online technologies such as social media platforms 
to disseminate the interpretation of financial news meant that investors face a more disaggre-
gated set of informational channels than ever before. We investigate how this form of financial 
innovation may add value-relevant information and how it relates to risks in stock price returns. 
We employ the sentiments of posts on HotCopper, the largest Australian online stock message 
board, to find that negative sentiment contains value-relevant information about a firm’s per-
formance and that disagreements amongst sentiments are a signal of bad news about firm fun-
damentals. Further, we reveal that volatilities of stock price returns induce higher levels of 
posting activities. Based on the seminal work of Antweiler and Frank (2004), studies on social 
media outlets (e.g., internet message boards, Twitter16, Google17) examine how sentiment, mes-
sage- and internet search volume are related to reactions in the equities markets. Studies on 
                                                 
15 For helpful comments, we thank Jens Martin, Taylan Mavruk and further conference participants at the 2017 International 
Finance and Banking Society Asia Conference in Ningbo. 
16The social media phenomena Twitter is rather found to be an echo of equities market activity (Sprenger et al., 2014) despite 
its indisputable US influence in political discussions. Recent studies relate emotions and moods on Twitter with equities market 
activity (Bollen et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2011; Nofer and Hinz, 2015). However, results are ambiguous. Nofer and Hinz 
(2015) for example argue that follower-weighted social mood levels would predict market returns on the subsequent day. 
Bollen et al. (2011) only find significant relations for the mood “calm” with regards to market performance. Sprenger et al. 
(2014) on the other hand applied the method used by Antweiler and Frank (2004) on Twitter and found that individual stock 
market activity impacts on tweet activity rather than the other way around. 
17A number of studies examine the relation between the Google Search Volume Index (SVI) and market activity to understand 
the role of sentiment and social media activity in terms of price discovery and investor attention.  Google related studies on 
the other hand analyze the implications of Google search volume. They derive market sentiments on the aggregate level  and 
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internet message boards have been contentious surrounding the return predictability of senti-
ment shared on social media (Tumarkin and Whitelaw, 2001; Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Das 
and Chen, 2007; Kim and Kim, 2014). Chen et al. (2014), however, find in their study that the 
fraction of negative words of articles and comments published on the peer-based advising plat-
form Seeking Alpha predicts returns over different time horizons. The difference in results to 
other studies is mainly explained by the broader sample and the more sophisticated design of 
messages posted on Seeking Alpha. Nonetheless, the results only relate to negative sentiment 
and the relation between positive sentiment and equities market activity has received little at-
tention, even though it is equally or even more so for internet message boards.18 
Tumarkin and Whitelaw (2001) find a contemporaneous relation between message board ac-
tivity and returns. Antweiler and Frank (2004) find significant, but the negative contempora-
neous correlation between stock returns and the message volume the following day. Das and 
Chen (2007) find no significant relationship between internet message board sentiment and 
individual stock prices. However, at the aggregate level, results indicate a relation between 
sentiment and stock prices. In another study, Kim and Kim (2014) compare self-disclosed and 
machine classified sentiment based on the Naïve Bayes algorithm and find little evidence that 
sentiment would predict future stock returns at an individual or aggregate level (also for market 
volatility and trading volume). Chen et al. (2014) show in their study that opinions on Seeking 
Alpha strongly predict future returns and earnings surprises. Similar to other media related 
studies, they find no significant relation for positive word categories and therefore focused on 
the relation of the negativity of articles and comments on future stock performances. Leung 
and Ton (2015) find that message board activity strongly relates to small market capitalization 
activity. We argue that bullish stock portfolios outperform bearish stocks in the same month, 
                                                 
suggest that Google search volume predicts market developments (Da et al., 2011; Da et al., 2015). Da et al. (2011) find that 
search frequency in Google (SVI) is a direct measure of retail investor attention and that SVI predicts higher stock prices the 
subsequent two weeks with potential return reversals within one year. Drake et al. (2012) show that investor information 
demand increases market efficiency surrounding earnings announcements. Other studies relate SVI with market indices and 
volatility (Vlastakis and Markellos, 2012; Vozlyublennaia, 2014; Andrei and Hasler, 2015; Da et al., 2015). As suggested by 
Tetlock (2007), negative terms in English language are more reliable for identifying investors sentiment. Consequently,  only 
applied negative terms to form their SVI based FEARS index used to measure the household sentiment. They find that the 
FEARS index predicts market returns, revealing contemporaneous low returns but higher returns the subsequent day. This 
might be consistent with the noise trading theory and the sentiment-induced divergence of asset pricing from the fundamental 
values. 
18 Antweiler and Frank (2004) and Leung and Ton (2015) show that sentiment expressed on internet message boards are 
strongly biased towards positive sentiment. 
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however with diminishing differences in subsequent months. Lead-lag-regressions show pre-
dictive power of message volume and sentiment for the next two days for small stocks however 
only with little economic significance. Renault (2017) provides evidence that the previous day 
last half-hour change in investor sentiment helps to forecast intraday stock index returns. In 
this study, we further attempt to analyze the role of stock message boards in the price discovery 
process. We examine whether positive and negative sentiment convey different levels of value-
relevant market information and further elaborate on implications for financial regulators. 
A common term used in relation with investor sentiment and noise trading is the term “Bull-
ishness”. Brown and Cliff (2004) define “Bullishness” as investor sentiment attached to some 
degree of outperformance of stocks, generally measured by their positive abnormal returns. 
However, the classical finance theory does not support the role of investor sentiment. It argues 
that mispricing will be offset by rational investors who statistically optimize their portfolio, 
leading to a price equilibrium based on arbitrage. A deviation of market pricing and a firm’s 
fundamental would, therefore, result from an uninformed demand shock and limits on arbitrage 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2006). De Long et al. (1990) argue that if irrational noise traders trade 
based on their erroneous stochastic beliefs, they would affect prices and create risk in the asset 
pricing. As a result, excess market volatility, divergence from fundamental values and the re-
version of stock returns are surrounded by market activity induced by noise traders. According 
to this theory, when sentiment rises, uninformed traders increase their capital allocation to as-
sets with higher risk classes and will drive prices away from their fundamental. This is followed 
by returns reversal and convergence to the price equilibrium (Kim and Kim, 2014). If returns 
do not reverse hereafter, it implies that sentiment conveys value-relevant information for mar-
ket participants. 
Our study differentiates itself from former studies on internet message boards. We examine 
the relation between distinctive sentiment environments (positive and negative) and equities 
market activity. Former studies mainly focused on the influence of average bullishness scores 
or only negative sentiments on social media. However, we show that the segmentation of sen-
timent is essential in sentiment analysis with significantly distinctive implications for equities 
markets (uninformed vs. informed trading). Using the sentiment disclosed by posters on 
HotCopper, we do not rely on machine learning algorithms compared to former studies 
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(Tumarkin and Whitelaw, 2001; Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Das and Chen, 2007). For exam-
ple, Das and Chen (2007) find that the popular Naïve-Bayes Algorithm revealed only a 50% 
accuracy on sentiment classification for their study. Our sample is, therefore, free from classi-
fication bias.  
Second, from the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to shed light on the relationship 
between short selling activity and sentiment expressed on internet message boards. Former 
studies have argued that limits on arbitrage resulting from short time horizons and higher 
cost/risk profiles of especially low capitalization and growth stocks might prevent contrarian 
arbitrageurs to trade against noise traders (De Long et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Baker and Wurgler, 2007). Short selling, as one mean of arbitrage, is regulated by the Corpo-
rations Act 2001 and the Corporations Regulations 2001 in Australia.19 Most short selling ac-
tivity in Australia is based on covered short sales since naked short sales are generally restricted 
except given circumstances. A violation of reporting would result in an offense as defined by 
the Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC). In our study, we use the short 
selling position data set from the ASIC to examine whether short selling activity contributes to 
the price stabilization process in a noisy or uninformed trading environment.    
Third, we analyze a broad data sample of 3,050 stocks with 4,586,271 stock forum messages 
between January 2008 and May 2016. Previous studies usually focused on tech companies or 
on the most active firms on the internet message board of up to 100 stocks for an only short 
period of time (usually less than one year). Our broad sample, therefore, allows us to examine 
the distinctive relationship between social media and equities markets on the aggregate and 
individual stock level over a longer time horizon. Due to their focus at the aggregate index 
level, former studies were thus prone to cancelation errors of overly optimistic or pessimistic 
individual stock sentiments on the aggregate level (Kim and Kim, 2014) and they were also 
subject to time effects.  
Fourth, we examine the relation between sentiment homogeneity and firm’s fundamentals 
around annual earnings announcements as well as equities market performance. As previous 
studies only examined how agreement on sentiment (namely the standard deviation of posted 
sentiments) relates to future stock returns and volatility, we furthermore analyze how sentiment 
                                                 
19 http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/regulatory-guides/rg-196-short-selling/. 
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homogeneity cross-sectionally and contemporaneously relates to activities in the equities mar-
ket. 
We show that positive sentiment shared on internet message boards induce noisy (unin-
formed) market trading activities with significant contemporaneous abnormal returns but neg-
ative return reversals the following days. We find empirical evidence that short selling activity 
reduces overreactions on positive sentiment expressed on internet message boards on the same 
day. Due to costly short selling activities for especially low capitalization and growth stocks, 
we argue that only informed short-sellers would take the risk to bet against positive sentiment 
traders. Furthermore, we find that stocks with negative sentiment postings experience signifi-
cantly lower abnormal returns. These effects are made visible by the segmentation of an aver-
age sentiment score into positive or negative sentiment scores. The results hold for small cap-
italization stocks. Additionally, we show that stock price volatility and internet message post-
ing volume correlate with each other, however with stronger impact from volatility to posting 
volume. For the aforementioned implications on sentiment and stock price volatility, we find 
that significance and magnitudes in results also strongly depend on the differentiated analysis 
on the aggregate index or individual stock level.  
Finally, we observe an agreement convergence pattern prior to annual earnings announce-
ments, and we show that stocks with low levels of sentiment homogeneity (low sentiment 
and/or agreement) experience significantly lower annual earnings surprise. This supports the 
view that disagreement and/or low sentiment levels amongst investors are a signal of bad news 
about firm fundamentals. The overall findings suggest that positive and negative sentiment are 
drivers for noise- and value-prompted price movements, respectively. Also, we show that the 
level of sentiment homogeneity is an indicator of changes in firm’s fundamentals before annual 
earnings announcements.  
In section 3.2, we describe the message board data and financial data. Section 3.3 shows the 
event study results. Section 3.4 encompasses the main regression analysis and results from 
vector autoregressions as well as Granger causality tests. Section 3.5 describes the cross-sec-
tional portfolio performance based on sentiment and agreement as well as results from regres-
sions regarding earnings surprises. Section 3.6 concludes the overall findings. 
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 Data and Research Design 
The data for this study was downloaded from the HotCopper Message Board, Australia’s 
largest message board with more than 250,000 registered members and more than 200,000 
unique website visitors every month. Most members of this internet message board are Aus-
tralian investors and share market traders generating more than 21 million monthly page views. 
In Australia, HotCopper has 18 times the traffic compared to its nearest competitors and com-
parable financial websites. HotCopper is a free access forum and enables investors to discuss 
financial topics such as the ASX and foreign stock markets, IPOs or Foreign Currency Trad-
ing.20 Our dataset contains 4,586,271 forum messages posted in the period from January 2008 
to May 2016. We include examples of opinions and messages extracted from HotCopper in 
Table 3-1 to provide a sense of information depth and content of board messages. Figure 3-1 
compares the posting activity for small and large stocks of our current dataset with our previous 
study (Leung and Ton, 2015). Small stocks still account for most of the posting activity with 
similar pattern compared to the past study. Peaks of message board activity have moved to the 
opening (10 a.m.) trading hours of the ASX. 
 
 
3.2.1. Internet Stock Message Board Sentiment and Agreement 
Previous studies were compelled to apply text classifier for sentiment classification of indi-
vidual board messages since board users did not directly reveal their recommendations (Buy 
                                                 
20 For more information please visit https://hotcopper.com.au/about/. 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
0:
0
0
1:
0
0
2:
0
0
3:
0
0
4:
0
0
5:
0
0
6:
0
0
7:
0
0
8:
0
0
9:
0
0
1
0
:0
0
1
1
:0
0
1
2
:0
0
1
3
:0
0
1
4
:0
0
1
5
:0
0
1
6
:0
0
1
7
:0
0
1
8
:0
0
1
9
:0
0
2
0
:0
0
2
1
:0
0
2
2
:0
0
2
3
:0
0
Small Stocks
Large Stocks
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
0:
0
0
1:
0
0
2:
0
0
3:
0
0
4:
0
0
5:
0
0
6:
0
0
7:
0
0
8:
0
0
9:
0
0
1
0
:0
0
1
1
:0
0
1
2
:0
0
1
3
:0
0
1
4
:0
0
1
5
:0
0
1
6
:0
0
1
7
:0
0
1
8
:0
0
1
9
:0
0
2
0
:0
0
2
1
:0
0
2
2
:0
0
2
3
:0
0
Small Stocks
Large Stocks
Figure 3-1. Message Postings (in thsd.): 2003-2008 vs. 2008-05/2016 
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vs. Sell) on internet message boards. Outcomes, therefore, relied on the quality and the accu-
racy of the applied methods. Our study has the advantage to fall back on board messages with 
self-disclosed sentiment and therefore lowers the risk of false sentiment classification. HotCop-
per allows its users to classify their sentiment along seven categories: “Hold”, “Short-term 
Buy”, “Long-term Buy”, “Buy”, “Short-term Sell”, “Long-term Sell” and “Sell”. As time ef-
fects are difficult to measure (e.g., long-term sell vs. sell), we assign all short-term, long-term 
and sell/buy recommendations to “Sell/Buy”. Different findings on the relation of internet 
board message sentiment and market activity are existent and may be attributed to different 
measures of sentiment. In this connection, Baker and Wurgler (2007) conclude that one of the 
key issues for researchers to address is the matter of sentiment measurement and the quantifi-
cation of its impact. Another question which needs to be answered is also the different nature 
of stock message boards and its degree of professionalism. But this must be elaborated in an-
other study and is a not focus in this one. Thus, existing findings on social media sentiment and 
their impact on capital markets are ambiguous. 
 Some authors find contemporaneous correlations between sentiment and stock returns (Ant-
weiler and Frank, 2004); others show that only negative sentiment predicts future stock returns 
(Chen et al., 2014). In turn, Kim and Kim (2014) argue that stock returns rather condition 
sentiment reaction than the other way around. All studies have in common, that analysis was 
either based on average sentiment scores or only contemplated the impact of negative sentiment 
on the capital market. To examine whether sentiment partitioning may improve the predictive 
power of message board sentiment scores, we employ the standardized Bullishness index from 
Antweiler and Frank (2004)  for our sentiment analysis and disentangle the average sentiment 
index into a dedicated positive and negative sentiment score. Only buy and sell messages (forth 
on called financial relevant messages) are included into the bullishness index. The total number 
of relevant messages is, therefore, defined as 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑈𝑌 + 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿 .  
Following Antweiler and Frank (2004) the standardized bullish index Bullishnessi,t for stock 
i at time t is defined as: 
𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ≡ 
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑈𝑌 − 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
 ∙ ln (1 + 𝑀𝑖,𝑡) (10) 
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To measure the differentiated impact of positive and negative sentiment, we define the posi-
tive and negative sentiment for stock i on day t as: 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ≡ ln (1 + 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑈𝑌) (11) 
and 
𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ≡ ln (1 + 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿) (12) 
We also include an agreement index Ai,t (see Antweiler and Frank (2004)) to measure the 
degree of agreement between sentiments of messages. This score is also used in a later section 
to examine how sentiment and agreement jointly convey fundamental information around com-
pany events (especially earnings announcements).  
The agreement index Ai,t is defined by: 
 
𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  ≡ 1 − √1 − (
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑈𝑌 − 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
 ) (13) 
3.2.2. Financial Data 
We obtain individual daily trading data from Compustat / Securities Industry Research Centre 
of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) for our observation period of January 1st, 2008, to May 31st, 2016. 
The data contains exchange ticker codes for each transaction with a timestamp, price, price 
returns, highest and lowest daily price. We calculate Volatilityi,t-30,t-1 as the 30 trading-day 
standard deviations of returns prior to day t. Following Chakrabarty et al. (2012), we define 
daily volatility, Volatilityi,t, as the relative difference between the highest and the lowest price 
of the stock i on day t scaled by the daily closing price. 
We use the market-weighted All Ordinaries Index to proxy the market performance since it 
includes 500 constituents and is, therefore, the broadest index in the Australian market. Using 
the market index, we calculate abnormal returns, AbReti,t-j,t-k, as the difference between the 
firm’s compounded stock return and value-weighted market return over a defined holding pe-
riod j to k (see Akbas (2016)). 
   
This table represents four examples of messages posted in the thread ‘Quarterly report due this week’ on the internet message 
board HotCopper (https://hotcopper.com.au). 
Ticker Thread time Post ID Posting time Disclosure User Message Sentiment 
EDE 27/04/16 17:13 17615495  28/04/16 07:07 Held Espinsight My thoughts are that the Quarterly re-
ports give a neat overview and can con-
tain a clear vision of expectations, par-
ticularly for new investors, or those 
considering investing. Should likely be 
very positive and confirming.  
Buy 
EDE 26/04/16 10:41 17598450  26/04/16 12:38 Held RULES Plans in place to increase Colorado's ca-
pacity to 24,000,000 gals p.a. by late 
this year to early next year at approx 
20% margin on $25.00/gal should pave 
the way for the cash you reckon is short. 
Time will Tell. 
Buy 
EDE  27/04/16 17:13 17618313  28/04/16 11:05 Held brassmad As a newbie to HC it's sometimes quite 
difficult to put together the structure of 
companies, so your post has helped me 
in that regard. I'm gradually getting my 
head around the acronyms but there's 
one in your post that I can't decipher..... 
could you let me know what R/I stands 
for? Really enjoy reading MOST of the 
comments posted. 
Hold 
EDE  26/04/16 10:41 17596748  26/04/16 10:41 Not Held Colstone The involvement of the state of Georgia 
as well giving tax breaks and no doubt 
future business will only benefit this 
company. But after having a look 
through their statements in the weekend 
they have basically no cash at the mo-
ment and plans to spend 68mil building 
a plant that will take years... 
Sell 
 
Table 3-1. Example of HotCopper Messages 
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This table reports the summary statistics of the main internet message board and financial 
control variables. The observations are on a firm-day level. LogMessagesi,t is the log trans-
formation (1+Mt), Bullishnessi,t is the standardized bullishness index defined in formula (10), 
PosSentimenti,t and NegSentimenti,t describe the positive and negative sentiment denoted in 
formula (11) and (12), Agreementi,t is the agreement index described in formula (13), AbReti,t 
describes the firm’s abnormal return, calculated as the difference of compound raw returns 
and value-weighted market return, Volatilityi,t-30,t-1 is the 30-day-standard deviation of returns 
prior to day t,  Upgradei,t/Downgradei,t describe the number of analyst upgrade/downgrade 
recommendation on day t, PosMeanESi,t/NegMeanESi,t denote dummy variables for posi-
tive/negative mean earnings surprise on day t. 
  N Mean Median Std. Dev. 10th Pctl. 25th Pctl. 75th Pctl. 90th Pctl. 
Message board variables 
LogMessagesi,t 390,842 1.292 1.099 0.703 0.693 0.693 1.609 2.303 
Bullishnessi,t 390,842 1.096 1.099 0.840 0.693 0.693 1.609 2.197 
PosSentimenti,t 390,842 1.218 1.099 0.733 0.693 0.693 1.609 2.197 
NegSentimenti,t 390,842 0.136 0.000 0.381 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.693 
Agreementi,t 390,842 0.925 1.000 0.246 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Financial control variables        
AbReti,t 390,842 -0.001 -0.001 0.070 -0.058 -0.024 0.020 0.059 
AbReti,t-1 390,842 -0.003 -0.002 0.067 -0.055 -0.023 0.016 0.049 
AbReti,t-2 390,842 -0.002 -0.002 0.068 -0.057 -0.024 0.017 0.052 
Volatilityi,t-30,t-1 390,842 0.047 0.039 0.038 0.017 0.026 0.057 0.083 
Upgradei,t 390,842 0.043 0.000 0.412 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Downgradei,t 390,842 0.074 0.000 0.630 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PosMeanESi,t 390,842 0.007 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NegMeanESi,t 390,842 0.002 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
In order to examine the value-relevant information content of board messages around finan-
cially relevant company events, in this case yearly earnings announcements, we obtain data on 
analyst recommendations and earnings forecast from the IBES summary, surprise and detail 
history file. The IBES summary file contains information about the number of recommendation 
upgrades/downgrades for firm i on day t (Upgradei,t/Downgradei,t). The IBES surprise history 
file tracks the mean consensus Earnings per Share-estimate for a particular fiscal period. We 
use this metric to assign positive and negative mean earnings surprise dummy variables to firm 
i on day t, (PosMeanESi,t/NegMeanESi,t). We also constructed median consensus analyst fore-
cast to calculate annual earnings surprises for our analyses. The approach will be detailed in a 
later section. 
Table 3-2. Summary Statistics: On Firm/Trading Level  
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3.2.3. Sample Characteristics and Summary Statistics 
Table 3-2 presents the descriptive statistics of the main internet message board and financial 
variables used in our main analysis. It is apparent that positive sentiment dominates the under-
lying sentiment on HotCopper. Similar to previous studies, board message users rather express 
positive opinions and might want to avoid to speak against their own interest (e.g., Antweiler 
and Frank, 2004; Kim and Kim, 2014; Leung and Ton, 2015). The trend towards positive sen-
timent also comes along with a high agreement amongst users. Where the Agreement index 
might take values up to 1, the average Agreement score is 0.925, and in more than half of the 
firm-days, users agree on their sentiment (median of 1). Abnormal returns are slightly negative, 
which might result from larger firms outperforming smaller firms during the sample period and 
our use of a value-weighted market index similar to Kim and Kim (2014).  We find a higher 
number of analyst downgrade recommendations but a higher number of firm-days with positive 
earnings surprises on day t during our sample period. 
To examine the impact of sentiment and the value relevant information content of internet 
message board, we mainly conduct four different types of analysis with varying underlying 
datasets: 
(a) Event study dataset: We segment our event study sample into events triggered by an 
abnormal level of positive or negative sentiment expressed on day t. Additionally, we 
analyze the impact of events with increasing minimum number of positive or negative 
messages [10, 20, 30, 40] on day t. Events triggered by Buy/Sell messages sum up to a 
range between 1,093/17 (min. 40 messages) and 13,126/493 (min. 10 messages). Again, 
the data set implies a high bias towards positive related board messages.  
(b) Regression dataset: The total HotCopper message board data set covers 3,362 stocks 
(2,700 stocks with at least 100 messages) whereas the trading dataset contains 3,778 
stocks between January 2008 and May 2016. We only deleted messages if no trade oc-
curred on the day and the total number of stocks covered in our regression results in 3,050. 
The regression sample on firm-day level contains 283,585 to 390,842 observations de-
pending on the holding period of the regression. The market capitalization of the stocks 
with available data has a mean of 691.1 million Australian dollars (AUD). Similar to our 
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previous study, we find that the majority of stocks discussed on HotCopper can be clas-
sified as small stocks with a median stock capitalization of 19,2 million AUD. 
(c) (Panel) Vector autoregression (VAR) data set: We analyze the causal relationship be-
tween (c.1) board sentiment and abnormal returns and (c.2) message volume and daily 
price volatility by using (panel) VAR models as well as the Granger causality test on the 
aggregate and individual stock level. We apply lag order selection tests to determine the 
optimal lag length for our (panel) VARs. On the aggregate (individual) level, the optimal 
leg length of 4 (3) for c.1 and 3 (3) for c.2 results in data sets with 380 (42,872) and 797 
(42,872) observations, respectively.       
(d) Regressions around earnings announcements data set: In order to examine the value 
content of internet message boards around company-specific events, in this paper annual 
earnings announcements, we construct earnings surprises using analyst forecasts and his-
torical numbers. We obtain 479 observations and 560 observations for a cumulative pe-
riod of [t-7, t-1], respectively. 
 Event Study 
In section 3.2.1, we have argued that internet message board postings might have varying 
relations to the stock market depending on the sentiment expressed. Based on the findings of 
Tetlock (2007), we expect negative opinions on internet message boards to have a more pro-
nounced influence on capital market features.  In another study, Chen et al. (2014) find no 
correlation between positive sentiment and market features. De Long et al. (1990) argue in their 
study that noise traders act based on their erroneous beliefs which affects asset prices, moves 
them away from their fundamental values and reinforce market volatility. Due to the bullish-
ness nature of message boards (e.g., Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Leung and Ton, 2015), one 
might argue that especially negative sentiment contains more value relevant information as 
internet message board users would like to discuss negative associated firm information in only 
very specific situations. 
Hence, we test the hypothesis that positive and negative sentiment have a significantly differ-
ent relation to stock market prices and that herding of bullish internet message board users 
quickly reflects in the market but only remain temporarily influential. Abnormal returns were  
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calculated based on the market excess model in order to examine the relationship between 
message board activity and abnormal markets features. We define an event as a day t with 
abnormal message posting volume (at least 10 buy/sell messages), where message volume on 
day t exceeds double the standard deviation of message posting volume in the previous five 
days. We, therefore, determine an event window of t – 5 to t + 5 and control for overlapping 
events and thus momentum-induced noise. Consequently, we only included the first event 
within a seven-day period. Results are shown in Figure 3-2 (min. of 10/20 messages) and Figure 
3-3 (min. of 30/40 messages) and are tabulated in Table 3-3 (“Buy”-events) and Table 3-4 
(“Sell”-events). On the event day, average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) are signifi-
cant for positive and negative triggered events, however with lower impact for positively re-
lated events. Applying the parametric t-test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon-test, we find for 
event days with minimum of 20 messages highly significant ACARs of 2.03% (buy) and -
5.23% (sell). Robustness tests on events with a minimum of 30 or 40 messages show similar 
and even stronger results in their magnitude.   
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Figure 3-2. Abnormal Message Board Activity (min. 10/20 Buy/Sell Messages)  
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We find an increasing and significant trend of ACARs from 1.33%min10MSG to 2.87%min40MSG 
on the event day t with an increasing number of positive messages. Of even higher impact, we 
observe an increasing trend of ACARs from -3.65%min10MSG to -7.75%min40MSG on event day t 
for negative messages. In comparison, the median CARs on the event day tend to be signifi-
cantly lower than the average CARs for both sentiment segments. This indicates that results 
are driven by particular stocks which are either hyped or negatively talked about in message 
boards. For events triggered by positive messages, CARs before the event [t-5, t-1] experience 
a drop in significance with increasing number of postings. However, we find significant 
negative CARs [t+1, t+5] following the event day t from -4.16% (min. 10 messages) to -7.40% 
(min. 40 messages). These findings support the noise trading theory by De Long et al. (1990). 
If sentiment rises, noise traders will invest in more risky assets, and the uninformed demand 
drives asset prices above the fundamental value. 
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Figure 3-3. Abnormal Message Board Activity (min. 30/40 Buy/Sell Messages)  
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This table describes the average and median cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for varying 
event windows surrounding abnormal positive posting volume. The significance is tested 
based on the parametric t-test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon test. ***, **, and * describe 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%-levels, respectively. 
  ACAR Median CAR t-test   Wilcoxon   
Min. of 10 buy messages (n = 13,126) (%) (%) (t-value)   (Z-Score)   
[-1,0] 1.33 0.49 12.33 *** 11.13 *** 
0 1.33 0.38 15.49 *** 14.07 *** 
[0,1] 0.22 -0.12 2.21 ** 0.50  
[-5,-1] -1.77 -1.55 -13.66 *** -16.83 *** 
[1,5] -4.16 -3.27 -33.91 *** -36.62 *** 
[-5,5] -4.59 -3.74 -22.92 *** -24.76 *** 
Min. of 20 buy messages (n = 4,247)            
[-1,0] 2.26 0.96 9.59 *** 9.30 *** 
0 2.03 0.51 10.72 *** 9.54 *** 
[0,1] 0.16 -0.18 0.74  -0.69  
[-5,-1] -1.40 -1.35 -5.30 *** -7.18 *** 
[1,5] -6.25 -5.16 -26.17 *** -27.24 *** 
[-5,5] -5.61 -4.89 -13.91 *** -15.20 *** 
Min. of 30 buy messages (n = 1,972)            
[-1,0] 2.67 1.06 6.96 *** 6.64 *** 
0 2.23 0.52 6.89 *** 5.97 *** 
[0,1] -0.04 -0.39 -0.11  -1.14  
[-5,-1] -0.78 -0.95 -1.81 * -2.80 *** 
[1,5] -7.17 -6.14 -19.32 *** -20.37 *** 
[-5,5] -5.72 -5.08 -8.74 *** -9.60 *** 
Min. of 40 buy messages (n = 1,093)            
[-1,0] 3.67 2.02 6.68 *** 6.43 *** 
0 2.87 0.72 6.10 *** 5.29 *** 
[0,1] 0.30 -0.50 0.62  -0.63  
[-5,-1] -0.44 -0.67 -0.71  -1.32  
[1,5] -7.40 -6.51 -14.82 *** -15.52 *** 
[-5,5] -4.95 -4.71 -5.44 *** -6.19 *** 
 
Subsequently, prices then revert to their fundamental values with associated lower returns 
which also comes along with excess market volatility (e.g., Kim and Kim, 2014).  We do not 
observe a “pump and dump” behavior (e.g., Sabherwal et al. (2011)), where long positions are 
built before the event day t (positive hype) and then sold subsequently to generate profits.  
Contrarily to the results surrounding an abnormal volume of positive messages, the analysis 
of negative sentiment indicates another finding.  For negative sentiment, CARs before the event   
Table 3-3. Event Study Results: “Buy”-Events  
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This table describes the average and median cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for varying 
event windows surrounding abnormal negative posting volume. The significance is tested 
based on the parametric t-test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon test. ***, **, and * describe 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%-levels, respectively. 
  ACAR Median CAR t-test   Wilcoxon   
Min. of 10 sell messages (n = 493) (%) (%) (t-value)   (Z-Score)   
[-1,0] -3.89 -3.16 -4.33 *** -7.89 *** 
0 -3.65 -1.87 -6.00 *** -8.52 *** 
[0,1] -5.14 -3.27 -7.14 *** -8.43 *** 
[-5,-1] -6.28 -3.86 -5.86 *** -7.46 *** 
[1,5] -6.17 -3.42 -7.02 *** -7.68 *** 
[-5,5] -16.12 -10.89 -10.18 *** -10.66 *** 
Min. of 20 sell messages (n = 100)            
[-1,0] -5.75 -5.78 -2.11 ** -3.97 *** 
0 -5.23 -3.13 -2.92 *** -4.23 *** 
[0,1] -7.48 -4.08 -3.89 *** -4.15 *** 
[-5,-1] -7.75 -6.32 -3.02 *** -3.98 *** 
[1,5] -5.28 -3.57 -2.55 ** -2.63 *** 
[-5,5] -18.26 -14.51 -4.59 *** -4.84 *** 
Min. of 30 sell messages (n = 38)            
[-1,0] -9.89 -8.86 -2.46 ** -2.75 *** 
0 -6.20 -3.33 -2.18 ** -2.52 ** 
[0,1] -6.10 -1.89 -1.85 * -1.37  
[-5,-1] -8.58 -10.78 -2.70 ** -2.43 ** 
[1,5] -4.20 -2.38 -1.35  -1.95 
* 
[-5,5] -18.98 -13.74 -3.66 *** -3.14 *** 
Min. of 40 sell messages (n = 17)            
[-1,0] -14.86 -14.82 -2.28 ** -2.15 ** 
0 -7.75 -6.27 -1.74  -1.92 
* 
[0,1] -6.89 -3.29 -1.23  -1.16  
[-5,-1] -8.90 -11.26 -1.83 * -1.63  
[1,5] -6.42 -5.31 -1.89 * -1.92 * 
[-5,5] -23.07 -20.33 -2.78 ** -2.30 ** 
 
[t-5, t-1] are significantly and economically meaningful negative ranging from -6.28%min10MSG 
to -8.90%min40MSG. Peak average abnormal returns then follow on the event day t ranging from 
-3.65%min10MSG to -7.75%min40MSG. Furthermore, we generally find significant negative CARs 
in the event window [t+1, t+5]. The development of the CARs for negative events suggests 
that message board users discuss and interpret the negative development of firms. One might 
Table 3-4. Event Study Results: “Sell”-Events  
Agreeing to Disagree: Informativeness of Sentiments in Internet Message Boards | 83 
 
  
argue that message board users especially anticipate the negative momentum of underperform-
ing stocks. The peak of negative abnormal returns on the event day t and the absence of return 
reversals within five days, however, imply that message board users may contribute to price 
discovery by interpreting and analyzing the firm’s situation and allow other users to understand 
the downward slope of stock price performance further. 
In summary, the event study findings support our hypothesis that negative message board 
sentiment has a substantially detrimental relation to abnormal returns and that bullish board 
users might act as noise traders in the market, reinforcing stock price volatility.   
 Predictability of Investor Sentiment for Abnormal Returns 
To examine the intertemporal relationship between message board activity, in particular, the 
average investor sentiment score or segmented sentiments (positive vs. negative), and abnormal 
stock performance, we organize our principal analysis around the following regression speci-
fications: 
𝐴𝑏𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡0,𝑡+𝑗 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾𝑋 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (14) 
𝐴𝑏𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡0,𝑡+𝑗 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾𝑋 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(15) 
where AbReti,t0,t+j denotes the difference of compound raw returns and value-weighted market 
return from day t to t+j (where j = 0,5,10, and 30 respectively) for firm i. We showed in our 
previous study, that message board sentiment would be incorporated into stock prices within 
one month. Thus, we expect a maximum time window of t+30 to be sufficient (Leung and Ton, 
2015). The general regression specification is based on Chen et al. (2014) but adapted for our 
research goals. The regression dataset contains 283,585 until 390,842 observations on firm-
day level depending on the time window. Our main message board variables are defined as 
follows or already described in section 3.2: LogMesi,t is the log transformation (1+Mt), 
Bullishnessi,t is the standardized bullishness index defined in formula (1), PosSentimenti,t and 
NegSentimenti,t describe the positive and negative sentiment denoted in formula (2) and (3), 
Agreementi,t is the agreement index described in formula (4). 
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The vector X includes the following control variables: Volatilityi,t-30,t-1 is the 30-day-standard 
deviation of returns prior to day t,  Upgradei,t/Downgradei,t describe the number of analyst 
upgrade/downgrade recommendation on day t, PosMeanESi,t/NegMeanESi,t denote dummy 
variables for positive/negative mean earnings surprise on day t.  We further include AbReti,t-1, 
AbReti,t-2, and AbReti,t-j,t-1 to control for possible autocorrelation. Lastly, we include the inter-
action terms Bull x Agreei,t (Bullishnessi,t x Agreementi,t) and LogMes x Volai,t (LogMesi,t x 
Volatilityi,t-30,t-1). Due to the broad variety of observed firms in our data set, we assume signif-
icant cross-sectional differences in message posting volumes as well as firm-characteristics. 
We, therefore, use firm/year-fixed effects for each stock in our regressions21.  Additionally, we 
use clustered standard errors by firm and year to account for the lack of independence in firms’ 
abnormal returns (heteroscedasticity), as well as serial- and cross-correlation. This approach is 
consistent with the method used by Petersen (2009). 
Results of the regression are tabulated in Table 3-5. The analyst-based coefficient estimates 
of the control variables are generally in line with our expectations. For AbReti,t0,t+30 (column 
10) we find positive estimates for Upgradei,t and PosMeanESi,t. and negative (significant) val-
ues for Downgradei,t and NegMeanESi,t. In general, we find that message volume is signifi-
cantly negative, and the average bullishness/agreement index is significantly positively 
associated with abnormal returns throughout our observed holding periods. Applying seg-
mented sentiment, the significance of positive sentiment diminishes after 30 trading days, but 
for negative sentiment, the coefficient estimates remain significant with increasing impact 
(from 𝛽𝑡0
𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
= -0.010 to 𝛽𝑡0,𝑡+30
𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
 = -0.033). Therefore, the significance of the 
average bullishness index is mainly driven by negative sentiment. Similar to Tetlock (2007) 
and Chen et al. (2014), we find predictive power of negative sentiment shared on internet 
message boards. We also do find a significant positive correlation between positive sentiment 
and abnormal returns until the holding period of 10 trading days with 𝛽𝑡0,𝑡+𝑗
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ranging 
from +0.006 to +0.012.  The effect, however, diminishes after 30 trading days and speaks for 
a return reversal and the theory of noise trading at some part. 
                                                 
21 To test the robustness of the fixed-effect vs. the random-effect model we have conducted the Hausman-specifi-
cation test on the panel data. Results confirmed the validity of the fixed-effect regression model specification. 
Results are not tabulated here. 
Agreeing to Disagree: Informativeness of Sentiments in Internet Message Boards | 85 
 
  
Other implications from our regressions are that Bullishnessi,t and Agreementi,t are dependent 
on each other: the significant coefficient of the interaction term Bull x Agree implies the higher 
the Agreementi,t the higher the impact of Bullishnessi,t on abnormal returns. Furthermore, vola-
tility significantly predicts future abnormal returns. Negative realized volatility is significantly 
negatively related to AbRett0. The significance reverts to a positive relationship for subsequent 
holding periods. To also examine the connection between realized volatility and the message 
volume, we include the interaction term LogMes x Volai,t. At first, the interaction term LogMes 
x Volai,t is slightly positively significant for the contemporaneous regressions, with a 
coefficient of about -0.062 for all specifications. The relation then reverts into negative and 
becomes highly significant for a holding period of 30 trading days with coefficients of around 
0.320 for all specifications. This suggests that the higher the number of posted messages on 
day t the lower the impact of volatility of the past 30 trading days, Volai,t-30,t-1, on future abnor-
mal returns. 
We also repeat regressions for our sample divided in large (Table 3-6) and small capitalization 
stocks (Table 3-7), since we found previously that small stocks are rather impacted by internet 
message board activity than large stocks (Leung and Ton, 2015). Again, the results and the 
coefficient estimates of the internet message board variables especially hold for small capital-
ization stocks. For large stocks, we only find weak evidence on the contemporaneous correla-
tion between positive or negative sentiment abnormal returns. For robustness and to test the 
extent to which our results might have been affected by sparseness of message postings by 
different firms, we conduct the same regressions on a data set with firm-days with at least ten 
relevant buy or sell messages a day. The overall structure and pattern remained stable and re-
sults are tabulated in Table 3-8 to Table 3-10.   
In summary, our regression findings that average and segmented sentiment scores must be 
treated individually suggest that opinions expressed via finance related social media outlets 
contribute to price discovery for firms experiencing negative abnormal return momentum but 
also induce positive shocks which may be attributed to the outcome of noise trading. However, 
the causal explanation if sentiment leads stock performance or vice versa cannot be clearly 
answered. 
   
Firm- and year-fixed regressions were conducted. LogMessagesi,t is the log transformation (1+Mt), Bullishnessi,t is the standardized bullishness index defined in formula (1), 
PosSentimenti,t / NegSentimenti,t is the log transformation (1+MtBuy / MtSell), Agreementi,t is the agreement index described in formula (4), AbReti,t describes the firm’s 
abnormal return, calculated as the difference of compound raw returns and value-weighted market return, Volai,t-30,t-1 is the 30-day-standard deviation of returns prior to day 
t,  Upgradei,t/Downgradei,t describe the number of analyst upgrade/downgrade recommendation on day t, PosMeanESi,t/NegMeanESi,t denote dummy variables for posi-
tive/negative mean earnings surprise on day t.   T-statistics computed are based on standard errors clustered by firm and year and are denoted in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All stocks are included in these panel regressions. The constant is not reported. 
 AbRett0 AbRett0 AbRett0 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+30 AbRett0,t+30 AbRett0,t+30 
LogMesi,t -0.000  -0.002** -0.008***  -0.011*** -0.009***  -0.011*** -0.018***  -0.021*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.006)  (0.006) 
Bullishnessi,t 0.008***  0.006*** 0.018***  0.015*** 0.014***  0.012*** 0.017***  0.015*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.005)  (0.005) 
PosSentimenti,t  0.008***   0.012***   0.006***   0.001  
  (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.003)  
NegSentimenti,t  -0.010***   -0.027***   -0.025***   -0.033***  
  (0.001)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.010)  
Agreementi,t 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.009** 0.000 0.003 0.015*** 0.005 0.010** 0.014** 0.002 0.009 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
Bull x Agreei,t   0.003***   0.008***   0.006***   0.006** 
   (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.003) 
Volai,t-30,t-1 -0.089*** -0.088*** -0.089*** 0.278*** 0.279*** 0.278*** 0.513*** 0.514*** 0.513*** 1.577*** 1.577*** 1.577*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.174) (0.174) (0.174) 
LogMes x Volai,t 0.062* 0.063* 0.062* -0.095 -0.088 -0.092 -0.094 -0.089 -0.093 -0.322*** -0.314** -0.320*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) 
Upgradei,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Downgradei,t 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
PosMeanESi,t -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
NegMeanESi,t -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
AbReti,t-1 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.084*** -0.070* -0.070* -0.070* -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.080** -0.080** -0.080** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
AbReti,t-2 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.041 0.041 0.041 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
AbReti,t-5,t-1    -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.105***       
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)       
AbReti,t-10,t-1       -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.087***    
       (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)    
AbReti,t-30,t-1          -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.185*** 
          (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Observations 390,842 390,842 390,842 344,523 344,523 344,523 331,655 331,655 331,655 283,585 283,585 283,585 
Adjusted R2 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 
  
Table 3-5. Message Board Variables and Abnormal Returns – All Stocks  
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Firm- and year-fixed regressions were conducted. LogMessagesi,t is the log transformation (1+Mt), Bullishnessi,t is the standardized bullishness index defined in formula (1), 
PosSentimenti,t / NegSentimenti,t is the log transformation (1+MtBuy / MtSell), Agreementi,t is the agreement index described in formula (4), AbReti,t describes the firm’s 
abnormal return, calculated as the difference of compound raw returns and value-weighted market return, Volai,t-30,t-1 is the 30-day-standard deviation of returns prior to day 
t,  Upgradei,t/Downgradei,t describe the number of analyst upgrade/downgrade recommendation on day t, PosMeanESi,t/NegMeanESi,t denote dummy variables for posi-
tive/negative mean earnings surprise on day t.   T-statistics computed are based on standard errors clustered by firm and year and are denoted in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Only large capitalization stocks are included in these panel regressions. The constant is not reported. 
 AbRett0 AbRett0 AbRett0 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+30 AbRett0,t+30 AbRett0,t+30 
LogMesi,t -0.001**  -0.001** -0.005  -0.009 -0.009  -0.009* 0.019  0.021 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.018)  (0.018) 
Bullishnessi,t 0.002***  0.002*** 0.002  -0.002 0.004  0.005 -0.010  -0.007 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.011)  (0.012) 
PosSentimenti,t  0.001   -0.003   -0.003   0.011  
  (0.001)   (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.010)  
NegSentimenti,t  -0.003***   -0.011   -0.011   0.036  
  (0.001)   (0.009)   (0.007)   (0.030)  
Agreementi,t 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.007 -0.014 -0.012 -0.013 -0.016 -0.012 -0.019 0.002 -0.016 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.027) (0.033) (0.025) 
Bull x Agreei,t   0.000   0.010*   -0.001   -0.006 
   (0.001)   (0.005)   (0.003)   (0.008) 
Volai,t-30,t-1 -0.025 -0.025 -0.026 2.020*** 2.029*** 2.017*** 1.797** 1.799** 1.798** 3.054*** 3.029*** 3.056*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.718) (0.720) (0.716) (0.834) (0.834) (0.834) (0.780) (0.762) (0.779) 
Upgradei,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Downgradei,t 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
PosMeanESi,t -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.023* -0.026* -0.023* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
NegMeanESi,t -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.013 -0.012 -0.015 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.065*** -0.066*** -0.064*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
AbReti,t-1 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273*** -0.129 -0.130 -0.131 -0.131 -0.131 -0.131 0.129 0.133 0.129 
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.177) (0.177) (0.177) (0.193) (0.192) (0.193) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) 
AbReti,t-2 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 0.133 0.134 0.132 -0.206 -0.206 -0.206 -0.035 -0.037 -0.035 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.121) (0.120) (0.121) 
AbReti,t-5,t-1    -0.019 -0.021 -0.020       
    (0.052) (0.051) (0.052)       
AbReti,t-10,t-1       -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.063***    
       (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)    
AbReti,t-30,t-1          -0.179** -0.178** -0.179** 
          (0.079) (0.078) (0.079) 
Observations 28,122 28,122 28,122 26,808 26,808 26,808 26,193 26,193 26,193 24,379 24,379 24,379 
Adjusted R2 7.9% 7.9% 7.9% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 6.8% 6.9% 6.8% 
  
Table 3-6. Message Board Variables and Abnormal Returns – Only Large Stocks 
A
g
reein
g
 to
 D
isag
ree: In
fo
rm
ativ
en
ess o
f S
en
tim
en
ts in
 In
tern
et M
essag
e B
o
ard
s | 8
7
  
   
Firm- and year-fixed regressions were conducted. LogMessagesi,t is the log transformation (1+Mt), Bullishnessi,t is the standardized bullishness index defined in formula (1), 
PosSentimenti,t / NegSentimenti,t is the log transformation (1+MtBuy / MtSell), Agreementi,t is the agreement index described in formula (4), AbReti,t describes the firm’s 
abnormal return, calculated as the difference of compound raw returns and value-weighted market return, Volai,t-30,t-1 is the 30-day-standard deviation of returns prior to day 
t,  Upgradei,t/Downgradei,t describe the number of analyst upgrade/downgrade recommendation on day t, PosMeanESi,t/NegMeanESi,t denote dummy variables for posi-
tive/negative mean earnings surprise on day t.   T-statistics computed are based on standard errors clustered by firm and year and are denoted in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Only small-capitalization stocks are included in these panel regressions. The constant is not reported. 
 AbRett0 AbRett0 AbRett0 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+30 AbRett0,t+30 AbRett0,t+30 
LogMesi,t -0.000  -0.002* -0.009***  -0.012*** -0.009***  -0.012*** -0.025***  -0.028*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.006)  (0.006) 
Bullishnessi,t 0.009***  0.008*** 0.021***  0.019*** 0.015***  0.013*** 0.022***  0.019*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.006)  (0.006) 
PosSentimenti,t  0.009***   0.013***   0.006***   -0.001  
  (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.003)  
NegSentimenti,t  -0.012***   -0.030***   -0.026***   -0.042***  
  (0.002)   (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.009)  
Agreementi,t 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.003 0.007 0.020*** 0.010 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.006 0.016* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) 
Bull x Agreei,t   0.003***   0.007***   0.005**   0.007** 
   (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.003) 
Volai,t-30,t-1 -0.078*** -0.077*** -0.078*** 0.292*** 0.292*** 0.292*** 0.467*** 0.468*** 0.467*** 1.483*** 1.482*** 1.483*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.200) (0.200) (0.200) 
LogMes x Volai,t 0.054 0.055 0.054 -0.114 -0.106 -0.111 -0.069 -0.063 -0.068 -0.276** -0.265** -0.274** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.085) (0.087) (0.086) (0.090) (0.089) (0.090) (0.121) (0.122) (0.121) 
Upgradei,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 0.019 0.019 0.019 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Downgradei,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
PosMeanESi,t -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
NegMeanESi,t -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
AbReti,t-1 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** -0.090** -0.090** -0.090** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.096*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
AbReti,t-2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.070** 0.070** 0.070** 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.042 0.042 0.042 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
AbReti,t-5,t-1    -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.128***       
    (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)       
AbReti,t-10,t-1       -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.084***    
       (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)    
AbReti,t-30,t-1          -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189*** 
          (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Observations 284,452 284,452 284,452 246,781 246,781 246,781 238,759 238,759 238,759 208,803 208,803 208,803 
Adjusted R2 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 
             
Table 3-7. Message Board Variables and Abnormal Returns – Only Small Stocks 
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Firm- and year-fixed regressions were conducted. LogMessagesi,t is the log transformation (1+Mt), Bullishnessi,t is the standardized bullishness index defined in formula (1), 
PosSentimenti,t / NegSentimenti,t is the log transformation (1+MtBuy / MtSell), Agreementi,t is the agreement index described in formula (4), AbReti,t describes the firm’s 
abnormal return, calculated as the difference of compound raw returns and value-weighted market return, Volai,t-30,t-1 is the 30-day-standard deviation of returns prior to day 
t,  Upgradei,t/Downgradei,t describe the number of analyst upgrade/downgrade recommendation on day t, PosMeanESi,t/NegMeanESi,t denote dummy variables for posi-
tive/negative mean earnings surprise on day t.   T-statistics computed are based on standard errors clustered by firm and year and are denoted in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Only firm-days with a minimum of 10 sell and buy messages were included. The constant is not reported. 
  AbRett0 AbRett0 AbRett0 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+30 AbRett0,t+30 AbRett0,t+30 
LogMesi,t 0.008***  0.001 -0.009  -0.019*** -0.018***  -0.024*** -0.046*  -0.061** 
 (0.003)  (0.003) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.025)  (0.024) 
Bullishnessi,t 0.010***  0.009*** 0.019***  0.018*** 0.016***  0.015*** 0.033*  0.031 
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.019)  (0.020) 
PosSentimenti,t  0.019***   0.017***   0.006   0.003  
  (0.002)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.008)  
NegSentimenti,t  -0.019***   -0.037***   -0.034***   -0.064**  
  (0.003)   (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.033)  
Agreementi,t 0.027*** 0.001 0.001 0.027*** -0.017 -0.011 0.035*** -0.004 0.013 0.015 -0.050 -0.041 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.028) (0.056) (0.036) 
Bull x Agreei,t   0.010***   0.015***   0.009*   0.022* 
   (0.002)   (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.011) 
Volai,t-30,t-1 -0.238*** -0.238*** -0.239*** -0.164 -0.165 -0.164 0.144 0.141 0.143 1.255*** 1.249*** 1.254*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.368) (0.368) (0.368) 
LogMes x Volai,t 0.090** 0.093** 0.090** 0.072 0.076 0.074 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.035 -0.032 -0.035 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.125) (0.126) (0.126) 
Upgradei,t -0.001 -0.002 -0.002* 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Downgradei,t 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* 0.006 0.005 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
PosMeanESi,t -0.013** -0.013** -0.013** -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.024 0.024 0.023 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
NegMeanESi,t 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.039 0.040 0.039 0.011 0.012 0.012 -0.037 -0.033 -0.035 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.072) (0.071) (0.071) 
AbReti,t-1 0.056* 0.056* 0.055* -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.098** -0.098** -0.099** 0.067 0.067 0.066 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) 
AbReti,t-2 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 0.030 0.030 0.030 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 0.220* 0.219* 0.219* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) 
AbReti,t-5,t-1    -0.099*** -0.099*** -0.099***       
    (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)       
AbReti,t-10,t-1       -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.108***    
       (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)    
AbReti,t-30,t-1          -0.238*** -0.238*** -0.238*** 
          (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Observations 35,722 35,722 35,722 31,879 31,879 31,879 30,366 30,366 30,366 24,474 24,474 24,474 
Adjusted R2 2.9% 3.1% 3.1% 1.2% 1.3% 1.3% 2.0% 2.1% 2.0% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 
  
Table 3-8. Message Board Variables and Abnormal Returns – All (Min. 10 Mes.) 
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Firm- and year-fixed regressions were conducted. LogMessagesi,t is the log transformation (1+Mt), Bullishnessi,t is the standardized bullishness index defined in formula (1), 
PosSentimenti,t / NegSentimenti,t is the log transformation (1+MtBuy / MtSell), Agreementi,t is the agreement index described in formula (4), AbReti,t describes the firm’s 
abnormal return, calculated as the difference of compound raw returns and value-weighted market return, Volai,t-30,t-1 is the 30-day-standard deviation of returns prior to day 
t,  Upgradei,t/Downgradei,t describe the number of analyst upgrade/downgrade recommendation on day t, PosMeanESi,t/NegMeanESi,t denote dummy variables for posi-
tive/negative mean earnings surprise on day t.   T-statistics computed are based on standard errors clustered by firm and year and are denoted in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Only firm-days with a minimum of 10 sell and buy messages for large capitalization stocks were included. The 
constant is not reported. 
  AbRett0 AbRett0 AbRett0 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+30 AbRett0,t+30 AbRett0,t+30 
LogMesi,t 0.001  -0.002 -0.001  -0.010 -0.018  -0.037 0.142  0.104 
 (0.003)  (0.003) (0.027)  (0.027) (0.021)  (0.028) (0.130)  (0.110) 
Bullishnessi,t 0.002  0.002 -0.008  -0.008 0.013**  0.010 -0.050  -0.053 
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.019)  (0.019) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.039)  (0.042) 
PosSentimenti,t  0.004   -0.012   0.007   0.049  
  (0.004)   (0.013)   (0.014)   (0.048)  
NegSentimenti,t  -0.006**   -0.007   -0.047**   0.178  
  (0.003)   (0.036)   (0.019)   (0.137)  
Agreementi,t 0.007 -0.002 -0.009 0.029 0.003 -0.020 -0.026 -0.092* -0.134 0.059 0.268 -0.128 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.043) (0.072) (0.050) (0.031) (0.051) (0.090) (0.049) (0.182) (0.136) 
Bull x Agreei,t   0.007**   0.021   0.048   0.083 
   (0.003)   (0.014)   (0.031)   (0.067) 
Volai,t-30,t-1 -0.088 -0.089 -0.093 2.153*** 2.152*** 2.135*** 4.682*** 4.672*** 4.657*** 3.991*** 3.986*** 3.963*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.235) (0.240) (0.236) (0.831) (0.828) (0.806) (0.253) (0.250) (0.256) 
Upgradei,t -0.002* -0.002* -0.003** 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.021 -0.021 -0.023 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) 
Downgradei,t 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
PosMeanESi,t -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.056** -0.057** -0.055** -0.057** -0.058** -0.057** -0.020 -0.031 -0.011 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.040) (0.039) (0.044) 
NegMeanESi,t -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.033*** -0.077*** -0.086*** -0.061** -0.159*** -0.165*** -0.123*** -0.101* -0.093* -0.039 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.019) (0.016) (0.024) (0.030) (0.028) (0.019) (0.058) (0.053) (0.111) 
AbReti,t-1 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.566*** -0.729*** -0.729*** -0.734*** -0.589*** -0.593*** -0.597*** 0.188** 0.189** 0.182** 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.088) (0.226) (0.227) (0.227) (0.132) (0.132) (0.128) (0.091) (0.094) (0.086) 
AbReti,t-2 -0.221*** -0.222*** -0.222*** 0.322** 0.325** 0.317** -0.656*** -0.658*** -0.665*** 0.330*** 0.326** 0.321*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.135) (0.134) (0.132) (0.102) (0.100) (0.102) (0.117) (0.125) (0.112) 
AbReti,t-5,t-1    0.073* 0.071* 0.072*       
    (0.040) (0.039) (0.040)       
AbReti,t-10,t-1       0.039 0.037 0.038    
       (0.048) (0.047) (0.047)    
AbReti,t-30,t-1          -0.189*** -0.186*** -0.189*** 
          (0.059) (0.058) (0.060) 
Observations 1,452 1,452 1,452 1,335 1,335 1,335 1,289 1,289 1,289 1,211 1,211 1,211 
Adjusted R2 23.4% 23.5% 23.6% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 9.2% 9.3% 9.3% 7.9% 8.2% 8.0% 
  
Table 3-9. Message Board Variables and Abnormal Returns – Large (Min. 10 Mes.) 
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Firm- and year-fixed regressions were conducted. LogMessagesi,t is the log transformation (1+Mt), Bullishnessi,t is the standardized bullishness index defined in formula (1), 
PosSentimenti,t / NegSentimenti,t is the log transformation (1+MtBuy / MtSell), Agreementi,t is the agreement index described in formula (4), AbReti,t describes the firm’s 
abnormal return, calculated as the difference of compound raw returns and value-weighted market return, Volai,t-30,t-1 is the 30-day-standard deviation of returns prior to day 
t,  Upgradei,t/Downgradei,t describe the number of analyst upgrade/downgrade recommendation on day t, PosMeanESi,t/NegMeanESi,t denote dummy variables for posi-
tive/negative mean earnings surprise on day t.   T-statistics computed are based on standard errors clustered by firm and year and are denoted in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Only firm-days with a minimum of 10 sell and buy messages for small capitalization stocks were included. The 
constant is not reported. 
  AbRett0 AbRett0 AbRett0 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+30 AbRett0,t+30 AbRett0,t+30 
LogMesi,t 0.007*  0.001 -0.016**  -0.024*** -0.016**  -0.018** -0.044**  -0.060*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.018)  (0.022) 
Bullishnessi,t 0.013***  0.011*** 0.026***  0.024*** 0.015***  0.014*** 0.035**  0.031** 
 (0.003)  (0.003) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.014)  (0.013) 
PosSentimenti,t  0.021***   0.018***   0.005   0.006  
  (0.002)   (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.010)  
NegSentimenti,t  -0.019***   -0.046***   -0.027***   -0.068***  
  (0.005)   (0.010)   (0.009)   (0.024)  
Agreementi,t 0.028*** 0.006 0.006 0.023** -0.026 -0.006 0.046*** 0.019 0.041** 0.015 -0.056 -0.051 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) (0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.024) (0.045) (0.045) 
Bull x Agreei,t   0.009***   0.012**   0.002   0.027** 
   (0.003)   (0.006)   (0.005)   (0.012) 
Volai,t-30,t-1 -0.237*** -0.238*** -0.238*** -0.074 -0.076 -0.074 0.167 0.164 0.167 1.331*** 1.327*** 1.330*** 
 (0.075) (0.074) (0.075) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.419) (0.418) (0.418) 
LogMes x Volai,t 0.071* 0.074* 0.072* 0.044 0.050 0.046 0.034 0.035 0.034 -0.042 -0.038 -0.041 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.126) (0.127) (0.127) 
Upgradei,t -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Downgradei,t 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
PosMeanESi,t -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.035 0.035 0.035 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
NegMeanESi,t 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.045 0.047 0.045 0.012 0.013 0.012 -0.060 -0.057 -0.058 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.097) (0.096) (0.096) 
AbReti,t-1 0.061* 0.061* 0.061* -0.093* -0.092* -0.093* -0.051 -0.051 -0.051 0.086 0.087 0.086 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) 
AbReti,t-2 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 0.066 0.067 0.066 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.189 0.188 0.188 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) 
AbReti,t-5,t-1    -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.154***       
    (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)       
AbReti,t-10,t-1       -0.137*** -0.137*** -0.137***    
       (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)    
AbReti,t-30,t-1          -0.259*** -0.259*** -0.258*** 
          (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) 
Observations 25,135 25,135 25,135 22,486 22,486 22,486 21,719 21,719 21,719 18,884 18,884 18,884 
Adjusted R2 3.0% 3.1% 3.1% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 6.6% 6.6% 6.6% 
Table 3-10.  Message Board Variables and Abnormal Returns – Small (Min. 10 Mes.) 
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3.4.1. Predictability of Message Board Sentiment and Abnormal Returns 
To further investigate the causal relationship between message board sentiment and abnormal 
returns and to address the endogeneity issues in the data, we apply a Vector Autoregression 
model (VAR) on the aggregate and the individual firm level (panel VAR22).  
3.4.1.1. Sentiment and Abnormal Returns at the Aggregate Level 
We first conduct a test for the optimal lag length to apply the most adequate lead-lag regres-
sion specification. Results are reported in Table 3-11. Three out of five tests indicate that a lag 
structure of four fits best for our model. Only the Hannan-Quinn information criteria and the 
Schwarz information criteria imply an optimal lag structure of 3 and 2, respectively. Hence, 
we construct our VAR model based on four endogenous lags to closer examine the causal re-
lationship between the segmented sentiment and abnormal returns. We consider the following 
three equations to test the intertemporal interaction of sentiment and abnormal returns: 
𝐴𝑏𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼1 + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑗 , 𝐴𝑏𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ ∑𝛾1,𝑗 , 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝛿1,𝑗, 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀1𝑡 (16) 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼2 + ∑𝛽2,𝑗 , 𝐴𝑏𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ ∑𝛾2,𝑗 , 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ ∑𝛿2,𝑗, 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀2𝑡 (17) 
𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼3 + ∑𝛽3,𝑗 , 𝐴𝑏𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ ∑𝛾3,𝑗 , 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝛿3,𝑗, 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀3𝑡 (18) 
where AbRett is the equally-weighted abnormal return and PosSentt/NegSentt the aggregated 
sentiment level of the 3,050 sample stocks at time t between January 11th, 2008 and May 27th, 
2016. We apply the lag exclusion χ2 Wald-tests on each lag in the VAR to test whether aggre-
gated investor sentiment Granger-cause aggregated abnormal stock returns or vice versa. The 
first two null hypothesis are therefore H1/2: γ/δ1,1 = γ/δ1,2 = … = γ/δ1,L = 0, implying that 
aggregated positive/negative sentiment does not Granger-cause aggregated future abnormal 
stock returns. The third and fourth null hypothesis of interest are H3/4: 𝛽2/3,1 = 𝛽2/3,2 = … = 
𝛽2/3,L= 0, indicating that aggregated abnormal stock returns do not Granger-cause aggregated  
 
                                                 
22 Based on the model by Abrigo and Love (2015). 
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* indicates the lag order selected by each criterion, where LH-Ratio = Likelihood-Ratio, FPE 
= Final prediction error, AIC = Akaike information criterion, SBIC = Schwarz information 
criterion, and HQIC = Hannan-Quinn information criterion. 
Lag LH-Ratio   DoF p-Value FPE   AIC   HQIC   SBIC   
0     0.000  -11.719  -11.707  -11.688  
1 791.334  9 0.000 0.000  -13.755  -13.705  -13.630  
2 82.153  9 0.000 0.000  -13.923  -13.837  -13.706 * 
3 49.629  9 0.000 0.000  -14.007  -13.883 * -13.696 
 
4 20.092 * 9 0.017 0.000 * -14.012 * -13.852  -13.608  
  
positive or negative sentiment, respectively. Table 3-12 shows the results for our lag 4 VAR 
specification. For comparison, we additionally show results for the lag 2 VAR. The coefficient 
estimates for equation (16) on the aggregated positive and negative sentiment variables are 
only highly significant for the negative sentiment on the previous day (γ1,1 = -0.063). The p-
value of the χ2-test statistics for H2 is 0.000, and the hypothesis that aggregated negative 
sentiment does not Granger-cause aggregated abnormal stock returns must, therefore, be 
rejected. In line with previous results, we also find a negative relationship in equation (16) for 
positive sentiment on the previous day and abnormal returns which is line with the return re-
versal observed in the event study, even though not found significant here. On the aggregate 
level, we thus find indications that negative sentiment predicts abnormal returns and that ag-
gregated positive sentiment has no Granger-relation to aggregated abnormal returns. 
3.4.1.2. Sentiment and Abnormal Returns at the Individual Level 
To further examine the individual Granger-relationship between investor sentiment and ab-
normal returns on the individual level, we perform a panel vector autoregression. Hence, we 
also test the hypothesis H1-4 on the individual level. Based on the test for the optimal lag length 
for the panel data, we use the lag of 3 for the panel VAR.  For comparison, we also show the 
results for lag 2 and 4 of the panel VAR in Table 3-13. 
 
 
 
Table 3-11. Lag-Order Selection Statistics for VAR – Aggregate Level 
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The observations are on an aggregate level. Abrett is the average difference of value-weighted mar-
ket and stock return, PosSentimentt / NegSentimentt is the log transformation of (1 + 𝑀𝑡
𝐵𝑢𝑦
 / 𝑀𝑡
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙). 
Z-statistics are reported in parenthesis. χ2-test statistics are shown for the exclusion of the individ-
ual variable for the Granger-causality Wald-test. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10%-levels, respectively. 
Lags 2 4 (opt.)  2 4 (opt.)  2 4 (opt.) 
 Abrett Abrett PosSentt PosSentt NegSentt NegSentt 
Intercept 0.009** 0.013*  0.090*** 0.040  0.008 0.006 
 (2.477) (1.931)  (5.225) (1.394)  (0.829) (0.373) 
Abrett-1 0.031 -0.067  0.181 0.247  -0.172** -0.115 
 (1.108) (-1.297)  (1.436) (1.148)  (-2.483) (-0.900) 
Abrett-2 0.022 -0.020  0.028 0.064  0.050 -0.102 
 (0.852) (-0.392)  (0.234) (0.310)  (0.761) (-0.828) 
Abrett-3  0.012   0.062   -0.147 
  (0.261)   (0.318)   (-1.256) 
Abrett-4  -0.014   0.195   -0.104 
  (-0.308)   (1.064)   (-0.953) 
PosSentt-1 -0.005 -0.007  0.602*** 0.407***  0.015 -0.019 
 (-0.918) (-0.575)  (22.458) (7.868)  (0.992) (-0.627) 
PosSentt-2 0.006 0.006  0.309*** 0.240***  0.009 -0.026 
 (1.076) (0.454)  (11.565) (4.488)  (0.621) (-0.818) 
PosSentt-3  0.009   0.115**   0.048 
  (0.716)   (2.262)   (1.572) 
PosSentt-4  -0.005   0.186***   0.022 
  (-0.397)   (3.889)   (0.771) 
NegSentt-1 -0.063*** -0.065***  0.101** -0.081  0.518*** 0.435*** 
 (-5.763) (-3.117)  (2.029) (-0.943)  (18.897) (8.433) 
NegSentt-2 -0.001 -0.008  0.002 0.222**  0.236*** 0.052 
 (-0.083) (-0.344)  (0.046) (2.377)  (8.597) (0.925) 
NegSentt-3  -0.013   -0.075   0.209*** 
  (-0.584)   (-0.804)   (3.719) 
NegSentt-4  -0.008   0.015   0.059 
    (-0.392)     (0.183)     (1.206) 
Observations 1,230 380  1,230 380  1,230 380 
χ2-stat AbRet    2.224 3.201  6.393 5.177 
p-Value AbRet    0.329 0.525  0.041** 0.270 
χ2-stat PSent. 1.159 1.091       
p-Value PSent. 0.560 0.896       
χ2-stat NSent. 60.352 33.191       
p-Value NSent. 0.000*** 0.000***           
  
Results on the individual level yield different implications on the Granger-relationships com-
pared to the aggregate level: Positive sentiment significantly predicts abnormal returns at the 
significance level of 5% with coefficient estimates of -0.002 and +.0.001 for t-1 and t-3, re-
spectively (see Table 3-13 (column 2)). 
Table 3-12. Vector Autoregressions at Aggregate Level – Abnormal Returns 
   
The observations are on the individual stock level. Abrett is the difference of value-weighted market and stock return, PosSentimentt / NegSentimentt is the 
log transformation of (1 + 𝑀𝑡
𝐵𝑢𝑦
 / 𝑀𝑡
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙). Z-statistics are reported in parenthesis. χ2-test statistics are shown for the exclusion of the individual variable for 
the Granger-causality Wald-test. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10%-levels, respectively. 
  AbRett AbRett, opt. AbRett  PosSentt PosSentt,opt PosSentt  NegSentt NegSentt,opt NegSentt 
AbRett-1 -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.025  0.172*** 0.301*** 0.352***  0.020 0.024 -0.035 
 (-3.988) (-2.754) (-1.526)  (4.846) (5.630) (3.595)  (0.804) (0.622) (-0.477) 
AbRett-2 -0.019*** -0.018* -0.025  -0.215*** -0.048 -0.066  0.044** 0.068** -0.036 
 (-2.840) (-1.753) (-1.186)  (-6.637) (-0.891) (-0.659)  (2.086) (2.027) (-0.554) 
AbRett-3  0.009 0.046***   -0.212*** -0.156   0.009 0.110* 
  (0.932) (3.364)   (-4.199) (-1.611)   (0.307) (1.773) 
AbRett-4   -0.020*    -0.340***    0.028 
   (-1.667)    (-3.669)    (0.541) 
PosSentt-1 -0.001 -0.002** -0.003***  0.442*** 0.404*** 0.367***  -0.007** -0.001 0.004 
 (-1.207) (-2.294) (-2.998)  (86.134) (58.193) (32.002)  (-2.251) (-0.295) (0.528) 
PosSentt-2 0.001*** 0.000 -0.000  0.249*** 0.196*** 0.167***  -0.019*** -0.010*** -0.003 
 (2.912) (0.788) (-0.345)  (52.833) (30.531) (15.095)  (-7.201) (-2.720) (-0.493) 
PosSentt-3  0.001** 0.000   0.163*** 0.125***   -0.008** -0.011* 
  (1.998) (0.107)   (25.949) (11.697)   (-2.109) (-1.954) 
PosSentt-4   0.001    0.136***    -0.007 
   (1.184)    (13.100)    (-1.241) 
NegSentt-1 -0.003*** -0.001 -0.001  0.031*** 0.041*** 0.044**  0.340*** 0.318*** 0.301*** 
 (-3.414) (-1.147) (-0.598)  (4.260) (4.036) (2.541)  (49.809) (33.665) (19.418) 
NegSentt-2 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000  -0.018** -0.013 -0.016  0.170*** 0.129*** 0.110*** 
 (-1.042) (-0.084) (-0.030)  (-2.553) (-1.309) (-0.912)  (26.552) (14.811) (7.508) 
NegSentt-3  -0.001 0.000   -0.014 -0.001   0.107*** 0.096*** 
  (-1.180) (0.041)   (-1.448) (-0.047)   (11.977) (6.301) 
NegSentt-4   -0.003    -0.028    0.059*** 
      (-1.566)       (-1.628)       (4.059) 
Observations 90,503 42,872 15,039  90,503 42,872 15,039  90,503 42,872 15,039 
χ2-stat AbRet     73.106 52.271 29.567  4.735 4.286 3.744 
p-Val. AbRet     0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  0.094* 0.232 0.442 
χ2-stat PosSent 11.991 12.919 12.582         
p-Val. PosSent 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.014**         
χ2-stat NegSent 13.974 2.800 2.736         
p-Val. NegSent 0.001*** 0.423 0.603          
 
Table 3-13. Panel Vector Autoregression at Individual Level – Abnormal Returns 
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This result is in line with our event study which suggests that abnormal return reversals occur 
the day after an event day of abnormal positive sentiment. Additionally, results in Table 3-13 
(column 5) show that coefficient estimates (β2,t-1 = +0.301 and β2,t-3 = -0.212) for abnormal 
returns are highly significant at 1%-level, which indicates that abnormal returns predict posi-
tive sentiment. The χ2-test statistics for H1 of 52.271 (p-value = 0.000) are higher than for H3 
with 12.910 (p-value = 0.005), yet both hypotheses can be rejected at the significant level of 
1%. These results imply that positive sentiment and abnormal returns both Granger-cause each 
other, however with larger impact from abnormal returns on positive sentiment. In other words, 
message board users rather react to abnormal return shocks, but also provide (noisy) infor-
mation which is then incorporated into abnormal returns, albeit of smaller economic impact.  
For negative sentiment and abnormal returns, however, we do not find a Granger-relationship 
based on the optimal lag length 3. The Granger-causality Wald-test cannot reject the hypothesis 
H2 and H4. As we look at the results for a lag of 2 (Table 3-13 (column 1)), the coefficient 
estimate for δ1,t-1 of -0.003 is highly significant, and the χ2 Wald-test rejects hypothesis H2 
which means that negative sentiment Granger-causes abnormal returns and not vice versa. We 
expect that this difference results from the data structure and the dominance of bullishness in 
the data set. Since negative related messages are less present on the HotCopper internet mes-
sage board, we believe that the lag order of 3 and the smaller data set results in insignificance.  
Summarizing the (panel) VAR findings, we first find on an aggregate level that negative sen-
timent Granger-causes aggregated abnormal returns. This suggests that the aggregated senti-
ment level of message board users can predict market movements. Secondly, we find that pos-
itive sentiment and abnormal returns Granger-cause each other on an individual level, yet with 
significantly more significant impact from abnormal returns to positive sentiment. Therefore, 
message board users rather react to market activity but also disseminate information that moves 
stock prices. The predicted abnormal return reversal after positive messages on a subsequent 
day also speaks for the noise trading theory by De Long et al. (1990), where stock prices are 
moved away from fundamentals but then return to the real fundamental value. For negative 
sentiment, we find on an individual level and based on the optimal lag length of 3 for the whole 
panel data set that negative sentiment is not Granger-related to abnormal returns. However, as 
we reduce the lag length to 2, we observe that negative sentiment predicts abnormal returns on 
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the individual stock level. This effect might be induced by the structure of the strongly posi-
tively biased data set. 
To examine the dynamic interaction between the endogenous variables (Abrett, PosSentt, and 
NegSentt) of the panel VAR process, we apply the impulse response analysis. For the validity 
of the panel VAR application, we first test on the stability of the panel VAR process. Please 
refer to Sims (1980), Hamilton and Susmel (1994) and Lütkepohl (2005) for an econometric 
explanation of the model. As stability implies stationarity of the VAR model, we can find an 
infinite-order vector moving-average (VMA) representation, which is needed for the interpre-
tation of impulse-response functions. Consider that equations (16) - (18) can be formulated as: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶0 + 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1𝐴1 + 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−2𝐴2 + ⋯+ 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝐿𝐴𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (19) 
where Yi,t is a (1 x n) vector of the endogenous variables, A1, A2, …,  AL are (m x n) coefficient 
matrices and εi,t is a (1 x n) vector of error terms. The panel VAR process is stable when the 
moduli of all eigenvalues of the companion matrix ?̅? are less than 1.  
The companion matrix is defined as: 
?̅? =
[
 
 
 
 
𝐴1 𝐴2 …
𝐼𝑛 0𝑛 …
0𝑛 𝐼𝑛 …
𝐴𝐿 𝐴𝐿−1
0𝑛 0𝑛
0𝑛 0𝑛
⋮ ⋮ ⋱
0𝑛 0𝑛 …
⋮ ⋮
𝐼𝑛 0𝑛 ]
 
 
 
 
 (20) 
where In is the identity (n x n) matrix. Our robustness tests show that all moduli of the eigen-
values of ?̅? are strictly less than 1 and thus account for the stability of our panel VAR process 
(results are not tabulated here). 
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Based on the work of Abrigo and Love (2015), we apply the Cholesky impulse-response 
function, to address the issue that the error terms eit might be contemporaneously correlated. 
The Cholesky adaption is based on the simple impulse-response function 𝛷𝑖, which can be 
expressed as an infinite vector-moving average with the following VMA specifications23: 
𝚽𝒊 = {
𝑰𝒏         , 𝑳 = 𝟎
∑𝚽𝒕−𝒋𝑨𝒋
𝑳
𝒋=𝟏
, 𝑳 = 𝟏, 𝟐, . .
 (21) 
Figure 3-4 depicts the results of the impulse response function based on equation (19). We 
focus on the dynamic interaction of positive/negative sentiment and abnormal returns. Abnor-
mal returns show no contemporaneous reaction to negative sentiment shocks, but negative 
peaks occur after 4 days and successively disappear. Positive sentiment shocks lead to a nega-
tive peak of abnormal returns on the following day, also in accordance to previous event study 
and regressions results in sections 3.3 and 3.4.1.  This again indicates a negative market reac-
tion on a subsequent day. However, we do not observe a contemporaneous market reaction. A 
reason could be that a high number of board messages are posted after the closing hours of the 
ASX as shown in Figure 3-1.  
Abnormal return shocks come with different impact. We observe contemporaneous responses 
of negative and positive sentiment to abnormal return shocks with gradually decreasing impact, 
yet with larger response magnitudes for positive sentiment. In line with our expectations, 
negative abnormal return shocks come with positive responses for negative sentiment whereas 
positive abnormal return shocks come along with positive sentiment responses.  We interpret 
these findings as follows: Message board users tend to react to abnormal returns shocks. For 
negative abnormal returns shocks, message board users intensify their research on recent de-
velopments and future expectations, contribute and may add valuable information to the price 
discovery process. When experiencing positive abnormal return shocks, message board users 
first react with positive postings and then trade regardless of their informational situation.  
Bloomfield et al. (2009) clearly distinguishes noise traders between “liquidity” traders, who 
trade due to unexplained liquidity reasons, or “uninformed trades”, who might trade despite  
                                                 
23 We run our statistical analysis with the panel VAR STATA package by Abrigo and Love (2015) 
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Figure 3-4. Impulse-Response-Functions – Abnormal Returns (Impulse : Response)  
 
having no advantages in information or other exogenous motivational reasons for trade.  Li-
quidity based trading would be the nearest explanation for the negative abnormal return on the 
day following positive sentiment shocks and thus induce volatility in the market. 
In summary, our impulse response function results confirm our prior findings that negative 
and positive sentiment have differentiated relations to stock market performances. Negative 
abnormal return responses to negative sentiment shocks show a 4-day delay while positive 
sentiment shocks lead to a negative abnormal return response on a subsequent day. On the other 
hand, message board sentiment contemporaneously reacts to abnormal return shocks. Negative 
abnormal returns follow positive sentiment shocks, implying trading activities of liquidity trad-
ers who might induce additional volatility in the market. 
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3.4.2. Informed Short Selling Against Positive Noise Traders 
Previous results in this paper show a contemporaneous positive relationship between positive 
sentiment and a firm’s abnormal returns with subsequent return reversals. This indicates that 
trades were dominated by sentimental traders who show a propensity to either speculation or 
over-optimism (Baker and Wurgler, 2007).  Prior literature argued that misevaluation of asset 
prices could only be partially offset by contrarian arbitrageurs or in specific cases (un-)in-
formed short sellers. The high costs and risks associated with betting against sentimental in-
vestors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) could lead to the conclusion that, for example, only well 
informed short sellers would bet against overpriced stock movements, which are driven by 
sentimental investors (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987). Therefore, we believe that stocks 
which are hyped on internet message boards and are also targeted by informed short sellers are 
less prone to experience a positive abnormal return shock with following return reversals. 
Hence, we conduct the same regressions as in section 3.4, based on equation (15) and further-
more include the variable PercShorti,t and the interaction terms PercShort x PosSentimenti,t and 
PercShort x NegSentimenti,t. PercShorti,t describes the ratio between the number of reported 
short positions and the number of shares outstanding on stock i and day t. The results are 
tabulated in Table 3-14.    
In line with the prior literature, we find that the share of short selling positions negatively and 
significantly predicts abnormal returns (e.g., Figlewski and Webb, 1993; Aitken et al., 1998). 
The contemporaneous relationship between PercShorti,t  and a firm’s abnormal return is at first 
slightly positive but then reverts into negative for the period of 30 days. One reason could be 
that informed sellers preferentially target overvalued stocks. Since the ASIC publishes the total 
short positions for financial products only four days after reporting24, one should expect a time-
lag of the negative impact of short selling positions on a stock’s excess returns. Due to the 
concern that our results might be affected of trading days with only little message board activ-
ity, we conduct the same regressions only including observations with a minimum of 10 and 
20 messages on day t. The direction of our results remains robust even though the results are 
less or not significant anymore.  
                                                 
24 Please see http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/markets/short-selling/short-selling-reporting-short-position-
reporting/ as of September 17th, 2017. 
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PosSentimenti,t / NegSentimenti,t is the log transformation (1+MtBuy / MtSell), Agreementi,t 
is the agreement index described in formula (4), AbReti,t describes the firm’s abnormal return, 
calculated as the difference of compound raw returns and value-weighted market return, 
PercShorti,t denotes the share of reported short positions of total shares outstanding, Other 
Controls include all other control variables and interaction terms of former regressions. T-
statistics computed are based on standard errors clustered by firm and year and are denoted 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  
Panel A: All observations 
 
Panel B: Min. 20 messages on day t 
  AbRett0 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+30 AbRett0 AbRett0,t+5 AbRett0,t+10 AbRett0,t+30 
PosSentimenti,t 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.004** -0.002 0.037*** 0.042*** 0.014 0.027* 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) 
NegSentimenti,t -0.012*** -0.029*** -0.024*** -0.034*** -0.023*** -0.041** -0.046** -0.060** 
  (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) 
AgreeIndi,t 0.003** -0.006 0.004 0.003 0.010 -0.020 -0.036 -0.095 
  (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.020) (0.043) (0.053) (0.074) 
PercShorti,t 0.001*** -0.000 -0.003*** -0.008*** 0.023*** 0.028** -0.019 -0.010 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.012) (0.028) (0.022) 
PosSent x PercShorti,t -0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.003*** -0.007*** -0.010*** 0.003 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) 
NegSent x PercShorti,t 0.001*** -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002*** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year-clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 329,308 305,317 299,276 258,223 9,894 9,089 8,748 6,722 
Adjusted R-squared 1.7% 0.6% 1.3% 4.5% 5.4% 2.4% 3.9% 3.0% 
F-value 73.07 20.09 15.36 15.76 19.21 10.02 6.724 4.272 
 
Additionally, we find a significantly negative relationship between positive sentiment ex-
pressed on internet message boards and short selling positions on stock i on day t (negative 
interaction term PercShort x PosSentimenti,t). The magnitude of the coefficient increases as we 
conduct our regressions with a minimum level of message board activity on stock i on day t. 
This finding implies that a higher ratio of a firm’s short position reduces a possible overreaction 
of a stock’s abnormal return on positive sentiment expressed on internet message boards. 
Therefore, we find empirical evidence that short selling reduces the impact of (positive) senti-
mental investors on the same day. From the economic point of view, it seems unlikely that our 
dependent variable, the abnormal return, causes short selling activity. However, we finally can-
not eliminate the possibility of confounding events which motivate a short seller to build up 
that position. 
  
Table 3-14. Short Selling and Sentiment Regressions 
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3.4.3. Volatility and Message Board Activity 
We have argued in former sections that the activity of noise traders, be it due to liquidity or 
other exogenous reasons, induce volatility in the market. To closer understand the drivers be-
hind volatility, we first regress volatility against the message board variables including the 
market return as a control variable for different time periods following Antweiler and Frank 
(2004). Results are tabulated in Table 3-15. We find that all three message board variables are 
significantly related to volatility. The message volume reveals significant coefficient estimates 
of +0.033 and +0.022 for the period t and t+1 at the significance level of 1%.  
The bullishness index, in general, has a negative impact on volatility with an also highly 
significant coefficient estimate of about -0.005 on day t. Agreement seems to be important in 
the time window of t+1 to t+30 with a coefficient of +0.005. It appears that the message vol-
ume has the most substantial impact on market volatility. To further examine the causal rela-
tionship between message board activity and market volatility, we conduct a VAR analysis in 
the next section. 
 
 
The observations are on a firm-day level. LogMessagesi,t is the log transformation (1+Mt), 
Bullishnessi,t is the standardized bullishness index defined in formula (10), Agreement is the 
agreement index described in formula (13), MarketReti,t describes the All Ordinaries market 
return, Volai,t and Volai,t+1 are the intraday price volatility, Volai,t+1,t+5/10/30 is the standard de-
viation of return in the respective time window. Robust standard errors are denoted in paren-
thesis. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10%-levels, respectively.   
 Volai,t Volai,t+1 Volai,t+1,t+5 Volai,t+1,t+10 Volai,t+1,t+30 
LogMessagesi,t 0.033*** 0.022*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Bullishnessi,t -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Agreementi,t -0.000 0.003 0.004* 0.004* 0.005*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
MarketRett -0.070** -0.141*** -0.063 -0.087** -0.047* 
 (0.034) (0.043) (0.044) (0.041) (0.028) 
Constant 0.032*** 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Observations 671,029 670,304 822,288 853,854 860,192 
Adjusted R2 3.91% 1.73% 0.41% 0.34% 0.35% 
Table 3-15. Regressions on Volatility 
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3.4.4. Predictability of Message Board Activity for Market Volatility 
3.4.4.1. Message Volume and Volatility at the Aggregate Level 
To examine whether message board activity forecast next-periods stock price volatility and 
to assess how these two variables interact intertemporally (short-term), we consider the 
following two equations: 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 = 𝛼1 + ∑𝛽1,𝑗 , 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ ∑𝛾1,𝑗 , 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀1𝑡 (22) 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼1 + ∑𝛽2,𝑗 , 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ ∑𝛾2,𝑗, 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀1𝑡 (23) 
where LogMest is the equally-weighted message board activity at time t and Volat is the 
equally-weighted stock price volatility of the 3,050 sample stocks at time t. Based on the test 
on the optimal lag length, we apply a lag of 3 (results reported in Table 3-16).  
Results for the VAR model on the aggregated level are shown in Table 3-17. The null-
hypothesis (H5) that: 𝛾1,1 = 𝛾1,2 = 𝛾1,3 = 0 from equation (22) cannot be fully rejected with 
a p-value of the χ2-test statistic for H5 of 0.395. However, the p-value of the χ2-test statistic for 
H6 is 0.093. The null-hypothesis (H6) that: 𝛽2,1 = 𝛽2,2 = 𝛽2,3 = 0 from equation (23)  can, 
therefore, be rejected at the 10%-signifiance level. In another words, the Granger-causality 
tests indicate that message board activity on the aggregate level may be positively Granger-
caused by prior stock price volatility. 
 
 
* indicates the lag order selected by each criterion, where FPE = Final prediction error, AIC = 
Akaike information criterion, SBIC = Schwarz information criterion, and HQIC = Hannan-
Quinn information criterion. 
Lag Likelihood-Ratio  DoF p-Value FPE  AIC   HQIC   SBIC   
0 0.0000    0.0000  -6.5294  -6.5211  -6.5086  
1 924.8699  4 0.0000 0.0000  -8.9422  -8.9175  -8.8800  
2 68.6352  4 0.0000 0.0000  -9.1017  -9.0606  -8.9981  
3 26.4214 * 4 0.0000 0.0000  -9.1502  -9.0926 * -9.0051 * 
4 8.4347  4 0.0769 0.0000 * -9.1514 * -9.0773  -8.9647  
Table 3-16. Lag-Order Selection Statistics for VAR – Aggregate Level 
   
The observations are on an aggregate level. Volatt is the scaled difference between the lowest and highest stock price and Log-
Mest is the log transformation (1+Mt).  Z-statistics are reported in parenthesis. χ2-test statistics are shown for the exclusion of the 
individual variable for the Granger-causality Wald-test. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10%-levels, respec-
tively. 
 
 
       
Explanatory variable        
     
 
  
Lags 2 3 (opt) 4  2 3 (opt.) 4 
  Volat Volat Volat   LogMest LogMest LogMest 
Intercept 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.008*  0.133*** 0.118*** 0.082* 
 (6.308) (3.995) (1.812)  (5.869) (4.240) (1.957) 
LogMest-1 0.002 0.002 -0.005  0.661*** 0.590*** 0.521*** 
 (0.844) (0.599) (-0.801)  (24.693) (16.500) (8.952) 
LogMest-2 -0.003 -0.003 -0.000  0.267*** 0.180*** 0.119** 
 (-1.119) (-0.867) (-0.022)  (10.035) (4.732) (2.003) 
LogMest-3  -0.001 -0.002   0.168*** 0.208*** 
  (-0.348) (-0.352)   (5.187) (3.798) 
LogMest-4   0.004    0.097** 
   (0.717)    (2.082) 
Volat-1 0.482*** 0.454*** 0.561***  -0.809*** -0.855** -0.006 
 (19.136) (11.704) (9.076)  (-3.131) (-2.265) (-0.010) 
Volat-2 0.312*** 0.287*** 0.335***  0.524** 0.555 0.386 
 (12.642) (8.224) (5.144)  (2.072) (1.636) (0.641) 
Volat-3  0.135*** 0.027   -0.053 0.403 
  (4.293) (0.532)   (-0.174) (0.858) 
Volat-4   0.050    -0.876* 
      (0.953)       (-1.817) 
Observations 1,230 797 380  1,230 797 380 
χ2-stat 1.361 2.978 3.271  9.823 6.416 3.863 
p-Value 0.506 0.395 0.513   0.007 0.093 0.425 
 
Table 3-17. Vector Autoregression at Aggregate Level – Volatility 
Volat =  α1 +  ∑β1,j, Volat−j
L
j=1
+  ∑γ1,j, LogMest−j
L
j=1
+  ε1t LogMest =  α1 +  ∑β2,j, Volat−j
L
j=1
+  ∑γ2,j, LogMest−j
L
j=1
+  ε1t 
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3.4.4.2. Message Volume and Volatility at the Individual Level 
To further examine the individual Granger-relationship between message board activity (vol-
ume) and stock price volatility on the individual level, we perform a panel VAR following an 
impulse response analysis similar to the previous section. We first test the hypothesis H5 and 
H6 on the individual level. Based on the test for optimal lag length for the panel data, we use 
the lag of 3 for the panel VAR.  For comparison, we also show the results for lag 2 and 4 of the 
panel VAR in Table 3-18. 
We find for the optimal lag length of 3, that the previous day message board volume signifi-
cantly predicts volatility, however, with an economically small impact (coefficient estimate of 
+0.004). On the other hand, we also observe that past days volatility strongly predicts message 
board activity even though with changing signs (𝛽2,3 = −0.124, 𝛽2,2 =  −0.249 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽2,1 =
 +0.483).  Both χ2-test statistics for H5 of 51.632 (p-value = 0.000) and for H6 of 66.607 (p-
value = 0.000) are highly significant so that both hypotheses can be rejected. In other words, 
message board volume and stock price volatility Granger-cause each other.  Nevertheless, we 
can conclude the reaction of message board volume to stock market volatility is significantly 
higher than vice versa. 
To also examine the dynamic interaction of message board volume and stock price volatility, 
we again apply the Cholesky based impulse function. Figure 3-5 shows the corresponding re-
sults. Stock price volatility reacts to message board volume shocks on day t+1 with decreasing 
but remaining impact after ten days. Setting a one-standard-deviation volatility shock, we 
observe a considerably high contemporaneous message board activity response compared to 
the other direction. Our results suggest, that message board activity follows market volatility 
even though message board activity might induce stock price volatility, albeit of small eco-
nomic impact. 
 
 
 
   
The observations are on the individual stock level. Volat is the scaled difference between the lowest and highest stock price and 
LogMest is the log transformation (1+Mt).  Z-statistics are reported in parenthesis. χ2-test statistics are shown for the exclusion of 
the individual variable for the Granger-causality Wald-test. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10%-levels, re-
spectively. 
 
Explanatory variable 
     
 
   
 
 
   
 
  
Lags 2 3 (opt.) 4  2 3 (opt.) 4 
  Volat Volat Volat   LogMest LogMest LogMest 
LogMest-1 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***  0.430*** 0.398*** 0.369*** 
 (9.176) (6.809) (4.373)  (80.483) (56.013) (32.134) 
LogMest-2 -0.000 0.001 0.001  0.244*** 0.192*** 0.163*** 
 (-0.134) (1.175) (1.557)  (48.998) (28.975) (14.461) 
LogMest-3  -0.001 0.000   0.163*** 0.128*** 
  (-1.455) (0.528)   (24.717) (11.671) 
LogMest-4   0.001    0.124*** 
   (0.895)    (11.389) 
Volat-1 0.237*** 0.239*** 0.232***  0.426*** 0.483*** 0.361*** 
 (25.306) (16.604) (11.132)  (9.479) (6.851) (2.807) 
Volat-2 0.097*** 0.075*** 0.058***  -0.216*** -0.249*** -0.251* 
 (12.020) (6.131) (2.798)  (-5.617) (-3.858) (-1.958) 
Volat-3  0.088*** 0.081***   -0.124** -0.223* 
  (7.923) (4.690)   (-2.078) (-1.956) 
Volat-4   0.070***    0.004 
      (3.591)       (0.040) 
Observations 90,503 42,872 15,039  90,503 42,872 15,039 
χ2-stat 86.244 51.632 22.645  115.499 66.607 15.218 
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.004 
 
Table 3-18. Panel Vector Autoregressions at Individual Level – Volatility 
Volat =  αi,1 +  ∑β1,j, Volai,t−j
L
j=1
+  ∑γ1,j, LogMesi,t−j
L
j=1
+  ε1t LogMest =  α𝑖,1 +  ∑β2,j, Volai,t−j
L
j=1
+  ∑γ2,j, LogMeso,t−j
L
j=1
+  ε1t 
 
A
g
reein
g
 to
 D
isag
ree: In
fo
rm
ativ
en
ess o
f S
en
tim
en
ts in
 In
tern
et M
essag
e B
o
ard
s | 1
0
6
  
Agreeing to Disagree: Informativeness of Sentiments in Internet Message Boards | 107 
 
 
 
 
 Fundamental Information in Message Boards around Company Events 
The differentiated impact of social media activity found in our event study (Figure 3-2 and 
Figure 3-3) and in our multivariate analysis underlines its importance in capital markets. De-
spite our different steps taken (event study, panel VAR, multivariate regressions), we cannot 
clearly argue in general whether social media users act as noise traders, who move prices away 
from their fundamentals, or convey financially relevant information and thus contribute in price 
discovery. Consequently, researchers must distinguish between the impact of social media in 
non-event and event specific environments. Thus, we now examine the cross-sectional rela-
tionships between the message board variables and fundamental values around annual earnings 
announcements. 
Financial analysts act as essential intermediaries in financial markets and are subject to a 
broad body of research streams. Two main reasons of existence come along with their role: the 
discovery of private information and furthermore the interpretation of publicly available infor-
mation (e.g., Ivković and Jegadeesh, 2004; Asquith et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2010).      
Chen et al. (2014) argued that annual earnings reported by firms are probably not affected by 
social media activity. Since it would also be unlikely that financial analysts revise their recom-
mendations based on negative sentiment (therefore negative sentiment would predict negative 
earnings surprise), social media would represent an information channel with predictive power. 
They find that negative opinions revealed on the investment-related platform SeekingAlpha 
0
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Figure 3-5. Impulse-Response-Functions – Volatility (Impulse : Response) 
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predict future negative earnings surprises. One of the main disadvantages of looking at analyst 
forecasts is the sole reflection of analysts opinions, rather than the consideration of market 
information, which could be available to other well-informed market participants (Akbas, 
2016). Attributable to the area of Behavioral Finance, opinions might be subject to a positive 
bias as financial analysts encounter the desire to conform, or in other words “herd” (Olsen, 
1996). Herding characteristically moves the mean Earnings per Share (EPS) forecast towards 
a specific direction and lowers the forecast dispersion. Former studies showed that analysts 
forecasts have been overly optimistic compared to the actual reported EPS (e.g., Olsen, 1996). 
A reinforcing factor is also that financial analysts are judged by their degree of conformity with 
other analyst forecasts since the quality of predictions is exposed to uncontrollable exogenous 
factors. A consensus forecast is, therefore, in the interest of all analysts to protect their right 
for existence and thus their human capital (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Trueman, 1994; 
Froot et al., 1992; Olsen, 1996). Hence, we argue that if financial analysts release optimistic 
consensus recommendations and social media users agree in the optimistic outlook of the firm’s 
performance, then earnings surprises might be positive. 
Following the work of Chen et al. (2014) and Akbas (2016), we conduct a firm/year-fixed 
regression of annual earnings surprises on message board variables and various control varia-
bles to examine the value-content of internet message boards. Our model extends the approach 
of Chen et al. (2014) by additional consideration of positive sentiment and the degree of agree-
ment in message board discussions. If message board activity would not contain value-relevant 
information, then no relationship should exist between earnings surprises and our message 
board variables. However, our results suggest that social media does provide financially rele-
vant information in event-specific environments. For comparison, we construct two different 
types of earnings surprises as our dependent variable. The standardized unexpected earnings 
surprise based on analyst forecasts (SUEAF) and the standardized unexpected earnings based 
on the historical time series information (SUEHIST). 
 The standardized unexpected earnings (SUEAF) based analyst forecasts is defined as: 
𝑆𝑈𝐸𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =
( 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑋𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡−90𝑑)
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
  
(24) 
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where Xit is the primary Earnings per Share (EPS) before significant items for firm i in financial 
year t and Xmedi,t-90d is the EPS-median of most recent analyst forecasts over 90 days prior to 
the annual earnings announcement, and Pi,t is the price per share for firm i at the end of the 
financial year t from I/B/E/S. To eliminate the impact of outliers, we winsorized the top and 
bottom 1% of the observations.  
The standardized unexpected earnings based on the random walk model (SUEHIST) is de-
fined as follows: 
𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 =
( 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1)
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
  
(25) 
where 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is the primary Earnings per Share before significant items for firm i in the previous 
financial year. For our control variables and following Akbas (2016), we first include Ret50, the 
compounded return over the period of [-61, -12] days prior to the earnings announcement date 
and Ret5 for the five-day return period [-6, -2] prior to the earnings announcement date.  We 
also include Volatilityi,10 which is the standard deviation of daily returns in the time window  
[-11, -2] prior to the earnings announcement. Next, we include the log-transformed average 
turnover LogTurnoveri,50 over the time window [-61, -12] to account for potential average vol-
ume effects as stated by Berkman et al. (2009). Additionally, we add the log-transformed mar-
ket capitalization LogSizei,t, which is the log-transformation of shares outstanding times the 
share price at the end of the financial year and also accounts for skewness in the data set (small 
capitalization stocks are predominant in the data set as described in Section 3.2). Lastly, we 
include cumulated message board variables LogMessagesi,[RP], Bullishnessi,[RP], PosSenti-
ment/NegSentiment i,[RP] and Agreement i,[RP] with the reference periods (RP) of [-2, -1],  
[-7, -1], and [-30 ,-1] to measure the information content over a sufficient period of time.  
Table 3-19 reports the summary statistics for the message board period of [-7, -1] days before 
the earnings announcement based on analyst forecasts. We find a mean of -0.014 for scaled 
earnings surprise (SUEAF) which supports the argument that analysts tend to herd and are too 
optimistic in their consensus forecast.  
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This table reports the summary statistics for the main regression surrounding annual earnings 
announcements. SUEAFi,t is the difference in actual EPS and forecasted EPS using analyst 
forecasts 90 days prior to the earnings announcement date scaled by the stock price of the end 
of the year, LogMessagesi,7 is the log transformation of (1 + Mt) for the event window [-7,-1], 
Bullishnessi,7 is the cumulated bullishness index using formula (12), Agreementi,7 is the cu-
mulated agreement index using formula (13),  Returni,50 is the compounded return over the 
period of [-61,-12] and Returni,5 for the five-day return period [-6,-2] prior to the earnings 
announcement date. LogTurnoveri,50 is the log-transformed average turnover over the time 
window [-61,-12] prior to the earnings announcement date, Volatilityi,10 is the standard devi-
ation of daily returns in the time window [-11,-2] and LogSizei,t is the log-transformation of 
the market capitalization at the end of the financial year. 
VARIABLES N Mean Median Std. Dev. 10th Pctl. 25th Pctl. 75th Pctl. 90th Pctl. 
SUEAFi,t 479 -0.014 -0.001 0.186 -0.090 -0.013 0.009 0.052 
LogMessagesi,7 479 2.147 2.079 1.038 0.693 1.386 2.944 3.555 
Bullishnessi,7 479 1.784 1.791 1.196 0.649 1.075 2.565 3.359 
Agreementi,7 479 0.817 1.000 0.338 0.169 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Returni,50 479 -0.027 -0.020 0.352 -0.362 -0.174 0.120 0.304 
Returni,5 479 -0.003 0.000 0.083 -0.099 -0.042 0.040 0.092 
LogTurnoveri,50 479 13.840 13.510 2.081 11.330 12.260 15.360 16.810 
Volatilityi,10 479 0.029 0.025 0.017 0.012 0.017 0.036 0.051 
LogSizei,t 479 24.430 24.110 1.721 22.530 23.310 25.430 26.970 
 
In past literature, researchers link (excess) trading volume to divergence in investor opinion 
(e.g., Beaver, 1968; Bamber, 1987; Kandel and Pearson, 1995; Garfinkel and Sokobin, 2006). 
As we hypothesis that opinion convergence would, on the other hand, contribute to price 
discovery, we can directly refer to the sentiment expressed in the internet message board in-
stead of using trading volume as a proxy. Figure 3-6 shows the development of the cumulated 
agreement index before the earnings announcement date t. For example, for the event window 
of 7 days prior the announcement date [-7, -1], we cumulated all financially relevant board 
messages (sell and buy recommendations) and constructed the agreement index based on for-
mula (13). We find a convergence pattern as we approach the earnings announcement date with 
event windows of [-60, -1], [-30, -1], [-7, -1] and [-2, -1]. As DeMarzo et al. (2003) pointed 
out, the main prerequisites for the convergence of beliefs are that investors may not be isolated 
from each other and that their beliefs are not fixed in a sense that discussions would stop. Social 
media platforms enable retail investors to participate in discussions rather than isolating its 
users in distinctive discussions. Hence, social media generally meet the first requirement for  
Table 3-19. Summary Statistics  
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belief convergence. However, it is not clear how message board users with fixed beliefs interact 
in their discussions. We take a closer look at the cross-sectional impact of sentiment on agree-
ment on earnings surprises in the next section. 
3.5.1. Portfolio Analysis 
Akbas (2016) argues that extraordinary low trading volume contains unfavorable information 
about a firm’s fundamentals since informed investors would not trade – given short selling 
constraints – based on the bad information they have. We believe that the direct measure of 
agreement combined with the underlying sentiment would also act as a signal of bad news of 
a change in firm’s fundamentals, equivalent to the abnormal low trading volume found by 
Akbas (2016). Hence, we construct a portfolio for each year end and assigned the stocks to 
quartiles based on the combined sentiment and agreement score (Agreement index x Bullishness 
index).  Figure 3-7 depicts the average earnings surprise based on analyst forecasts (SUEAF) 
for each quartile. The mean SUEAF for quartile 4 is negative at -2.6% and significant at the  
1.0
LogMes[t-60,t-1]
1.2
LogMes[t-30,t-1]
0.6
0.0
LogMes[t-7,t-1]
0.8
LogMes[t-2,t-1]
Total agreement
Figure 3-6. Average Cumulated Agreement Index Relative to the Event Date t  
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The figure presents time-series averages of annual mean values of unexpected earnings based 
on analyst forecasts, within Agreement x Bullishness quartiles. The weights are based on the 
number of messages posted a week before the actual earnings announcement. SUEAF is the 
difference between the median analyst forecast over the 90-day-period before the announce-
ment and actual earnings divided by the year-end price. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
5% level. For quartile 3, we find a negative mean SUEAF of -3.8%, and it is significant at the 
10% level. The mean SUEAF turns into positive for quartile 1, however, not found significant 
anymore. The difference of -2.2% between quartile 4 (lowest sentiment and agreement level) 
and 1 (highest sentiment and agreement level) is significant at the 5% level, based on the Sat-
terthwaite method. The trend depicted in Figure 3-7 thus suggests that low levels of combined 
sentiment and agreement convey negative information about earnings surprises. This finding 
is as expected; however one cannot undoubtfully argue that either negative sentiment or high 
levels of disagreement convey negative information about future earnings surprises. Both var-
iables must be treated jointly in this discussion.  
Figure 3-7. Average Unexpected Earnings (SUEAF) by Agreement/Sentiment Quartiles 
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3.5.2. Regressions on Earnings Surprises 
In this section, we conduct a cross-sectional fixed-effects regression with firm-year clustered 
standard errors on SUEAF and SUEHIST to analyze the relation between message board vari-
ables and earnings surprises while controlling for factors that may affect this relation.  The 
starting point of the regressions (see results in Table 3-20, column (1)) is as follows: 
𝑆𝑈𝐸𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡 / 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝐻𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1,𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,7 + 𝛽2,𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,7
+ 𝛽3,𝑡𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,7 + 𝛾1𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛾2𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,10
+ 𝛾3𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,50 + 𝛾4𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,5 + 𝛾5𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,50 + + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(26) 
The main message board and control variables are described in the previous section. We per-
form the regression for both types of earnings surprises, SUEAFi,t and SUEHISTi,t to examine 
whether retail investors on social media relate to specific events or information in their discus-
sions. If retail investors developed to sophisticated, well-informed investors, then we would 
expect them to acquire the most relevant financial analyst reports before the earnings announce-
ment.  The primary variables of interest are the message board related variables (incl. interac-
tion terms). We extend the regression with the dummy variables High-/LowAgreeD indicating 
whether the messages posted can be assigned to the top or bottom 20%-quintile at the end of 
the fiscal year, analogous to Akbas (2016), to test the impact of abnormal agreement or disa-
greement on earnings announcement. We then add the interaction terms BullInd x AgreeIndi,7  
to test the mutual relation of this score with earnings announcements. Results are tabulated for 
SUEAF (SUEHIST) in Table 3-20 (Table 3-21).  
For SUEAFi,t, the results show that the coefficient estimates for bullishness (agreement) is 
negative (positive) and significant at the level of 10% (5%) in the basis regression (Table 3-20 
(column 1)). As we segregate the high and low agreement quintiles (Table 3-20 (column 2)), 
we find that it is HighAgreeD which is positively related to SUEAFi,t.  By adding the interaction 
term BullInd x AgreeInd, we find a positive relation of bullishness and agreement with SUEAFi,t 
with a positive coefficient estimate of +0.082 which is significant at the 1% level (Table 3-20 
(column 3)). In other words, the higher the bullishness, the higher the impact of the agreement  
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Firm- and year-fixed regressions were conducted. T-statistics computed are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm and year and are denoted in parentheses. SUEAFi,t is the difference in actual EPS 
and forecasted EPS using analyst forecasts 90 days prior to the earnings announcement date scaled by 
the stock price of the end of the year, LogMessagesi,7 is the log transformation of (1 + Mt) for the event 
window [-7, -1], Bullishnessi,7 is the cumulated bullishness index using formula (12), Agreementi,7 is 
the cumulated agreement index using formula (13), High/LowAgreeDi,7 is a dummy variable 
indicating the cumulated agreement index to be in the top/bottom 20-percentile,  Return50 is the 
compounded return over the period of [-61, -12] and Return5 for the five-day return period [-6, -2] 
prior to the earnings announcement date. LogTurnover50 is the log-transformed average turnover over 
the time window [-61, -12] prior to the earnings announcement date, Volatilityi,10 is the standard de-
viation of daily returns in the time window [-11, -2] and LogSizei,t is the log-transformation of the 
market capitalization at the end of the financial year. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  SUEAFt0 SUEAFt0 SUEAFt0 SUEAFt0 SUEAFt0 
LogMessagesi,7 0.019 0.032** -0.012 -0.007  
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019)  
Bullishnessi,7 -0.022* -0.028** -0.061*** -0.037***  
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.014)  
PosSentimenti,7     0.000 
     (0.011) 
NegSentimenti,7     0.029 
     (0.020) 
Agreementi,7 0.060**  -0.045   
 (0.026)  (0.029)   
HighAgreeDi,7  0.147*  0.016 0.144* 
  (0.078)  (0.082) (0.083) 
LowAgreeDi,7  0.084  0.049 0.083 
  (0.068)  (0.073) (0.068) 
BullInd x AgreeInd i,7   0.082***   
   (0.020)   
BullInd x HighAgreeD i,7    0.053***  
    (0.018)  
BullInd x Low_AgreeD i,7    -0.015  
    (0.023)  
Return50 -0.057** -0.066** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.062** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) 
Return5 0.539** 0.467** 0.522** 0.464*** 0.466** 
 (0.228) (0.181) (0.206) (0.178) (0.183) 
LogTurnover50 0.013 0.017 0.024 0.025 0.013 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
Volatilityi,10 -2.158** -2.230** -1.978** -1.876** -2.203** 
 (0.945) (0.930) (0.884) (0.893) (0.955) 
LogSizei,t 0.002 -0.008 -0.008 -0.013 -0.002 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
Constant -0.227 -0.129 -0.016 0.018 -0.220 
  (0.377) (0.373) (0.357) (0.357) (0.377) 
Observations 479 479 479 479 479 
Adjusted R2 14.6% 17.5% 22.0% 20.7% 16.5% 
 
Table 3-20. Message Board Activity as Predictor of Earnings Surprise (SUEAF) 
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Firm- and year-fixed regressions were conducted. T-statistics computed are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm and year and are denoted in parentheses. SUEHISTi,t is the difference in actual EPS 
in year t and the previous year actual EPS scaled by the stock price of the end of the year, 
LogMessagesi,7 is the log transformation of (1 + Mt) for the event window [-7, -1], Bullishnessi,7 is the 
cumulated bullishness index using formula (3), Agreementi,7 is the cumulated agreement index using 
formula (4), High/LowAgreeDi,7 is a dummy variable indicating the cumulated agreement index to be 
in the top/bottom 20-percentile,  Return50 is the compounded return over the period of [-61,-12] and 
Return5 for the five-day return period [-6, -2] prior to the earnings announcement date. LogTurnover50 
is the log-transformed average turnover over the time window [-61,  -12] prior to the earnings an-
nouncement date, Volatilityi,10 is the standard deviation of daily returns in the time window [-11, -2] 
and LogSizei,t is the log-transformation of the market capitalization at the end of the financial year. 
***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  SUEHISTt0 SUEHISTt0 SUEHISTt0 SUEHISTt0 SUEHISTt0 
LogMesi,7 -0.597 -0.587 -0.551* -0.672*  
 (0.368) (0.369) (0.329) (0.383)  
BullIndi,7 0.402 0.414 0.445 0.127  
 (0.344) (0.336) (0.396) (0.166)  
PosSentimenti,7     -0.127 
     (0.110) 
NegSentimenti,7     -0.792 
     (0.505) 
AgreeIndi,7 -0.543  -0.405   
 (0.651)  (0.540)   
High_Agree_Di,7  0.337  -0.643 0.015 
  (0.449)  (0.972) (0.582) 
Low_Agree_Di,7  0.888**  -0.365 0.957*** 
  (0.348)  (0.729) (0.319) 
BullInd x AgreeInd i,7   -0.105   
   (0.204)   
BullInd x HighAgreeD i,7    0.374  
    (0.252)  
BullInd x LowAgreeD i,7    0.828  
    (0.558)  
Return50 -0.374 -0.357 -0.362 -0.335 -0.362 
 (0.286) (0.297) (0.302) (0.316) (0.279) 
Return5 1.867** 1.435** 1.897** 1.040 1.401** 
 (0.744) (0.714) (0.773) (0.649) (0.693) 
LogTurnover50 -0.194 -0.203 -0.209 -0.232 -0.156 
 (0.205) (0.208) (0.217) (0.212) (0.189) 
Volatilityi,10 12.003 13.132 11.808 12.423 15.509 
 (9.286) (9.376) (9.311) (9.597) (10.019) 
LogSizei,t 0.335* 0.337* 0.351* 0.367* 0.307* 
 (0.178) (0.184) (0.190) (0.194) (0.171) 
Constant -4.974*** -5.852*** -5.312*** -5.021*** -5.586*** 
  (1.743) (1.851) (1.904) (1.875) (1.723) 
Observations 560 560 560 560 560 
Adjusted R2 10.0% 11.4% 10.0% 14.5% 11.4% 
 
Table 3-21. Message Board Activity as Predictor of Earnings Surprise (SUEHIST) 
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on SUEAFi,t, and vice versa. Investors using social media relate information from analyst 
reports with their newest findings and analysis. Information about changes of a firm’s funda-
mental values are discussed, and results suggest that situations in which investors are bullish 
and agreed on lead to higher earnings surprises. One must consider in our results, that social 
media users in our analysis could have a timing advantage against financial analysts since we 
consider analyst reports of the past 90 days for our earnings surprise calculation. Since our 
results only hold for the time window of [-7, -1], we can assume that retail investors on social 
media have sufficient time to access older reports and invest the effort to interpret and extend 
the information content of the report. The overall regression results in this section are in line 
with our previous finding in the portfolio section that increasing score of bullishness and agree-
ment are a positive signal for earnings surprises.  
The results for SUEHISTi,t, on the other hand, did not show any relevant significance for 
message board variables. Our results, therefore, suggest that retail investors on social media 
are important market participants who disseminate value-relevant information and thus con-
tribute to the improvement of market efficiency. They discuss, interpret and disseminate infor-
mation depending on the type of event, sentiment, and agreement among the users. 
 Conclusion 
We investigate the differential information content of internet message boards in non-specific 
event setups and surrounding annual earnings announcements. We first find that positive sen-
timent is positively related to abnormal returns, but the effect diminishes after a month. In the 
short-term, the relation holds in both directions but with implications that positive sentiment 
follows the previous day excelling stock performance. Furthermore, we observe a pattern of 
noise trading activity surrounding events with abnormal positive sentiment postings. More spe-
cifically, abnormal returns are positively contemporaneously associated with abnormal positive 
sentiment postings, however with negative return reversals on the subsequent days. Short 
selling activities reduce this presumably observed contemporaneous overreaction in firm’s 
abnormal returns. We argue that only informed sellers initiate short selling activities when they 
believe that sentiment diverges far beyond a firm’s fundamentals. Hence, short sellers arbitrage 
against noisy sentiment traders. However, due to limits of arbitrage and hyping of rather small 
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stocks we do see a remaining contemporaneous relation between positive sentiment and a 
firm’s abnormal returns.  
Secondly, we find that negative sentiment incorporates information about stock underperfor-
mances with a negative correlation of up to one month as analyzed in this paper. Contrary to 
the characteristics of positive sentiment postings, we find indications that negative sentiment 
predicts the underperformance of stocks compared to the market in the short-term. Abnormal 
return reversals into positive remain absent after days of abnormal high postings with negative 
sentiment. The impact of negative sentiment is thereby much more economically meaningful 
compared to messages with positive sentiment. As the questions arise if social media might 
induce market volatility, we thirdly find that increased internet message board postings are 
rather caused by previous stock price swings than vice versa.  Even though our findings imply 
a bilateral-direction in causality, the impact of message board activity on volatility reveals only 
modest economic significance. Lastly, our results provide evidence that message board senti-
ment and agreement – or sentiment homogeneity - amongst the users predict earnings surprises 
using analyst forecasts. This is in line with former studies (Chen et al., 2014; Leung and Ton, 
2015) which propagate the dissemination of value-relevant information through internet mes-
sage boards or social media outlets.  
We summarize our findings that internet message boards as an outlet of social media have a 
substantial impact on equities markets however with significant differential effects depending 
on the sentiment and the surrounding events. Additionally, regulators should succumb to the 
discussion whether arbitrageurs contribute to the price stabilization process, especially in noisy 
market environments. 
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4. Investor Sophistication and Attention in Target Price Run-Ups  
ABSTRACT: We analyze direct and indirect measures of investor attention before M&A 
announcements and their relation to the well-documented phenomena of target run-ups. Con-
trolling for attention of (un-)sophisticated individual and institutional investors, we show that 
dedicated internet investment platforms contribute to the run-ups of small enterprise M&A 
targets. The fundamental characteristics of these firms covered only in internet investment plat-
forms do not economically differ from other small firms that receive no (social) media atten-
tion. Contrarily, institutional investors covering large stocks are influenced by analyst recom-
mendations. Altogether, the results are consistent with the market expectations hypothesis 
around M&A announcements. 
 Introduction 
“But whether a contrarian or a trend follower, an investor is less likely to purchase a stock 
that is out of the limelight.” (Barber and Odean, 2008, p. 813). 
 
M&A (mergers and acquisitions) literature shows that the target run-up phenomenon occurs 
around two to three months before the first official bid announcement (Keown and Pinkerton, 
1981; Asquith, 1983; Schwert, 1996; King, 2009; Brigida and Madura, 2012). One strand of 
research argues that run-ups result from efficient markets, which quickly process valuable in-
formation from news articles or rumors (Gupta and Misra, 1989; Murray, 1994; Zivney et al., 
1996; Clarkson et al., 2006; Gao and Oler, 2012; Siganos and Papa, 2012) or pre-announcement 
relationships based on toeholds (Mikkelson and Ruback, 1985; Choi, 1991). Alternatively, 
Meulbroek (1992) explains that target run-ups are susceptible to insider information leakage 
because bid announcements are valuation-relevant events. This idea is extended by Tang and 
Xu (2016) who show that unreported insider trading causes target run-ups. 
The two channels put forth to explain target run-ups, however, neglect the issues that 1) 
institutional and individual investors would not only have access to different sources of 
information but differ in the resources they have available to process this information and also 
in the quality of their investment decisions; 2) unsophisticated and sophisticated individual 
investors have varying impact on financial markets; and 3) new information is only valuable if 
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the receiver pays attention to it (Da et al., 2011). For example, Huberman and Regev (2001) 
demonstrate that stock prices only significantly react to information when investors pay atten-
tion to it. 
We study the contribution of investor sophistication and attention amongst institutional and 
individual investors to target run-ups prior M&A announcements. People purchase stocks with 
the belief that they will increase in value. In traditional efficient market theories, those gains 
are based on valuable information which is processed efficiently by market participants and is 
thus incorporated into stock prices. However, how do institutional and individual investors 
catch the attention of potential target firms who seem to gain in value? Barber and Odean 
(2008) suggest that it is the extreme returns that catch an investor’s attention and that these 
returns are related to news or attention-grabbing information. Thus, extreme returns act as news 
vis-à-vis events without other details. Investors face a fundamental search problem in a world 
of thousands of stocks (Barber and Odean, 2008). This leads to the question of how investors 
search for winner stocks in the M&A context. There are several theories and models existing 
which try to identify potential M&A targets based on firm characteristics and performances 
(e.g., Palepu, 1986; Comment and Schwert, 1995).  
We measure sophisticated individual investor attention using posting activity on HotCopper, 
which is the leading online Australian equities discussion platform. Individual investors receive 
attention surrounding a stock when they actively post messages and discuss them on social 
media platforms. Da et al. (2011) show that internet search volume is likely to capture the 
attention of unsophisticated individual investors. Hence, we further introduce merger attention 
signals based on internet search queries on Google. In Australia, Google’s search engine is the 
market leader with a total market share of 94% of total search inquiries. We can, therefore, 
assume that financial Google search queries cover a broad audience of unsophisticated indi-
vidual investors. In another study, Drake et al. (2012) find that abnormal internet search queries 
preempt information on upcoming firm events such as earnings announcements.  
Furthermore, the authors argue that individual investor attention is positively related to media 
coverage but negatively associated with investor distraction.25 In addition to the previous stud-
ies, there have been several further studies added to the investor attention literature which make 
                                                 
25 Drake et al. (2012) describe investor distraction as the level of competing earnings news. 
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use of internet search queries as a new direct measure of individual investor attention (Vlastakis 
and Markellos, 2012; Vozlyublennaia, 2014; Andrei and Hasler, 2015; Da et al., 2015; We-
lagedara et al., 2017). However, these studies do not disentangle the relation between investor 
attention and financial market activities (e.g., index returns for stocks, bonds, and commodities, 
return volatility, analyst recommendation revisions, earnings announcements) for unsophisti-
cated and sophisticated individual investors. 
Prior studies on run-ups, such as from Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) and Schwert (1996), test the 
relation between press speculation and run-ups. However, these studies do not distinguish the 
behavioral characteristics between individual and institutional investors. In a pre-IPO-setting, 
Liu et al. (2009) claim that media coverage reflects institutional investor attention. On the con-
trary, Fang and Peress (2009) find that analyst coverage is more likely to be the predominant 
information source for institutional investors and that (traditional) news media coverage serves 
individual investors. Womack (1996) points out that institutional investors obtain their infor-
mation from costly databases and brokerage firms which provide sophisticated analyst reports. 
These reports are by nature evaluative and predictive. Analyst recommendations are future 
predictions of stock valuations and thus include all available sources of costly industry and 
firm-related information. Furthermore, buy and sell recommendations directly test the intrinsic 
value of an analyst’s information. It is well known that target firm valuations are particularly 
subject to bid announcements. We employ changes in analyst recommendations from Institu-
tional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) and traditional news media from Thomson Reuters 
News Analytics (TRNA) to examine the relationship between institutional investor attention 
and target run-ups. 
Further, evidence reveals that target run-ups still occur in the Australian equity market despite 
the introduction of tighter guidelines surrounding the leakage of price sensitive information 
prior to bid announcements. The ASIC (Australian Securities and Investment Commission) 
examined the extent of media leakage two weeks before 40 takeovers (46% of total value) and 
40 equity raisings (22% of total secondary equity) between July 2006 and March 2013. During 
this period, the industry-led Governance Institute of Australasian Investor Relations Associa-
tion, with the support of ASIC, introduced guidelines to enforce the release of price-sensitive 
information on July 1st, 2010. It was shown that 45% of takeovers and 35% of equity raisings 
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were leaked prior the installment of the guidelines and the level of leakage dropped to 20% for 
takeovers and moderately increased to 40% for equity raisings after the installment. The Aus-
tralian Financial Review and The Australian newspapers were the most active reporters of 
transaction leakage.26 The occurrence of information leakage despite the strict regulatory 
guidelines in the Australian equity market provides the ideal setup for us to test the impact of 
traditional news media and social media attention around bid announcements. 
We find that smaller and underperforming stocks that only catch the attention of sophisticated 
individual investors on HotCopper experience a significantly higher target run-up before bid 
announcements. Firms with similar fundamental characteristics but no (social) media attention 
do not experience a significant run-up, but only a short-term announcement effect. Large firms, 
on the other hand, are found to be sensitive to analyst opinions. Positive and negative analyst 
upgrades have significant influences on target run-ups in their respective directions. Merger 
signals in traditional news media only appear to play a minor role for institutional investors. 
Also, Google search activity before bid announcements of unsophisticated investors does not 
significantly or economically meaningfully explain target run-ups. In summary, we find dis-
tinctive drivers of institutional and individual investor attention which explain target run-ups 
and they are consistent with the market expectations hypothesis.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data and research 
design of this study. Section 4.3 analyzes the timing effects and magnitudes of target run-ups 
for different types of traditional and social media attention. Section 4.4 provides evidence that 
institutional and sophisticated individual investor measures capture investor attention before 
bid announcements. Whether investors are net buyers or net sellers around attention-grabbing 
events is tested in section 4.5. In section 4.6, we test the relevance of unsophisticated investor 
attention via internet search queries. Section 4.7 examines the relation between target run-up 
characteristics and markup pricing around bid announcements. Section 4.8 and 4.9 discuss po-
tential endogeneity issues and conclude the study.  
                                                 
26 http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1344584/rep393-published-27-May-2014.pdf. 
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 Data and Research Design 
M&A announcement data was downloaded from the Thomson Reuters Securities Data Com-
pany’s (SDC) database. The sample consists of acquirer firms which can either be a private or 
public firm, and takeover targets which are listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). 
The highly regulated Australian market requires persons or firms to report a potential acquisi-
tion to the relevant market operator (typically the ASX) within two days as defined in the Cor-
porations Act 2001, when ownership thresholds of 5% (so-called “substantial holdings”) are 
exceeded or a 1% change in ownership is pursued. Exceeding ownership thresholds of 20% are 
only allowed under specified circumstances.27 As we strive to examine M&A announcements 
effects collectively, we also include acquisition announcements which potentially result in mi-
nority stakes (<50% after acquisition). We do not restrict our study to full ownership 
persuasions since we want to examine the overall relation of announcements for (un-)sophisti-
cated individual and institutional investors with such public announcements.  
The sample consists of 3,165 transaction announcements between January 2008 and August 
2015 with sufficient returns data available for our analysis. We obtained our trading data from 
Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). To circumvent the impact of 
confounding events and especially multiple announcements for the same target company within 
a short-term period, we only included the first takeover announcement within a two-month 
period. This filter yields 2,765 takeover events. 
For an approximation of institutional investor attention, we include 15,135 news articles and 
alerts about 513 firms from the TRNA database which occurred in the two-month period before 
the actual takeover announcement. In order to differentiate between a random press coverage 
(press article or alert regardless of content) or dedicated merger signals (specific takeover con-
tent), we analyzed the news and alert headlines for M&A related keywords. To add another 
indirect proxy of institutional investor attention, we also included analyst up- and downgrades 
data which was extracted from the I/B/E/S database.  
                                                 
27 http://www.clearstream.com/clearstream-en/products-and-services/market-coverage/asia- pacific/australia/dis-
closure- requirements ---australia/7380, November 15th, 2017. 
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To analyze the relationship between individual investor attention and M&A announcement 
effects, we use data from HotCopper, the most popular internet investment platform in Aus-
tralia. We find 83,988 messages posted on 1,045 distinct firms in this forum in the two-month 
period before the takeover announcement. Since price sensitive ASX announcements are 
directly linked to HotCopper, we use the HotCopper database to control for public firm an-
nouncements which are posted with directly related company tickers.   
For each event, we examine whether it was covered by traditional and social media in a two-
month period before the M&A announcement date. If we find a takeover signal and posts on 
the social media investment platform HotCopper, we classify the event as a deal with “full 
media” coverage. In the case of single takeover signals or HotCopper coverage, we define these 
events as “only news” or “only HotCopper”.  Among the 2,765 events in our sample, there is 
full media coverage for 407 target firms. We find for the majority of 1,779 announcements that 
firm talks solely took place on the investment platform HotCopper.  
Panel A in Table 4-1 shows the yearly distribution of our M&A sample. The number of M&A 
announcements decreased continuously after the period of the financial crisis in 2008/2009. 
The share of M&A announcements only experiencing news signals remains relatively low. 
M&A announcements just catching the attention of HotCopper users account for the largest 
group across all years. Panel B in Table 4-1 presents the industry distribution of our sample 
according to the SDC industry classification. The Materials industry sector constitutes about 
half of our sample, followed by Financials and Energy & Power with each accounting for nearly 
10% of the total sample. This industry distribution remains consistent amongst all subsamples. 
We, therefore, find no bias or tendencies in our sample that, for example, Materials companies 
experience full media attention compared to other sectors. 
Table 4-2 reports the financial summary statistics for target deal characteristics. Details about 
the variable construction are described in Table A-11 in the Appendix. The table presents the 
means, medians and standard deviations for the four subsamples based on their (social) media 
coverage followed by the total sample. To better interpret the differences of characteristics for 
distinctive subsamples, we report the differences in means and medians for each target charac-
teristic and subsample and test the mean differences with the Welsh-test to account for differ-
ences in variances of the different samples. 
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This table shows the sample distribution of 2,765 Australian M&A announcements between 
Jan. 2008 and Aug. 2015. The target is public and the acquirer is either private or public. Panels 
A and B present the number of M&A announcements by year and industry, respectively. The 
full sample consists of all four types of media coverage. 
Panel A: By announcement year 
        Media coverage 
  Full sample  Full media  Only news  Only HC  No media 
Year # %   # %   # %   # %   # % 
2008 522 18.9  46 11.3  24 31.6  263 14.8  189 37.6 
2009 511 18.5  43 10.6  10 13.2  368 20.7  90 17.9 
2010 462 16.7  41 10.1  8 10.5  353 19.8  60 11.9 
2011 305 11.0  47 11.5  9 11.8  215 12.1  34 6.8 
2012 366 13.2  65 16.0  10 13.2  251 14.1  40 8.0 
2013 269 9.7  51 12.5  3 3.9  186 10.5  29 5.8 
2014 216 7.8  72 17.7  6 7.9  103 5.8  35 7.0 
2015* 114 4.1   42 10.3   6 7.9   40 2.2   26 5.2 
Total 2,765 100.0   407 100.0   76 100.0   1,779 100.0   503 100.0 
               
Panel B: By target industry  
        Media coverage 
  Full sample  Full media  Only news  Only HC  No media 
SDC Industry  
Classification # %   # %   # %   # %   # % 
Consumer Prod. & Serv. 107 3.9  15 3.7  1 1.3  69 3.9  22 4.4 
Consumer Staples 110 4.0  26 6.4  1 1.3  65 3.7  18 3.6 
Energy and Power 261 9.4  47 11.5  8 10.5  144 8.1  62 12.3 
Financials 298 10.8  32 7.9  6 7.9  198 11.1  62 12.3 
Healthcare 124 4.5  11 2.7  6 7.9  84 4.7  23 4.6 
High Technology 156 5.6  14 3.4  0 0.0  119 6.7  23 4.6 
Industrials 148 5.4  31 7.6  4 5.3  89 5.0  24 4.8 
Materials 1,235 44.7  175 43.0  39 51.3  802 45.1  219 43.5 
Media and Entertainment 87 3.1  19 4.7  2 2.6  55 3.1  11 2.2 
Real Estate 146 5.3  22 5.4  5 6.6  100 5.6  19 3.8 
Retail 52 1.9  11 2.7  2 2.6  31 1.7  8 1.6 
Telecommunications 41 1.5  4 1.0  2 2.6  23 1.3  12 2.4 
Total 2,765 100.0  407 100.0  76 100.0  1,779 100.0  503 100.0 
 
 
 
Table 4-1. M&A Announcement Sample Distribution 
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This table presents the mean, median and standard deviation summary statistics of M&A an-
nouncements between Jan. 2008 and Aug. 2015 for events with data available (at least 1,998 
events).  Observations are winsorized within a 2%-percentile window to control for possible 
outliers. 
 Full media Only news Only HC No media Total 
Market capitalization [mn. AUD]       
Mean 2,071.13 8,638.85 191.19 150.43 696.38 
Median 312.81 1,020.69 22.99 25.03 33.60 
Std. Dev. 6,039.37 20,460.49 1,121.36 701.01 4,471.00 
Equity ratio           
Mean 0.60 0.56 0.68 0.71 0.67 
Median 0.61 0.57 0.77 0.83 0.75 
Std. Dev. 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.31 
EPS ltm [AUD]         
Mean -15.49 0.40 -2.33 -4.55 -4.62 
Median 0.00 0.09 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
Std. Dev. 254.26 4.52 38.53 64.47 106.50 
Market-to-Book         
Mean 2.34 2.84 2.28 2.37 2.32 
Median 1.45 1.44 1.14 1.38 1.24 
Std. Dev. 3.14 3.89 3.43 3.22 3.36 
Scaled EBITDA ltm         
Mean 0.00 -0.02 -0.13 -0.18 -0.11 
Median 0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.08 -0.04 
Std. Dev. 0.21 0.33 0.40 0.41 0.38 
Net analyst up-/downgrades       
Mean -1.61 -2.53 -0.38 -0.27 -0.60 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std. Dev. 8.42 13.12 3.43 2.51 4.91 
 
To test whether differences may result from differences in distributions, namely location and 
shape of the distribution, we apply the Mann-Whitney-U-test for the test in differences of me-
dians. 28 The results in differences are reported in Table 4-3.  It is interesting to observe that 
target firms which solely receive social media attention are not significantly different to firms 
with non-media attention regarding firm size (market capitalization), earnings (EPS), valua-
tions (market-to-book) and change in analyst recommendations. Furthermore, they show lower 
                                                 
28 Tests in differences of medians only apply, if shapes of distributions do not significantly differ from each other.  
Table 4-2. Financial Descriptives of Sample 
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equity ratios and higher operating performances (EBITDA), which is significant but not of 
economic importance compared to the other subsamples. Compared to firms that additionally 
or only experience acquisition signals on news media, firms only talked about on social media 
are significantly smaller (market capitalization), possess higher equity ratios, have earned less 
(EPS), lower valuations (market-to-book), lower operative performances (EBITDA), and fewer 
analyst downgrades. These results suggest that small target firms which only catch attention on 
social media are similar to those firms which experience no media attention at all. Furthermore, 
these firms appear to be undervalued and underperforming compared to firms also covered by 
traditional media. 
 Event Study with M&A Announcements and Merger Signals 
We follow Schwert (1996) and define target run-ups as ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
−1
−𝑡 , target markups as ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
+𝑡
−1 , 
and target premium as the summation of run-up and markup. We examine the pre-bid and 
markup abnormal returns using the market model regression approach. For each target firm, 
we calculate the abnormal returns (or market excess returns) before a public M&A announce-
ment using: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡) 
(27) 
where Rit is the compounded return of target firm i and Rmt the market-weighted All Ordinaries 
Index return for day t. Following Cai and Sevilir (2012) and also motivated by Schwert (1996), 
we estimate the market model parameters over 200 trading days ending two months before the 
public M&A announcement. We analyze cumulative abnormal returns for different time win-
dows based on: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
+𝑡
−𝑡            t = -40, …, +10       (28) 
Since we classify news articles or alerts as one part of our subsample, we investigate the 
relation between news/social media coverage and target run-ups; and not the magnitude of a 
target run-up itself. The phenomenon of target run-ups is documented in the literature, even  
  
This table presents the average and median differences in firm characteristics. The Welch-test and Mann-Whitney-U-test were 
applied to test the mean and median differences, respectively. ***, **, and * describe significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, 
respectively. 
Differences of full media vs.     Only news sample  HotCopper sample  No media sample  
         Average   Median   Average   Median   Average   Median   
Market cap. [mn. AUD]      -6,567.72 ** -707.88 *** 1,879.95 *** 289.82 *** 1,920.71 *** 287.78 *** 
Equity ratio      0.05  0.04  -0.07 *** -0.16 *** -0.11 *** -0.22 *** 
EPS ltm [AUD]      -15.88  -0.09 * -13.16  0.02 *** -10.94  0.02 *** 
Market-to-Book      -0.50  0.02 * 0.06  0.31 *** -0.03  0.07 *** 
Scaled EBITDA ltm      0.02  0.00  0.13 *** 0.08 *** 0.18 *** 0.11 *** 
Net analyst up-/downgrade         0.91  0.00  -1.23 ** 0.00 *** -1.34 ** 0.00 ** 
Only news sample vs. Full media sample       HotCopper sample  No media sample  
  Average   Median           Average   Median   Average   Median  
Market cap. [mn. AUD] 6,567.72 ** 707.88 ***      8,447.67 *** 997.70 *** 8,488.43 *** 995.66 *** 
Equity ratio -0.05  -0.04       -0.12 ** -0.20 *** -0.16 *** -0.26 *** 
EPS ltm [AUD] 15.88  0.09 *      2.73 * 0.11 *** 4.94  0.11 *** 
Market-to-Book 0.50  -0.02 *      0.56  0.29 *** 0.47  0.05 *** 
Scaled EBITDA ltm -0.02  0.00       0.11 * 0.08 *** 0.15 *** 0.10 *** 
Net analyst up-/downgrade -0.91  0.00          -2.15  0.00  -2.25  0.00  
HotCopper sample vs. Full media sample  Only news sample       No media sample  
  Average   Median   Average   Median           Average   Median   
Market cap. [mn. AUD] -1,879.95 *** -289.82 *** -8,447.67 *** -997.70 ***      40.76  -2.04  
Equity ratio 0.07 *** 0.16 *** 0.12 ** 0.20 ***      -0.04 * -0.06 ** 
EPS ltm [AUD] 13.16  -0.02 *** -2.73 * -0.11 ***      2.22  0.00  
Market-to-Book -0.06  -0.31 *** -0.56  -0.29 ***      -0.09  -0.24  
Scaled EBITDA ltm -0.13 *** -0.08 *** -0.11 * -0.08 ***      0.05 * 0.03 ** 
Net analyst up-/downgrade 1.23 ** 0.00 *** 2.15  0.00          -0.11  0.00  
No media sample vs. Full media sample  Only news sample  HotCopper sample       
  Average   Median   Average   Median   Average   Median          
Market cap. [mn. AUD] -1,920.71 *** -287.78 *** -8,488.43 *** -995.66 *** -40.76  2.04       
Equity ratio 0.11 *** 0.22 *** 0.16 *** 0.26 *** 0.04 * 0.06 **      
EPS ltm [AUD] 10.94  -0.02 *** -4.94  -0.11 *** -2.22  0.00       
Market-to-Book 0.03  -0.07 *** -0.47  -0.05 *** 0.09  0.24       
Scaled EBITDA ltm -0.18 *** -0.11 *** -0.15 *** -0.10 *** -0.05 * -0.03 **      
Net analyst up-/downgrade 1.34 ** 0.00 ** 2.25  0.00  0.11  0.00          
Table 4-3. Average and Median CAR-Differences between Subsamples 
In
v
esto
r S
o
p
h
isticatio
n
 an
d
 A
tten
tio
n
 in
 T
arg
et P
rice R
u
n
-U
p
s | 1
2
7
  
Investor Sophistication and Attention in Target Price Run-Ups | 128 
 
 
 
 
 
though it is still open to debate what causes these run-ups (Schwert, 1996). Figure 4-1 depicts 
the CARs in the time window of [-40; +10] around the public M&A announcement date on 
day t0. It is striking that the subsample CARs develop significantly different depending on the 
degree of (social) media coverage. Table 4-4 and Table 4-5 show the average and median CARs 
around M&A announcements, respectively. In Table 4-4 Panel A, the full sample shows highly 
significant target premiums of around 2% depending on the time horizon. Nearly half of the 
premium (0.93%) results from abnormal returns occurring on the announcement date. 
The lower level of M&A premiums in this full sample compared to the universal M&A liter-
ature mainly result from the filter applied. We also included M&A announcements for minority 
positions (<50%) and do not filter for deal value size (usually > $1-5 million), because we are 
also interested in individual investor trading behavior which relates to small trade volume and 
deal sizes. Splitting our full M&A sample into four groups based on whether a M&A announce-
ment was previously covered in traditional or social media, we repeated the event study anal-
ysis for mean and median CARs. Most importantly, mean premiums starting 30 or 40 days 
before the M&A announcement date are significantly different from zero at a significance level 
of 0.1% for the subsamples only experiencing news signals (around -10%) or only grabbing 
social media attention (around +3 to 4%), while the full- and non-media sample mean premi-
ums are not significantly different from zero. It is noticeable that a significant target run-up of 
+2.4% can only be observed for stocks of firms that solely received attention on the internet  
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Figure 4-1. Average CARs around M&A Announcements 
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This table presents the average CARs based on the market model. We apply the standardized 
cross-sectional Boehmer-test. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Window Panel A  Panel B  Panel C  Panel D  Panel E  
[-t] [+t] Full sample   News & HC   News only   HC only   No media   
-40 10 1.83% * 0.22%  -9.70% ** 3.26% *** -0.16%  
-30 10 2.08% ** 0.40%  -10.27% ** 3.80% *** -0.74%  
-20 10 1.96% *** 0.31%  -7.43% * 3.43% *** -0.47%  
-10 10 2.19% *** 1.11%  -5.09% * 3.03% *** 1.19%  
-3 3 1.36% *** 1.57% ** -1.86%  1.62% *** 0.73%  
-2 2 1.29% *** 1.37% ** -0.56%  1.47% *** 0.84%  
-1 1 1.26% *** 0.81% * -1.14%  1.34% *** 1.70% *** 
0 0 0.93% *** 0.83% ** -0.47%  0.82% *** 1.58% *** 
-1 -1 0.07%  -0.07%  0.11%  0.09%  0.10%  
-2 -2 0.08%  0.39% ** 0.34%  0.12%  -0.37% * 
-3 -3 0.15%  0.21%  -1.15% *** 0.26% ** -0.11%  
-4 -4 0.25% ** 0.20%  -0.03%  0.28% ** 0.19%  
-5 -5 0.19%  -0.13%  -0.09%  0.25%  0.25%  
1 1 0.26% * 0.05%  -0.77%  0.42% *** 0.02%  
2 2 -0.05%  0.18%  0.24%  0.02%  -0.49% ** 
3 3 -0.08%  -0.01%  -0.16%  -0.11%  0.00%  
4 4 0.19%  -0.13%  -0.10%  0.22%  0.40%  
5 5 -0.03%  -0.12%  -0.33%  -0.03%  0.11%  
-10 -1 1.14% *** 0.75%  -2.73% * 1.62% *** 0.39%  
-20 -11 -0.23%  -0.80%  -2.34%  0.40%  -1.66% ** 
-30 -21 0.12%  0.08%  -2.83% * 0.37%  -0.28%  
-40 -31 -0.25%  -0.17%  0.56%  -0.54%  0.59%  
-20 -1 0.92%  -0.05%  -5.08% ** 2.02% ** -1.27%  
-30 -1 1.04%  0.03%  -7.91% ** 2.39% ** -1.55%  
-40 -1 0.79%  -0.14%  -7.34% ** 1.85%  -0.96%  
# Events 2,765   407   76   1,779   503   
 
investment platform beginning 30 days before the M&A announcement.  One potential expla-
nation for this is based on the attention theory by Barber and Odean (2008). They assert that 
attention-grabbing events may increase disagreement between investors beliefs and investors 
only have limited options for portfolio rebalancing. This is consistent with our results and could 
explain the negative target run-down driven by sell activities of larger institutional investors. 
Bullish individual investors are able to buy the stock, whereas the bearish ones could only sell  
 
Table 4-4. Average CARs around M&A Announcements 
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if they own the stock or otherwise initiate a short position. As a result, attention-grabbing 
events, or in this case, social media attention for smaller, underperforming and undervalued 
stocks would induce net purchases by individual investors and therefore increase stock returns. 
Limited portfolios and short-sale constraints would hinder individual investors to sell, even if 
they would like to. However, institutional investors would be able to buy and sell with regards 
to heterogeneity in beliefs (Barber and Odean, 2008). This leads to the second possible expla-
nation why stocks of larger firms of the “news only” sample experience significantly negative 
target run-ups and premiums of up to -10.3%. 
As described in Table 4-2, stocks in this subsample are usually large capitalization stocks that 
experience on average more analyst downgrades compared to the other subsamples. Even 
though the differences in analyst net scores are not significantly different to other subsamples, 
we find that the mean of -2.53 indicates that this smaller subsample is pre-dominated by stocks 
that are talked down by analysts. 
Womack (1996) and Barber et al. (2001) state in their studies that unfavorable changes in an-
alyst recommendations would negatively impact on the respective stock’s return at the time of 
its release. Barber et al. (2001) also point out that institutional investors react more quickly to 
such changes in recommendations since smaller individual investors might receive such reports 
at a later stage. Palepu (1986) and Comment and Schwert (1995) discuss in their studies that 
accounting and stock market measures of firm’s performances contribute to predicting takeover 
activity. Comment and Schwert (1995) argue that compared to non-M&A targets, potential 
target firms perform poorly (lower sales growth), possess inefficient capital structures  
(lower debt/equity ratios) and have lower market-to-book ratios. The latter is explained by 
different interpretations in prior literature, such as fewer growth options (Myers, 1977), market 
undervaluation of the target firm (Comment and Schwert, 1995), or inefficient management of 
the target firm (Lang et al., 1989).  The higher target run-ups for firms belonging to the “Only 
HC” sample compared to firms also covered by traditional news media, might be explained by 
these factors. 
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This table presents the median CARs based on the market model. We apply the non-paramet-
ric Corrado-Rank-test to test for significance. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
Window Panel A  Panel B  Panel C  Panel D  Panel E  
[-t] [+t] Full sample   News & HC   News only   HC only   No media   
-40 10 1.42% * 2.68%  -3.21%  1.98% ** -1.75%  
-30 10 1.81% * 3.84% * -0.21%  2.30% ** -1.73%  
-20 10 1.58% ** 3.25% * -0.75%  1.89% *** -0.60% * 
-10 10 1.38% *** 2.89% ** -1.47%  1.69% *** 0.00%  
-3 3 0.70% *** 1.32% *** -1.52%  0.78% *** 0.04%  
-2 2 0.50% *** 1.15% *** -0.33%  0.51% *** 0.00%  
-1 1 0.36% *** 0.79% *** -0.36%  0.34% *** 0.14% *** 
0 0 0.10% *** 0.17% *** -0.16%  0.09% *** 0.15% *** 
-1 -1 0.03%  0.12%  -0.02%  0.03%  0.01%  
-2 -2 0.02%  0.16% *** 0.08%  0.03%  0.00%  
-3 -3 0.02%  0.13%  -0.35% ** 0.03%  0.00%  
-4 -4 0.03% ** 0.13%  -0.05%  0.05% ** 0.00%  
-5 -5 0.01%  0.02%  -0.02%  0.02%  0.00%  
1 1 0.06% ** 0.17%  0.24%  0.04% ** 0.01%  
2 2 0.00%  0.13%  0.13%  0.01%  -0.04% ** 
3 3 0.00%  0.12%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  
4 4 0.03%  0.10%  -0.13%  0.03%  0.00%  
5 5 0.01%  0.05%  0.02%  0.02%  0.00%  
-10 -1 0.21% * 0.95%  -0.27% * 0.31% ** 0.00%  
-20 -11 0.00%  0.28%  0.18%  0.21%  -0.15%  
-30 -21 0.00%  0.00%  -1.86%  0.00%  0.00%  
-40 -31 0.00%  -0.32%  -0.01%  0.00%  0.00%  
-20 -1 0.24%  0.86%  -0.49%  0.55% * 0.00%  
-30 -1 0.23%  1.64%  -0.46%  0.76%  -1.21%  
-40 -1 0.09%  1.64%  -0.86%  0.59%  -1.06%  
#Events 2,765   407   76   1,779   503   
 
Prior literature on US target run-ups has observed several different magnitudes, such as Sand-
ers and Zdanowicz (1992) with run-ups of 7.4% or Schwert (1996) with run-ups of 13.3% prior 
to bid announcements. For robustness, we repeat our analysis and cleaned our sample for ac-
quisition announcements in which the acquirer holds a minority or no stake on the target before 
the bid announcement and pursues a takeover resulting in an ownership of  > 50%. This filter 
yields a total sample size of 352 bid announcements. Results are shown in Figure 4-2. We find 
an average target run-up of 4.9% starting 40 trading days before and ending one day before the 
Table 4-5. Median CARs around M&A Announcements 
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Figure 4-2. Average CARs around M&A Announcements – Change of Control 
bid announcement date for the full sample.  The “News only” subsample only consists of 5 
events and might be confounded by other events around 20 days before the M&A announce-
ment. Interestingly, the “No media” subsample of 27 events experiences a return reversal, 
showing an overreaction to takeover announcements. Consistent with Asquith (1983), this pat-
tern is similar to patterns of unsuccessful merger announcements after the press release of the 
failure. Together, the results remain robust with higher levels of target run-ups and markups 
consistent with prior literature.29 
Overall, we can summarize two main findings in this section from our analysis. First, small 
stocks that only receive attention in social media do not differ significantly or economic mean-
ingfully from other small stocks which receive no (social) media attention at all. However, 
attention for these stocks is significantly related to higher target run-ups and markups around 
M&A announcements. Secondly, stocks only covered in social media are smaller (market cap-
italization), have less analyst coverage and changes in recommendations, perform weaker fi-
nancially (EBITDA, EPS), have higher equity ratios, and lower market valuations (market-to-
book) compared to stocks which (only) receive traditional media attention. The latter sample 
is characterized by a higher net number of analyst downgrades compared to other subsamples, 
and we find indications that institutional investors react with net sells for these stocks, resulting 
in target rundowns before M&A announcements. 
                                                 
29 For further robustness tests, we apply the Fama-French-three factor model and repeat the analysis for the entire 
sample including minor shareholder ownership. We qualitatively find the same results even though of different 
levels for target run-ups and markups. Results are not tabulated here for brevity. 
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 Multivariate Regression Analysis of Pre-Bid Run-Ups 
To measure the impact of (un-)sophisticated individual and institutional investor attention on 
pre-bid run-ups while controlling for target, deal and other characteristics, we perform a mul-
tivariate regression analysis specified as follows: 
𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝𝑖,−30 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑖,−40 +  𝛾𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖,−40 +  𝛿𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑖,−30
+  𝜌𝐴𝑆𝑋𝑖,−30 + 𝜃1𝐴𝑛𝑈𝑝𝑖,−30 + 𝜃1𝐴𝑛𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,−30 +  𝜗𝑋 +  𝜇𝑌 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
(29) 
The dependent variable Runupi,-30  is the target cumulative abnormal return (CAR) starting 30 
trading days before until one trading day before the bid announcement for firm i. Our five key 
independent variables are: FullMediai,-40, which is one if there was at least one merger signal 
in the news or news alert plus random talks on firm i on the investment platform HotCopper  
in the two month period before the bid announcement and zero otherwise; Newsi,-40, which is 
one if there was at least one merger signal in the news or news alert about firm i as well as no 
talks on the investment platform HotCopper in the two month period before the bid 
announcement and zero otherwise; SocialMediai,-30, which is one if there was no merger signal 
in the news or news alert but only talks on the investment platform HotCopper about firm i in 
the 30-trading day period before the bid announcement  and zero otherwise; ASXi,-30 equals one 
if there was a public ASX announcement about firm i in the 30-trading day period before the 
bid announcement and AnalystUpi,-30/AnalystDowni,-30  equals one if there was an 
upward/downward change in analyst recommendation for firm i in the 30-trading day period 
before the bid announcement  and zero otherwise.  
We include the following target characteristic control variables30 in vector X of our 
regression: LnSize is the natural logarithm of firm i’s market capitalization in the month of the 
bid announcement, Market-to-Book is the market capitalization divided by the book value of 
equity for firm i and EBITDA is the firm’s operative performance (EBITDA) of the last twelve 
month before the bid announcement scaled by total assets at the time of the bid announcement.  
                                                 
30 Palepu (1986) and Comment and Schwert (1995) discuss whether accounting and stock performance measures 
identify potential target firms and their determinants on target run-ups vary. Comment and Schwert (1995) assert 
that target firms perform poorly and have higher costs of capital. Palepu (1986) concludes that the probability of 
acquisitions decreases with size, increases with lower market values or increases with inefficient management 
teams. 
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Additionally, we include dummy variables for deal and other characteristics in vector Y of 
our regression model, representing: acquisitions involving toeholds or in other words the ac-
quirer’s ownership in the target before the bid announcement (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Betton 
and Eckbo, 2000; Stulz et al., 1990); takeover values of conglomerates or diversifying firms 
(Maquieira et al., 1998; Graham et al., 2002; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008); cross-border 
acquisitions (Porta et al., 1998;  Brigida and Madura, 2012); hostile and friendly takeovers 
(Servaes, 1991; Schwert, 2000) or tender offers (Dodd and Ruback, 1977; Schwert, 1996). We 
further test whether public companies are more experienced with acquisitions resulting in less 
leakage (lower target run-ups) and also use public takeover (intention to increase ownership 
from minority to majority stakeholder with more than 50% of the shares) as a proxy for the 
expectation of efficient management and include these control variables. 
We do not control whether the bid was successful or unsuccessful at a later stage of the pro-
cess for several reasons. First, we are interested in the nature of media attention before a bid is 
publicly announced. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that investors can predict at that point in 
time whether a bid will be successful or not. Second, Asquith (1983) shows that market re-
sponses on average for both successful and unsuccessful were equal at the time of public an-
nouncements. However, this changes as time approaches the outcome date (successful merger 
versus failure). Thus, the market is expected to be uncertain at the press date whether a bid will 
be successful or not.  
Regression Models 1 to 4 in Table 4-6 show the relation between media attention and target 
run-ups and form the foundation for our baseline results in regression Model 5 of Table 4-6. 
The coefficients on social media attention are positive and significant at the 5% level. Target 
run-ups which only catch social media attention on the investment platform HotCopper expe-
rience abnormal returns that are 3.7 percentage points higher compared to the mean run-up of 
-1.55% for firms with non-media attention. One can discuss the causality, whether social media 
activity about a firm increases net purchases of its stock and therefore cause target run-ups or 
whether target run-ups caused by other reasons grab the attention of individual investors on 
social media. However, taking the results of the previous section in consideration that firms 
that only receive social media attention do not differ from firms that receive no media attention 
at all, we argue that individual investors rather buy stocks that receive social media attention.  
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This table reports the industry- and year-fixed effect regressions results. Standard errors are 
firm-clustered and reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is Run-up, the cumulative 
abnormal returns of the target from 30 days to one day before the bid announcement. The 
variable definitions are in the Appendix. The constant is not tabulated in this table. ***, **, 
and * describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Media attention proxy variables 
FullMedia-40 -0.004   -0.010 0.006 0.007 
 (0.020)   (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
News-40  -0.087*  -0.091* -0.076 -0.085 
  (0.049)  (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) 
SocialMedia-30   0.037**  0.037** 0.036** 
   (0.017)  (0.018) (0.018) 
ASX-30   0.002  -0.005 -0.006 
   (0.020)  (0.021) (0.022) 
AnUp-30      0.097*** 
      (0.027) 
AnDown-30      -0.093*** 
      (0.029) 
Target characteristics       
LnSizei,t -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Market-to-booki,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EBITDAi,LTM -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Deal and other characteristics 
International 0.015 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.014 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Diversification 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.015 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Hostile 0.328 0.326 0.317 0.329 0.317 0.321 
 (0.206) (0.208) (0.196) (0.207) (0.198) (0.197) 
Toehold -0.020 -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 -0.020 -0.022 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Takeover 0.039*** 0.036** 0.040*** 0.037** 0.038** 0.037** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Tender 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.015 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
PublicAcq -0.029* -0.028* -0.029* -0.028* -0.029* -0.028* 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Observations 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,872 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 1.97% 2.15% 2.25% 2.11% 2.30% 2.95% 
Table 4-6. Fixed-Effects Regressions on Target Price Run-Ups 
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This is in line with the findings by Huberman and Regev (2001). They find that public attention 
impacts on share prices, even though no genuinely new information was disseminated. We 
transfer this finding to our economic reasoning that for structurally similar companies, public 
attention raises interest in a firm’s stock and therefore drive target run-ups as observed in our 
regression analysis. Results of Models 2 and 4, on the other hand, give indications that merger 
signals for firms with news and no other social media attention are negative and significant at 
the 10% level compared to firms with non-media attention. Consistent with Womack (1996) 
and Barber et al. (2001), who discuss the immediate impact of (un-)favorable changes of ana-
lyst recommendations at the date of its release for institutional investors, we include the indi-
cator variables for positive or negative changes in analyst recommendations in the run-up pe-
riod in our regression Model 6 in Table 4-6. It is interesting that analyst upgrades and down-
grades are both positive and negative and significant at the 1% level, while the coefficient for 
social media attention (SocialMedia-30) remains positive and significant at the 5% level. Also, 
both coefficients are almost at the same level with +0.097 for positive and -0.093 for negative 
changes in analyst recommendations, implying that investors do not put more weight on posi-
tive or negative analyst information. This consequently supports our hypothesis that analyst 
recommendations are an important information source for institutional investors who are able 
to buy and sell stocks with only low limitations on short selling.  Since analyst reports are 
usually costly to source for individual investors, they are expected to impact firms that are 
larger and thus have more analyst coverage. Individual investors, on the other hand, look for 
other low-cost information sources and therefore increase their activity such as in internet in-
vestment platforms. Most strikingly in our results is the finding that merger signals on tradi-
tional media have different relations to target run-ups depending on the degree of total media 
coverage. Especially firms which only catch traditional news attention tend to experience neg-
ative run-ups. However, analyst recommendations appear to be the more important source of 
information for institutional investors.  
The coefficients on the other control variables are mostly consistent with findings from the 
prior literature. We find no evidence that target characteristics of a firm could help to predict 
mergers or acquisitions. The coefficients for firm size (natural logarithm of market capitaliza-
tion), market valuation (market-to-book) and operational performance (EBITDA of last twelve 
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months scaled by total assets) are all low and insignificant. This is consistent with the findings 
of Palepu (1986) who concludes that financial models based on accounting and stock price 
information do not predict targets accurately. 
We find no significant coefficient for hostile takeovers which is consistent with the findings 
from Schwert (2000), who asserts that friendly and hostile takeovers do not differ significantly. 
Consistent with the findings from Maquieira et al. (1998), we do not find significant economic 
differences for diversifying firms before bid announcements. Also, cross-border related bid 
announcements do not significantly relate to target run-ups, yet with a positive coefficient of 
0.015. Porta et al. (1998) corroborate that investor protection and anti-insider trading laws are 
less pronounced than in the U.S. Similarly, Australia is also subject to strict anti-insider laws 
by the Corporations Act 2001. It is, thus, expected that information leakage could be more 
prominent in international deals and thus reinforce target run-ups. Most strikingly, we find that 
the coefficient for takeover expectations (when minority or non-shareholders intend to become 
a majority shareholder) of +0.0037 is significant at the 5% level. This finding supports the 
inefficient management theory, which suggests that the market anticipates a change in man-
agement prior to an official bid announcement. Furthermore, we find a negative and significant 
coefficient of -0.028 if the acquirer is a public firm. This could be explained by the fact that 
public firms are subject to stricter anti-insider trading laws. Shareholders of a public firm 
would, therefore, have fewer inclinations to disseminate price sensitive information before the 
official bid announcement illegally. 
In sum, the results of our main Model 6 presented in Table 4-6 suggest that firms only receiv-
ing social media attention before a bid announcement experience significantly higher target 
run-ups compared to similar firms without media attention. Furthermore, analyst recommen-
dations appear to be a significant informational source for institutional investors before bid 
announcements.  
 Net Buyers or Sellers for Attention-Grabbing Events 
We test the hypothesis whether stockholders who post actively on social media before bid 
announcements act as net purchasers or sellers. Barber and Odean (2008) describe the attention 
hypothesis as a positive buy-sell imbalance for attention-seeking events. Thus, net purchases  
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This table reports the industry- and year-fixed effect regressions results. Standard errors are firm-clustered and 
reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is Runup-30, the cumulative abnormal returns of the target from 
30 days to one day before the bid announcement. The constant of the regression parameters is not tabulated in 
this table. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
FullMedia-40 0.007 0.012 0.016 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
News-40 -0.085* -0.089* -0.088* 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
SocialMedia-30 0.037* 0.045** 0.056** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.026) 
ASX-30 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
OwnerHigh-30 -0.003  0.015 
 (0.017)  (0.024) 
OwnerLow-30  0.015 0.024 
  (0.016) (0.023) 
SocialMedia-30 x OwnerHigh-30 -0.004  -0.022 
 (0.038)  (0.041) 
SocialMedia-30 x OwnerLow-30  -0.011 -0.021 
  (0.061) (0.064) 
AnUp-30 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
AnDown-30 -0.093*** -0.092*** -0.092*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Target characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,872 1,872 1,872 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 2.84% 2.88% 2.79% 
 
would positively affect stock prices during such events. Merton (1987) claims that individual 
investors only hold a limited number of stocks in their portfolios compared to institutional 
investors. Individual investors only follow a few numbers of stocks based on scarce resources 
used to gather information. Hence, investors would only buy or sell the stocks they follow. On 
the other hand, individual investors would not buy a stock because these stocks have caught 
their attention. Individual investors would rather sell stocks they own (Barber and Odean, 
2008). To clarify the relation between stock ownership of social media posters and target run-
ups, we introduce two new variables, OwnerHigh-30 and OwnerLow-30, in our regression model 
and add two interaction terms to test the interactive relationship between ownership and social 
Table 4-7. Regressions on Target Run-Ups including Ownership Disclosure 
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media attention with target run-ups. We classify our regression sample into four quartiles ac-
cording to the share of social media posters who own the stock. We can test this because the 
investment platform HotCopper allows its users to disclose whether they own the stock or not. 
OwnerHigh-30 / Ownerlow-30 is an indicator variable equaling one for the highest / lowest quar-
tile. We interact both variables with our social media indicator variable. 
Results of our regression are shown in Table 4-7. Overall, our results remain robust. Model 3 
suggests that firms who experience social media attention yield 5.6% higher cumulative abnor-
mal returns before the bid announcement compared to similar firms who receive no media 
attention. Overall, we find a negative/positive relation for OwnerHigh-30 / OwnerLow-30 (in-
cluding the interactive terms) which indicates that stock owners who post before bid announce-
ments would sell/buy around attention-grabbing events. The results, however, are not signifi-
cant. Nevertheless, these findings support the idea that individual investors who do not own 
the stock are not able to short sell and rather buy a stock with attention as well that individual 
investors who own the stock will rather sell the stock they already own. Altogether, the results 
give weak evidence for a positive net-buy-sell balance as we consider the positive and larger 
coefficient for social media attention.  
 Search Activity of Unsophisticated Individual Investors 
Prior literature on investor attention makes a clear distinction between institutional and 
individual/retail investors (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2008). Institutional investors are defined by 
nature as sophisticated investors, who own dedicated resources for research and analysis. Indi-
vidual investors, on the other hand, act very differently in their research, analysis and trading 
behavior. We, therefore, explicitly distinguish in our paper between sophisticated and unso-
phisticated individual investors. The first group dedicates a considerable share of their spare 
time to financial research, analysis, and discussions to derive trading decisions from that infor-
mation. The second group, however, acts less rational in our definition, spends less time on 
financial analysis and would follow traditional media outlets with easy to access information.  
Traditional literature on investor attention analyzed different proxies for investor attention, 
such as significant abnormal returns (Barber et al., 2001), trading volume (Barber and Odean, 
2008; Gervais et al., 2001), or news media (Barber and Odean, 2008).  However, market-based 
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measures are prone to the argument of being the outcome of several different economic forces 
other than investor attention (a similar problem as described by Da et al. (2015) in relation with 
investor sentiment).  
Lately, a new strand of literature around internet search queries with Google as a direct meas-
ure for investor attention has evolved (see Da et al., 2011; Vlastakis and Markellos, 2012; 
Vozlyublennaia, 2014). Da et al. (2011) claim in their seminal work that this measure “captures 
investor attention in a timelier fashion”, p. 1461. All of these studies generally relate internet 
search queries with individual investor attention. Finding the right measure of attention remains 
a substantial issue in answering the question of whether investor attention contributes to in-
creasing (higher informativeness of prices) or decreasing (noise trading) market efficiency (Vo-
zlyublennaia, 2014). Da et al. (2011) suggest that financial internet search queries are related 
to less sophisticated investors. However, alike from the best of our knowledge, all other studies 
they missed to clearly distinguish between unsophisticated and sophisticated individual inves-
tor attention in their empirical research.  
We, therefore, introduce Google internet search queries as a direct measure for unsophisti-
cated individual investor attention in our regression model. As a reminder, the direct measure 
SocialMedia describes firms which only experience sophisticated investor attention on the in-
vestment platform HotCopper. Vozlyublennaia (2014) also argues in their study that it is un-
likely that sophisticated or professional investors would search for stock tickers on Google 
because their trading systems provide sufficient news data and information about the respective 
assets, already.  
Altogether, our regression model now controls for indirect and direct measures of investor 
attention for institutional (news media and changes in analyst recommendations), sophisticated 
(investment platform HotCopper) and unsophisticated (Google search queries) individual in-
vestors. Motivated by prior literature, we examine the Google search queries for all individual 
stock tickers (e.g., “ASX  MRE” for Minara Resources Ltd.) in our bid announcement sample. 
Google Trend returns the relative search volume in a search period scaled by the maximum 
number of searches. Based on Da et al. (2011), Da et al. (2015) and Siganos (2013), we first 
calculate the daily log differences in search volume and the abnormal search volume: 
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𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑒1𝑖,𝑡 = ln (1 + 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1) 
(30) 
and 
𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑒2𝑖,𝑡 = ln (1 + 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡) − ln [𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛((1 + 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−41), …,  
                           … , ln (1 + 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−60)]                     
(31) 
where Googlei,t is the relative Google search query score on day t for firm i that we also adjust 
to a range between 1 and 2 for analysis purposes following Siganos (2013). Google1i,t describes 
the daily change in Google search volume and Google2i,t represents the abnormal Google 
search volume calculated as the deviation from the median Google search activity from -41 to 
– 60 days before the bid announcement. This calendar period (-40 to -1 days relative to the bid 
announcement) approximately matches the relevant target run-up period of 30 trading days 
before the bid announcement.  
Table 4-8 reports the descriptives of the Google variables. Both measures show a positive 
skewness (0.0070 and 2.0637, respectively) and distinctive peaks (3.0110 and 4.3771), imply-
ing a non-normal distribution. Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4 show the average changes and abnor-
mal Google search inquiries forty days until one day before the bid announcement. The figures 
only show a slightly increasing trend of search volume towards the day of the bid announce-
ment. We adapt the method by Siganos (2013) and define each merger signal (Outlieri,t) as 
follows: 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 > 𝑄3𝑖 + 1.5 ∗ (𝑄3𝑖 − 𝑄1𝑖) 
(32) 
where Q3i and Q1i are the upper or lower quartiles for target firm i over the period of -40 to -1 
days before the bid announcement.  
Da et al. (2011) point out in their study that internet users commonly get their information via 
internet search engines. Google dominates the Australian search engine market with a market 
share of 94% and thus presents most of the households’ internet search queries in Australia.31 
We now repeat our main regression analysis and include the direct measure for unsophisticated  
                                                 
31 http://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share/all/australia/2016, November 16th, 2017. 
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Figure 4-4. Abnormal Google Ticker Search Volume around M&A Announcements  
 
  Google1i Google2i 
Average 0.0008 0.0558 
Median 0.0000 0.0000 
Minimum -0.6931 -0.4415 
Maximum 0.6931 0.6931 
Standard dev. 0.2413 0.1856 
Skewness 0.0070 2.0637 
Kurtosis 3.0110 4.3771 
 
individual investors Google1i,t and alternatively Google2i,t in our model. Furthermore, we want 
to examine how Google search inquiries interactively relate to news and social media coverage. 
Thus, we include three interaction terms in the model. The results of this regression are pre-
sented in Table 4-9. Overall, our model remains robust. The coefficients for social media cov-
erage and changes in analyst recommendations remain significant at the 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.  
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Figure 4-3. Google Ticker Search Volume around M&A Announcements  
Table 4-8. Google Descriptives 
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 This table reports the industry- and year-fixed effect regressions results. Standard errors are firm-clustered and 
reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is Runup-30, the cumulative abnormal returns of the target from 
30 days to one day before the bid announcement. The constant of the regression parameters is not tabulated in 
this table. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
FullMedia-40   0.007 0.007 0.025 0.008 0.029 
   (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
News-40   -0.071 -0.071 -0.028 -0.081 -0.028 
   (0.051) (0.051) (0.059) (0.051) (0.060) 
SocialMedia-30   0.037** 0.037** 0.038** 0.036* 0.037** 
   (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
ASX-30   -0.008 -0.008 -0.003 -0.010 -0.003 
   (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
AnUp-30      0.101*** 0.109*** 
      (0.027) (0.028) 
AnDown-30      -0.090*** -0.094*** 
      (0.029) (0.029) 
Google1-30 -0.041**  -0.038*  0.006 -0.039* 0.015 
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.039) (0.021) (0.041) 
Google2-30  -0.042**  -0.039*    
  (0.021)  (0.021)    
Google1-30 x FullMedia-40     -0.100*  -0.118** 
     (0.059)  (0.060) 
Google1-30 x News-40     -0.120  -0.150 
     (0.099)  (0.098) 
Google1-30 x SocMedia-30     -0.027  -0.036 
     (0.044)  (0.045) 
Target characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,872 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 2.19% 2.20% 2.43% 2.44% 2.52% 3.08% 3.27% 
 
Additionally, models 1 to 4 yield negative and significant coefficients of around -0.04 for the 
distinctive Google attention measures. The results of our final Model 7 suggest that increased 
Google search volume of unsophisticated individual investors reduces the generally positive 
impact of news and social media coverage.  All of the attention related interactive terms are 
negative, but only significant for Google1i,-30 x FullMediai,-30.  The interactive term is only sig-
nificant at the 5%-level for target firms with full media coverage. These stocks are generally 
mid to large size stocks in our sample. This is at some point consistent with the results from 
Table 4-9. Fixed-Effect Regression on Target Price Run-Ups – Google Merger Signals 
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Vozlyublennaia (2014), who find that (unsophisticated) individual investors pay more attention 
to indexes of larger rather than of small stocks. Also, Vozlyublennaia (2014) finds support that 
individual investors create positive or negative price pressure, depending on the information 
uncovered by the attention. The effect, however, is not long-lasting and speaks for a noise 
trading behavior. 
 Short-Term Target Markups around Bid Announcements 
A substantial amount of literature examined the short-term stock reactions on bid announce-
ments. While there is a general consensus on limited reactions on bidder returns, findings on 
the magnitude of target stock return reaction differ. Dodd (1980) finds that US targets experi-
ence a cumulative positive bid announcement effect of 12.2% one day before until one day 
after the bid announcement. For the same time period, the results by Asquith (1983) indicate a 
cumulative markup of around 7% for successful and unsuccessful bid announcements. In an-
other study, Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) find for 172 tender offers a target share reaction of 
+20.5% in the comparable time period.32 Even though our study is different from that con-
ducted by Clarkson et al. (2006), who elaborated on the impact of merger rumors in Australia, 
we find results which are similar in their magnitude. For example, we find cumulative markups 
of 3% one day before until one day after the bid announcement whereas Clarkson et al. (2006) 
suggest in their study that firm’s returns react by 5.32% the day before until the day of the 
release of a merger rumor.  
We conduct a regression analysis with our main and control variables on the markups or also 
called unanticipated premiums within the time period of [-1, +1], [-1, +5] and [-1, +10]. The 
results are reported in Table 4-10. While social media attention significantly increases target 
pre-bid run-ups, target markups are significantly reduced. All investor attention related media 
and social media variables are significantly and negatively correlated with short-term markups 
around bid announcements for each markup period.  
 
 
                                                 
32 Refer to Martynova and Renneboog (2008) for a review of literature on M&As and the short-term wealth effects 
around bid announcements.  
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This table reports the industry- and year-fixed effect regressions results. Standard errors are 
firm-clustered and reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is Markup, the cumulative 
abnormal returns of the target from one day before to one, five and ten days after the bid 
announcement. The constant of the regression parameters is not tabulated in this table. ***, 
**, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
  [-1,+1] [-1,+1] [-1,+5] [-1,+5] [-1,+10] [-1,+10] 
FullMedia-40 -0.015* -0.021** -0.018* -0.028** -0.020 -0.027* 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) 
News-40 -0.038** -0.058** -0.042 -0.071** -0.036 -0.077** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.026) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) 
SocialMedia-30 -0.014** -0.016** -0.022** -0.023** -0.025* -0.027** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
ASX-30 -0.015* -0.020** -0.013 -0.018 -0.011 -0.019 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) 
AnUp-30  -0.000  0.023*  0.027 
  (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.017) 
AnDown-30  0.002  -0.012  -0.023 
  (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.017) 
Google1-30  -0.035**  -0.044**  -0.070*** 
  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.024) 
Google1-30 x FullMedia-40  0.051***  0.063**  0.073** 
  (0.020)  (0.025)  (0.030) 
Google1-30 x News-40  0.066*  0.080  0.122* 
  (0.035)  (0.052)  (0.063) 
Google1-30 x SocMedia-30  0.033*  0.025  0.054* 
  (0.018)  (0.023)  (0.028) 
RunUp-30 0.036** 0.037** 0.067** 0.067** 0.095*** 0.093*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.027) (0.028) (0.036) (0.036) 
Target characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,872 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 3.18% 3.21% 1.91% 2.05% 1.89% 2.10% 
 
The effect is the strongest for firms which are only mentioned in traditional media compared 
to those experiencing no media attention (coefficient of -0.077 and significant at the 5%-level). 
Also, the effect is stronger for firms which have merger signals based on internet search queries 
before the bid announcement. Altogether, all four media variable coefficients are negative and 
Table 4-10. Target Markups around Bid Announcements 
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significant, though at different significant levels and in their magnitude. Even though all inter-
actions are positive and significant, the overall impact remains negative. Our regressions results 
reveal that target run-ups are positively and significantly related to all markup periods. 
The impact strengthens and becomes more significant with longer markup periods ranging 
from +0.036 to +0.095. This result supports the markup pricing theory rather than the substi-
tution hypothesis proposed by Schwert (1996), who finds evidence that observable target price 
run-ups replace markups around bid announcements. The markup pricing theory, on the other 
hand, suggests that target run-ups would increase markup pricing because bidders and targets 
revise their valuation as other bidders might be acquiring open shares in the market. Each in-
crease in target run-up is thus added to the final deal price. Another possible explanation for 
the positive correlation of run-ups and markups is the hubris hypothesis stated by Roll (1986). 
In this hypothesis, the bidder is willing to pay for the takeover irrespectively of the underlying 
costs. As a result, bidder prices would drop subsequently after the bid announcement since the 
market would anticipate the market overvaluation. 
Irrespective of undervaluation by targets and bidders or overestimation of the bidders, all 
media related investor attention proxy variables are negative and significant. One possible ex-
planation is that investor attention reveals new information which is immediately incorporated 
into stock prices (in line with the efficient market hypothesis). Investors would, therefore, not 
be entirely surprised by the day of the bid announcement. Another reason could be that investor 
attention before bid announcements reduces uncertainty so that hubris bidder activity is 
reduced. For both cases, investor attention would contribute to increasing market efficiency 
before bid announcements. 
 Discussion on Investor Behavior around Bid Announcements 
So far, the reader may be concerned that social media, traditional media, and internet search 
queries are endogenous, or to be more specific are prone to the reverse causality issue. For 
example, users on internet investment platforms learn in news articles about an upcoming mer-
ger and then search for further information on the internet. We have examined separate cases 
or subsamples according to their degree of total media coverage. Since Australia is also a  
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This table reports the number of firms receiving merger attention before bid announcements. 
Average and median days describe the first day of the respective merger signal before the bid 
announcement. 
  Google1i Google2i NewsSignali NewsAtti HCAtt 
With merger attention 434 430 483 753 1552 
Without merger at-
tention 2,331 2,335 2,282 2,012 1,213 
Total number of events 2,765 2,765 2,765 2,765 2,765 
Ratio covered from total  15.70% 15.55% 17.47% 27.23% 56.13% 
      
Average days -29 -29 -26 -34 -46 
Median days -34 -34 -24 -40 -53 
 
highly regulated market in which price sensitive announcements are quickly released, we ad-
ditionally controlled for public ASX announcements in our analysis. In our hypothesis, sophis-
ticated individual investors tend to share and express their opinions on dedicated internet in-
vestment platforms, whilst unsophisticated individual investors instead start internet search 
queries (Da et al., 2011). Institutional investors, however, tend to extract their information from 
analyst opinions. Since it is unlikely that analysts build their costly reports based on internet 
investment platforms and that individuals have access to expensive analysis reports, both media 
attention instruments should have a lower probability on reverse causality. Our results strongly 
support our belief that smaller and underperforming firms which catch individual investor’s 
attention before bid announcements experience net purchase balances and thus increasing stock 
returns. One might argue that especially internet search queries are endogenous to macroeco-
nomic or firm-specific events. Google, as one of the main search engines, dominated the market 
for internet search queries in Australia with a market share of 94%33 in 2016. Most Australians, 
including unsophisticated individual investors, release search inquiries via this channel. To ad-
dress the reverse causality issue of our media attention measures, we analyze the timing effects 
of the first merger signal or activity within each measure. Table 4-11 reports the average and 
median days of the first merger signal or firm attention before the bid announcement. Most 
interestingly, more than half of the potential merger targets caught attention on the internet 
investment platform. 27% of the firms in our sample were covered by traditional newspapers 
                                                 
33 http://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share/all/australia/2016, November 16th, 2017. 
Table 4-11. Timing of First Media / Internet Attention 
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This table reports the number of agreement and disagreement on merger signals for pairwise 
comparison of our different investor attention measures. 
Agree/Disagree [in #] Google1i Google2i NewsSigi NewsAtti HCAtti Total 
Google1i - 428/6 169/265 255/179 255/179 434 
Google2i 428/2 - 166/264 251/179 253/177 430 
NewsSignali 169/314 166/317 - 483/0 358/125 483 
NewsAtti 255/498 251/502 483/270 - 534/219 753 
HCAtti 255/1297 253/1299 358/1194 534/1018 - 1552 
       
Agreement of total [in %] Google1i Google2i NewsSigi NewsAtti HCAtti Total 
Google1i - 99% 39% 59% 59% 434 
Google2i 100% - 39% 58% 59% 430 
NewsSigi 35% 34% - 100% 74% 483 
NewsAtti 34% 33% 64% - 71% 753 
HCAtti 16% 16% 23% 34% - 1552 
 
before the bid announcement. 17% of these firms were explicitly covered in a merger context. 
Finally, only 16% of the sample received significant attention based on specific internet 
searches. Most strikingly, first investor attention signals on the internet investment platform 
HotCopper leads other investor attention measures with on average 46 days before the bid an-
nouncement. General news attention, which we define as a random firm coverage on the press, 
follows as the second fastest attention channel for investors with on average 34 days before the 
bid announcement. Explicit news signals, however, appear on average 26 days before the bid 
announcement. Both Google measures show on average 29 days before the bid announcement 
first signals of an upcoming merger. These results speak for our hypothesis that sophisticated 
investors are able to identify potential targets. Not only do investors talk in more of half of the 
cases about the target firm, but also identify these companies at an earlier stage.  
The results reported in Table 4-11 only give information on average and median days of first 
merger signals irrespectively, whether merger signals appeared on the same channel or only in 
individual media outlets. Table 4-12, therefore, additionally reports the agreement in attention 
(both outlets show merger signals) and disagreement of each media and internet measure. 
Google1i / NewsSigi (169/265) describes that out of 434 Google merger signals, 169 merger 
Table 4-12. Comparison of Attention Across Media and Internet Outlets 
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signals were also identified via traditional news. Nearly 60% of merger signals induced by 
internet search queries were also covered by news outlets and the investment platform HotCop-
per. On the other hand, only 16% of firms which caught attention on the investment platform 
HotCopper also experienced Google merger signals. This supports our hypothesis that unso-
phisticated and sophisticated individual investors use other instruments to identify the firm of 
interest. 
 Conclusion 
A large number of studies observed the phenomenon of target price run-ups before the actual 
first bid announcement. Researchers, in general, find consensus on the rationality of markup 
pricing behavior on the day of the bid announcement. However, it is elusive why target firms 
experience significant price run-ups (Schwert, 1996). Studies evolved around the market ex-
pectations and insider trading theory, which try to explain whether market efficiency or illegal 
exploitation of private information contribute in explaining target run-ups. This study extends 
the existing literature and connects the market expectations and investor attention theory (Bar-
ber and Odean, 2008). We find evidence that investor attention is the prerequisite for market 
expectations on upcoming merger or acquisition activity. 
Previous research relied on indirect measures of investor attention (e.g., news media, trading 
volume) to examine its relation to firm performances or specific events. New technologies and 
innovations, however, enable investors to participate and gather information in real-time and 
efficiently change their investment decisions. This also allows researchers to create direct 
measures of investor attention, such as posting activity on internet investment platforms or 
active internet search queries. Our study provides evidence that institutional and (un-)sophisti-
cated individual investors use preferred channels to gather and disseminate information before 
bid announcements.  
We find that smaller and underperforming stocks that only capture the attention of sophisti-
cated individual investors on HotCopper experience a significantly stronger target run-up be-
fore bid announcements. Firms with similar fundamental characteristics without (social) media 
attention do not experience a significant run-up but rather a short-term announcement effect. 
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Large firms, on the other hand, are especially sensitive to analyst opinions. Positive and nega-
tive analyst upgrades have significant influences on target run-ups in the respective directions. 
Merger signals in traditional media appear only to play a minor role for institutional investors. 
Also, Google search activity before bid announcements of unsophisticated investors does not 
significantly or economically explain target run-ups.  
In summary, we find distinctive drivers of institutional and individual investor attention 
which explain target run-ups consistent with the market expectations hypothesis. We show that 
media attention contributes to target run-ups before merger attention. Secondly, our results may 
be valuable to practitioners who aim to anticipate run-ups in their deal process to reduce their 
target premiums. 
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5. A News Sentiment Risk Factor in the Mass Media Zoo 
ABSTRACT: We study the tone of news media and the cross-section of stock returns. Our 
results provide evidence that an equally-weighted long-short portfolio of stocks sorted by the 
tone of the news media coverage earns significant returns of 7.5% per year even after control-
ling for market, size, book-to-market, momentum, liquidity, profitability, and investment fac-
tors. Separating the effect of positive and negative media tones reveals that results are mainly 
driven by positive media tone which we refer to as a “premium on optimism”. 
 
 Introduction 
The digitalization of news media content away from traditional newspaper outlets is an inex-
orable trend which also affects the informational finance environment. It influences how infor-
mation is disseminated in speed, quality, and quantity (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; Engelberg and 
Parsons, 2011; Hillert et al., 2014) . In the course of this development, news media tones about 
a firm’s latest performances and seemingly unforeseeable events gain importance in the con-
templation of stock markets. A strand of literature highlights how news media coverage influ-
ences investor behavior (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; Fang and Peress, 2009; Engelberg and Parsons, 
2011). It, therefore, suggests itself that the underlying news media tone conclusively provide 
directional indications for future stock market movements. However, existing literature offers 
ambivalent implications on the role of news media tone in financial markets. Some findings 
suggest that market reactions on negative news media tones are more pronounced. For example, 
Chan (2003) demonstrates in his study that “losers” with news headline coverage experience a 
negative return drift compared to their size, book-to-market, and event-return-matched peer 
group, whereas “winners” with good news exhibited less drift. Moreover, only the fraction of 
negative words in newspaper articles is found to possess predictive power as argued by Tetlock 
(2007) and Tetlock et al. (2008). Contrarily, García (2013) observes in his study that both, the 
fractions of positive and negative words in a newspaper article predict the next day’s return. In 
a momentum related study, Hillert et al. (2014) provide support for the hypothesis that investors 
tend to overreact to winner stocks with high media coverage and positive news media tone. 
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This study extends the news media related literature by analyzing the cross-sectional relation 
between news media tone and stock returns as well as shedding light on the short- to long-term 
behavior of stock returns resulting from news media tone coverage. In this study, we rely on 
an innovative news database with more than 120 million unique news publications consisting 
of news articles, news flashes, or press releases covering on average more than 6,800 U.S. 
firms per year (in the period between 2000 and 2017). Fang and Peress (2009) argue in their 
paper that it is unlikely that mass media contains new value-relevant information but that mass 
media supports the broader functional dissemination of news which in the end affects stock 
returns.  
Our results provide evidence that an equally-weighted portfolio of stocks experiencing news 
media coverage with positive and negative tones (positive/negative news stocks, forth on) earns 
significant returns of 7.5% per year even after adjusting for widely accepted market risk fac-
tors.34 In particular, an equally-weighted portfolio of positive and negative news stocks earn 
significantly higher returns, when stocks are smaller, less profitable and exhibit lower momen-
tum. The premium ranges between 8.3% and 17.5% for these subsamples even after adjusting 
for widely accepted risk factors. Especially the subsample dimension for past losers reveals the 
most substantial economic significance in our results. Separating the effect of positive and 
negative media tones, our results suggest that returns are mainly driven by positive media tone 
which we refer to a “premium on optimism”. 
The behavioral finance theory provides several explanations for the observed “premium on 
optimism”. First, it could be explained by a noise trading related premium in the spirit of De 
Long et al. (1990). If positive sentiment is a proxy for mispricing (e.g., due to limits of arbi-
trage), then rational or Bayesian investors would not trade against their positions in the pres-
ence of market frictions.35  Noise trader’s optimism might drive prices upwards away from its 
actual fundamentals. Rational investors or so-called arbitrageurs (short-)selling this asset must 
deal with the possibility that noise traders become even more optimistic and therefore contin-
uously drive prices further away. As a result, arbitrageurs would realize a loss and therefore 
                                                 
34 Adjusting for market, size, book-to-market, momentum, Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor, profitability, and 
investment.  
35 Whether news media tones serve as proxies for investor sentiment is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
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rather limit their willingness to open the originally intended short position. De Long et al. 
(1990) refer to this short-term deviation of asset prices as “noise trader risk”, in our context the 
premium on optimism. In the style of the attention theory by Barber and Odean (2008), inves-
tors rather only trade on stocks that they own. Conclusively, investors would rather buy stocks 
which they do not own based on the underlying sentiment than selling stocks which are not 
part of their private portfolio. The “impediments-to-trade” hypothesis stated by Fang and 
Peress (2009) signifies that market frictions prevent rational arbitrageurs to exploit mispricing. 
Negative sentiment can from this standpoint be less pronounced for stock prices because in-
vestors would rather be reluctant to open short positions according to the limits of arbitrage 
theory. Another theory, namely the prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (2013),  alter-
natively explains the limited overreaction to negative media tones with the behavioral bias that 
investors are reluctant to realize losses. If negative media tones reflect past investor sentiment, 
one should expect low returns in the short-term but high returns in the longer time horizon. In 
this context, negative media tone, therefore, acts as a proxy for “loser stocks”, where losses 
should have been already realized in the past. In summary, the premium on optimism might, 
therefore, subsume a variety of elements commonly discussed in the behavioral finance litera-
ture. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the theoretical back-
ground of news media tone and investor sentiment. Section 5.3 gives an overview of related 
literature. Section 5.4 describes the data used for this paper. Section 5.5 and 5.6 contain analysis 
and results on media tones and related market or firm returns. Section 5.7 give possible expla-
nations for the results. Time variation of news sentiment loadings and the risk factor character-
istic of news sentiment are discussed in Section 5.8. Section 5.9 concludes the results. 
 News Media Tone and Investor Sentiment 
The traditional literature view on security returns that financial markets efficiently and ra-
tionally price assets with publicly accessible information has faced a versatile challenge from 
a broad body of behavioral literature. Some of the most commonly discussed market anomalies 
are, for example, event-based return predictability, short-term momentum, long-term return 
reversals, high volatility of stock returns in deviation to its fundamentals or post-return drifts 
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as a result from earnings announcements (Daniel et al., 1998). The underlying drivers behind 
the aforementioned anomalies and thus the determinants of predictability, however, remain 
open to debate. Fama (1998) argues that chance deviations from fundamentals are elements of 
market efficiency and thus explain short-term appraisals of anomalies. Yet. behavioral research 
insists on the refutation that return patterns are strong and persistent (Daniel et al., 1998).   
One of the first studies to link news media and stock returns were published by Cutler et al. 
(1989). Unexpectedly, the authors find only small market responses to macroeconomic news 
in coincidence with important political and world events. Two recent studies provide 
interesting findings on news sentiment and its link to stock returns. García (2013) studies the 
fraction of positive and negative words of financial news in the New York Times. He reports 
that news sentiment predicts the next day’s market returns with subsequent reversals. In another 
study, Hillert et al. (2014) observe  significantly stronger momentum effects for stocks with 
higher news media coverage. The effect is influenced by news sentiment and reverses after 24 
months. Both papers, therefore, provide novel findings compared to the fundamental work of 
Tetlock (2007), who asserts that only media pessimism would be related to future stock returns. 
To clarify the underlying theory of news media tones and investor sentiment for our study, 
we revisit and furthermore extend the hypotheses stated by Tetlock (2007). In his paper, he 
tests explicitly the hypothesis that negative media tone (media pessimism) is related to low 
investor sentiment, resulting in declining stock prices. With this regard, it remains ambiguous 
whether media tones forecast the future or reflect past investor sentiment. If negative media 
tone serves as a proxy for low past and future investor sentiment, then one should expect low 
future returns in the short-term and high future returns in the long-term. However, if media 
pessimism follows past investor sentiment, the long-term returns will be higher than the short-
term returns.  
Alternatively, when media pessimism reflects negative fundamental information which is not 
yet fully incorporated into the stock price, then one would still find negative stock reactions in 
the short-term however with the absence of subsequent return reversals. Lastly, if media pes-
simism is a measure for stale information which is already fully reflected in the stock price, 
then one would observe no impact of media pessimism on stock returns.36 
                                                 
36 Please refer to Tetlock (2007), p. 1142 ff, for more details. 
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 We extend the model by Tetlock (2007) by two basic assumptions. The latest research has 
shown that positive sentiment can be equally important in explaining future stock returns. We, 
therefore, argue that the same mechanics described above should also apply to positive media 
tones. Another theory, namely the prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (2013),  alterna-
tively describes the behavioral bias that investors are reluctant to realize losses. If negative 
media tone reflects in part past investor sentiment and information about past low returns, one 
should expect low returns in the short-term but high returns in the longer time horizon. In this 
context, negative media tone, therefore, acts as a proxy for “loser stocks”, where losses should 
have been already (partly) realized in the past. Since investors become more risk averse when 
they face potential losses, they might hold on potential loser portfolio stocks which additionally 
experience negative news media exposure. Past literature reports that (social) media outlets 
tend to be more bullish in terms of coverage (e.g., Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Leung and Ton, 
2015) and, according to behavioral theory, investors tend to underweight information that does 
not confirm their private signal (e.g., bullish investors who experience negative media senti-
ment). This suggests that on average the impact of negative media tone must be lower than for 
positive media tones. The mechanisms and relationship between media tones, investor senti-
ment, and stock returns are summarized in Figure 5-1.  
In this paper, we thus specifically test the hypothesis that news media tone is related to inves-
tor sentiment with asymmetric associations between separate media tones and stock returns. 
We use the term news sentiment as an equivalent to investor sentiment in our study forth on. 
One of the most common critics on behavioral theories refer to the limited range of application 
and that presented theories only apply to specific environments. The acceptance of new models, 
therefore, relies on the parsimonious character, explanation power for various anomalies in a 
different context and the generation of empirical implications (Daniel et al., 1998). Extending 
the simple model by Tetlock (2007), thus allows us to consider a variety of behavioral theories 
and explain anomalies in a broader context. 
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 Literature Review 
Our paper can be categorized into the strand of literature which deals with the relationship 
between media sentiment and stock returns and the behavioral research around the cross-
sectional pattern of stock returns. 
5.3.1. Media Sentiment and Stock Returns 
Early studies on the impact of qualitative media content include Cutler et al. (1989), who 
argue that stock prices are affected by types of news (e.g., war, presidency) at some degree but 
that all return variations are not subject to qualitative news contents which are not associated 
with macroeconomic innovations. Thus, large market movements could not be observed on 
days without significant news events. Contrarily, Chan (2003) concludes in his study that es-
pecially “news losers” (stocks experiencing low past returns with coincidence in news headline 
coverage) exhibit a strong return drift. 
In a seminal work by Tetlock (2007), the author examines the qualitative content of the Wall 
Street Journal news column “Abreast of the Market” by measuring media pessimism. In his 
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major findings, media pessimism predicts downward pressure on stocks with a subsequent re-
versal in returns. In an extended study, Tetlock et al. (2008) further report that the fraction of 
negative words in all Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones News Service stories predicts low 
earnings and implies brief underreaction in stock returns. The authors, therefore, link the qual-
itative content of news articles with fundamental information incorporated into stock prices. 
To further investigate on the role of positive media content, García (2013) comprehensively 
studies the impact of positive and negative media sentiment of two columns of financial news 
from the New York Times in a broad time horizon along the 20th century. He provides evidence 
on return predictability for both, positive and negative news sentiment, which is especially 
pronounced in recession periods. More recently, Hillert et al. (2014) examined how momentum 
is associated with media coverage and sentiment. Their findings uncover a significant stronger 
momentum effect for stocks with news coverage in association with investor overreaction. 
News related momentum and subsequent return reversals are found to be more distinct when 
the underlying news sentiment matches the formation period return.  
In a broader media sentiment context, the literature provides mixed results on return predict-
ability of qualitative media content. The impact of internet stock message boards on US stock 
returns, for example, is documented to be economically insignificant as stated by Antweiler 
and Frank (2004). However, they find that posting volume predicts market volatility. In another 
study on a popular social media investing platform, Chen et al. (2014) document a strong rela-
tionship between social media pessimism expressed in articles and commentaries and future 
stock returns as well as earnings surprises. Extending the advocates on media pessimism as a 
return predictor, Da et al. (2015) innovatively constructed a “FEARS” sentiment measure based 
on daily internet search volumes. In particular, their sentiment measure predicts short-term 
market return reversals and increases in volatility.  
Our paper is most of all related but highly distinctive to Tetlock (2007), who focuses on daily 
short-term reactions of stock returns to media pessimism of news articles only published in one 
section of the Wall Street Journal. We enumerate a broad variety of news stories in mass news 
media outlets and include positive and negative news sentiment in our analysis. Furthermore, 
our study provides new insights on cross-sectional return patterns based on sentiment 
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differentials opposed to the time dimensional focus of Tetlock (2007). The role of news senti-
ment in a classical asset pricing setting will thus be in the limelight of our study.  
5.3.2. Sentiment and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns 
Our study is, furthermore, closely linked to the literature around behavioral asset pricing mod-
els and the explanation of cross-sectional returns. We do not aim to shed light on the convoluted 
factor zoo as described by Cochrane (2011), but primarily pursue to provide more clarity on 
the role of news sentiment in financial markets. Among those hundreds of papers, our study 
relates the most to the following two sentiment related asset pricing papers.  
Baker and Wurgler (2006) proposed in their famous study a composite investor sentiment 
index based on six different proxies identified in the prior literature.37 They, for example, doc-
ument for low beginning-of-period sentiment relatively high subsequent returns for growth 
stocks, which are typically small, young, more volatile, and unprofitable. In another study, 
Hirshleifer and Jiang (2010) investigate equity and debt financing to explain cross-sectional 
return patterns which they refer to as common misvaluations of asset prices. In this context, 
the authors define a misvaluation factor “as any statistical common factor in stock returns that 
is substantially correlated with the common mispricing of individual stocks” (Hirshleifer and 
Jiang, 2010, p. 3042-43). In their zero-investment-portfolio, they go long on firms that repur-
chase stocks and short firms with new equity issues, resulting in a so-called UMO (undervalued 
minus overvalued) factor. Their findings suggest that UMO loadings predict cross-sectional 
returns for both, portfolios and individual firms.  
Finally, our paper is closely related to Fang and Peress (2009) who focus on media coverage 
and its relation to cross-sectional return patterns. Firms with no media coverage are systemi-
cally found to generate what they call a “no-media premium”.  Their study, however, neglects 
the directional relationship of news content and stock returns. Our analysis in the later section 
will further provide details on the relevance of news sentiment in the cross-section of returns. 
 
                                                 
37 Baker and Wurgler (2006) use six sentiment proxies: discount on closed-end funds, turnover of NYSE shares, 
number and average of IPO-first-day-returns, share of equity in total new issues, and the dividend premium.  
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  Data Design and Descriptives 
5.4.1. Sample Data 
We obtained our monthly trading data (stock returns, market capitalization and trading vol-
ume) from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and included all stocks from the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (NYSE MKT, formerly 
AMEX), and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
(NASDAQ). Since our study does not limit to the universe of large stocks, which are mainly 
listed on NYSE, we consider all three major stock exchanges for our further analysis which 
were listed between January 1st, 2000 and December 31st, 2017. To understand the comprehen-
sive news sentiment impact on cross-sectional returns of all stocks, we also include smaller 
stocks and do not filter our data, for example, due to liquidity concerns (e. g. by price thresholds 
or size). Our analysis accounts for possible illiquidity drivers, which will be further presented 
and discussed in Sections 5.6 and 5.7. We have drawn our fundamental data such as book value 
of equity or operational profitability from the merged Compustat/CRSP database. As a conse-
quence of the financial crisis 2008/09 several self-regulatory organizations (SROs) offer daily 
and monthly short sale information on individual securities to increase the overall transparency 
around short sale transactions.38 To analyze how short sale activity relates to news sentiment, 
we obtained monthly short sale volume as reported by the Financial Industry Regulatory Au-
thority (FINRA) for stocks traded on NYSE during January 1st, 2010 and December 31st, 2017. 
We use the firm-level Composite Sentiment Score (forth on news sentiment) provided by 
RavenPack News Analytics (RPNA) to create an average monthly news sentiment score for an 
individual firm. RPNA gains in popularity amongst researchers but also for practitioners. Lead-
ing investment banks already use this proprietary dataset to investigate on global macro trends 
(equity index, FOREX, and sovereign bonds), improve their pair-trading strategies based on 
abnormal news volume and sentiment, or use CAPEX announcements effects for asset return 
predictions. RPNA covers more than 180,000 entities in more than 200 countries with its ana-
lytics. However, we focus on the US news sentiment coverage in this paper. The RPNA news 
sources can be divided into three distinct groups: Dow Jones, Web and PR edition. The former 
                                                 
38 Further information on short sale volume and transactions: https://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsalevolume.htm 
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examines information from well-established financial news provider including the Dow Jones 
Newswires, regional editions of the Wall Street Journal, Market Watch and Barron starting 
from January 1st, 2000. The Web edition uses articles from generic business publishers, local 
news, blog sites, government and regulatory updates beginning from January 1st, 2007. Lastly, 
the PR edition adds press releases from newswires, and distribution networks to RPNA analysis 
covered since January 1st, 2004.  A RPNA news story is, furthermore, classified into the cate-
gories full article, news flash, press release, and tabular material. Full articles possess both, a 
headline and a body text, with mostly textual material. News flash articles only have headlines 
and no body text. Press releases are news initially announced by a firm but distributed via news 
providers. Tabular material related news has a headline and a body text mostly dominated by 
tabular data. Table 5-1 presents summary statistics for the unique news stories of our sample. 
The total number of included news stories in the RPNA database increased significantly from 
less than 2 million articles in 2006 to almost 4 million articles in 2007 with the inclusion of the 
Web edition. The RPNA article universe more than tripled subsequently until 2017 with more 
than 14 million news stories. This might reflect either the increasing coverage of the RPNA 
algorithm or the actually increasing number of created news articles. We cannot disentangle 
this effect by now, but we assume that both elements contribute to the increasing number of 
news stories included. The most dominant news type is “full article” covering more than 80% 
from all news stories. 
To match each news story with the relevant firm entity, RPNA assigns relevance scores be-
tween 0 and 100 to measure how strongly the news stories and the firm entities are related. The 
relevance score considers, for example, keywords, mentions, firm role in the specific event, or 
the text positioning (headline vs. body) in its calculations. A headline story about a firm results 
in a relevance score of at least 90 for the respective firm. According to RPNA, sentiment scores 
are especially applicable in settings with relevance scores higher than 90. We, therefore, fol-
lowed their recommendation and only included firm-level news stories with relevance scores 
higher than 90. Other than previous studies on news media, we concentrate on media sentiment 
expressed via the mass media and not the coverage, or in other words the total number of news 
articles, itself. More details on the RPNA sentiment score construction are described in the next 
section. 
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This table describes the total number of unique RPNA news stories by each year. Full articles 
possess both a headline and a body text with mostly textual material. News flash articles only 
have headlines and no body text. Press releases are news initially announced by a firm but 
distributed via news providers. Tabular material related news have a headline and a body text 
mostly dominated by tabular data. The numbers of news stories are denoted in thousands. 
Year Full article  News flash  Press release  Tabular material  Total 
  # % of total   # % of total     % of total   # % of total     
2000 435 59%  152 21%  24 3%  129 17%  740 
2001 623 57%  269 25%  93 9%  107 10%  1,092 
2002 337 40%  268 32%  144 17%  83 10%  832 
2003 368 41%  245 28%  174 20%  100 11%  888 
2004 750 41%  302 16%  596 33%  183 10%  1,831 
2005 660 37%  314 18%  650 36%  171 10%  1,795 
2006 590 33%  325 18%  674 38%  175 10%  1,764 
2007 2,357 60%  488 12%  713 18%  384 10%  3,943 
2008 3,498 68%  605 12%  719 14%  328 6%  5,149 
2009 4,370 72%  757 12%  753 12%  225 4%  6,104 
2010 4,547 71%  680 11%  989 15%  196 3%  6,412 
2011 7,855 78%  877 9%  1,074 11%  256 3%  10,063 
2012 10,433 80%  1,100 8%  1,214 9%  326 2%  13,074 
2013 10,731 80%  966 7%  1,183 9%  556 4%  13,436 
2014 10,428 79%  865 7%  1,360 10%  581 4%  13,234 
2015 11,499 83%  612 4%  1,366 10%  371 3%  13,849 
2016 11,704 82%  645 5%  1,522 11%  437 3%  14,307 
2017 11,821 81%   716 5%   1,733 12%   362 2%   14,632 
Total 93,005 76%  10,188 8%  14,982 12%  4,969 4%  123,145 
 
5.4.2. News Sentiment 
The news sentiment classified by RPNA relies on three proprietary methodologies, grouped 
into Traditional, Expert Consensus and Market Response. The traditional method falls back on 
keyword analysis and assigns stories, according to a rule base (with more than 12,000 
phrase/word-level combinations) defined by RPNA, into sentiment clusters (positive, negative, 
neutral). A news story, typically about global equities and earnings evaluations in the tradi-
tional methodology, is then assigned into a positive or negative sentiment cluster. If a news 
story cannot be assigned to any of these two clusters, it is classified as neutral.  
Table 5-1. Summary Statistics for Total RPNA Stories 
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The Expert Consensus methodology rests on a training classification algorithm developed 
based on the results of manually classified sentiments by financial experts. A large news dataset 
was provided to financials experts who evaluated the possible positive, negative or neutral im-
pact on asset returns in the subsequent hours. The resulting training sets were then used for the 
generation of an automated computer classification algorithm. For this methodology, classifiers 
mainly examined short commentaries and editorials on global equity markets, news about mer-
gers and acquisitions, stories about corporate announcements, and news on earnings releases.  
The Market Response methodology examines the short-term impact of news stories on the 
subsequent stock price volatility in the next two hours. RPNA provides a so-called Composite 
Sentiment Score (CSS or news sentiment forth on) that combines the three methodologies de-
scribed before. The direction of the media sentiment (positive / negative) results from the 
classification strategy of the Traditional and Expert Consensus methodology. The overall 
strength of the score (range between 0 and 100, where 50 denotes neutral) is determined by the 
Market Response methodology.39  The sentiment data provided by RPNA is available on daily 
firm-level. For our analyses, we aggregated the sentiment data on a monthly basis and weighted 
each news item by its relevance. We only included news stories with a relevance score higher 
than 90. One news item can cover more than one firm. Table 5-2 describes the yearly summary 
statistics of the total media sentiment in our sample. The average news sentiment was 
exceptionally low in the year after the Dotcom crash in 2001 and in the year of the financial 
crisis in 2008 with scores of 49.30 and 49.79, respectively. Also, the statistics document a 
higher standard deviation in news sentiment and thus widespread disagreement on news senti-
ment in periods of financial downward pressure. The share of neutral news items remained 
fairly stable during the sample period. However, we find that the share of negative and positive 
news items developed asymmetrically, with an increasing (decreasing) share of positive (neg-
ative) sentiment from 32% (18%) in 2000 to 41% (11%) in 2017. On average, news items in 
the RPNA database covered 6,858 firms per year during the sample period. 
 
                                                 
39 Information are drawn from the RavenPack News Analytics 4.0 User Guide and Service Overview. For further 
details please contact RavenPack News Analytics. Alternatively, RPNA also provide another sentiment score, 
called the Event Sentiment Score (ESS). ESS systematically compares news stories with categories classified by 
financial experts. The strength of the score is based on survey data from industry experts.  
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This table summarizes the statistics for Ravenpack Composite Sentiment Scores (CSS) for our 
sample firms by year. Sentiment describes the average CSS in the respective year. Sentiment 
scores exceeding 50 are considered positive, equal 50 are referred as neutral, and below 50 are 
defined as negative. A Ravenpack story has a unique identifier but can cover more than one 
firm. The statistics only include news stories with a relevance score higher than 90.  Ravenpack 
categorizes stories into full article, news flash, press release, and tabular material. Firms denote 
the total number of firms covered by Ravenpack in the respective year. 
  Sentiment   # stories and covered firms (in thousands)   
    Negative  Neutral  Positive    
Year Mean Std.   # (% total)   # (% total)   # (% total)   # Total # firms 
2000 49.742 5.069  79.9 18.2  219.0 50.03  139.0 31.74  437.8 6,097 
2001 49.302 5.846  131.4 21.10  300.8 48.28  190.8 30.63  623.0 5,904 
2002 49.354 6.358  98.1 19.38  230.0 45.45  178.0 35.17  506.1 5,791 
2003 49.742 5.991  87.3 16.70  239.7 45.88  195.5 37.42  522.5 5,782 
2004 50.079 5.130  200.3 17.84  515.5 45.89  407.4 36.27  1,123.3 6,829 
2005 50.165 4.826  200.5 16.84  574.9 48.30  414.9 34.86  1,190.4 7,127 
2006 50.309 4.915  169.3 14.98  539.6 47.73  421.7 37.30  1,130.7 7,274 
2007 50.159 5.404  337.0 17.45  881.3 45.63  713.2 36.92  1,931.6 7,281 
2008 49.785 5.703  416.0 19.16  982.7 45.27  772.3 35.57  2,171.0 7,159 
2009 49.962 5.204  398.6 15.78  1225.4 48.52  901.7 35.70  2,525.7 6,917 
2010 50.455 4.445  345.6 12.95  1303.5 48.83  1020.3 38.22  2,669.5 6,941 
2011 50.505 4.370  483.9 12.36  1882.1 48.09  1548.1 39.55  3,914.1 6,917 
2012 50.464 4.484  673.2 12.57  2574.4 48.08  2107.3 39.35  5,354.9 7,269 
2013 50.645 4.355  631.7 11.78  2488.9 46.39  2244.3 41.83  5,364.9 7,412 
2014 50.612 4.308  558.3 11.94  2171.4 46.44  1946.2 41.62  4,675.9 7,089 
2015 50.457 4.560  587.4 12.35  2239.1 47.07  1930.6 40.58  4,757.2 7,089 
2016 50.389 4.544  584.5 12.55  2247.1 48.24  1826.8 39.22  4,658.4 7,253 
2017 50.634 4.283   575.2 11.21   2449.9 47.74   2106.3 41.05   5,131.5 7,316 
   6558.4 13.47 
 23065.5 47.37  19064.5 39.16  48,688.4  
 
The changing data structure and composition of RPNA may raise the concern that media 
sentiment expressed via RPNA does not consistently reflect the actual investor sentiment in 
the same manner in relation to market movements. To alleviate this concern, we examine in 
the next section how the Composite Sentiment Score relates to US market activities, namely 
the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 and Russell 3000 index movements.   
 
Table 5-2. Summary Statistics for Media Sentiment  
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 RPNA Sentiment and US-Market Indices  
Is news sentiment generally an appropriate predictor for market returns? To approach the 
answer, we first conduct a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis in advance to the asset pricing 
tests in later sections. Before we explain our VAR results, we first illustrate the correlation of 
our media sentiment measure and general market movements in Figure 5-2. We construct a 
value-weighted 90-day moving average of the cumulative change in media sentiment and com-
pare the measure with the S&P 500 and the Russell 3000 market development. It is evident that 
the news sentiment score captures market movements quite close with indications for predict-
ability of news sentiment, especially before the financial crisis in 2008. The stagnation period 
in 2014/2015 was accompanied by seemingly negative overreactions of the news sentiment but 
a quick recovery of sentiment forth on. To formalize the relationship between news sentiment 
and market returns, we divide our sample period into bearish and bullish time periods according 
to minimum and maximum levels of market indices and conduct a pairwise correlation test.40 
Table 5-3 describes the correlation between the average aggregated news sentiment and 
respective market variables, the market index and the monthly market excess return. Overall, 
the results yield high, positive and significant correlations for the total sample period. However, 
the table also indicates in line with the findings by García (2013) that results are stronger for 
bearish periods. More particularly, the correlations are especially pronounced between news 
sentiment and monthly excess returns for both market indexes, ranging between 0.51 and 0.57.   
Furthermore, we perform a VAR analysis to examine the lead-lag relationship between the 
excess market return and our media sentiment measure according to the following specifica-
tions: 
𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼1 + ∑Ꝋ1,𝑗 ,𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ ∑𝛿1,𝑗, 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀1𝑡 (33) 
 
𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼2 + ∑Ꝋ2,𝑗, 𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ ∑𝛿2,𝑗, 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑡−𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀2𝑡 (34) 
                                                 
40 García (2013) reports higher sensitivity of market returns to news sentiment especially during recessions. 
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Figure 5-2. Aggregated News Sentiment and Index Developments 
 
where Mkt-Rft is the excess market return (S&P 500 and Russell 3000) and CSSt  is the average 
aggregated monthly news sentiment score. In order to apply the optimal lead-lag regression 
specification for our VAR analysis, we first compute the optimal lag length L based on the 
standard criterion used in the literature. Table 5-4 presents the results of the specification tests 
which suggest an optimal lag length of 3 for the endogenous variables in our analysis. As we 
aim to evaluate the economic importance of market reactions following a one-standard devia-
tion shock to news sentiment, we normalize our news sentiment measure with zero-means and 
unit-variance for our VAR analysis. The results are shown in Table 5-5.  
The null hypothesis that the three lags of aggregated news sentiment score do not forecast 
market excess returns can be rejected on the 5%-significance level (p-value of 0.016 and 0.021 
for S&P 500 and Russell 3000 related market excess returns, respectively). This strongly im-
plies that aggregated news sentiment is somehow related to future market excess returns. The 
table moreover pronounces, next to the significance, the economic meaningful impact of  
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This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between the average aggregated monthly 
news sentiment and market variables, market index and excess market returns, for the S&P500 
and the Russell3000. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respec-
tively.       
 Monthly Aggregated News Sentiment           
 
Jan. 00 -   
Aug. 02  
Sep. 02 -  
Jul. 07  
Aug. 07 -  
Feb. 09  
Mar. 09 -  
Nov.17  
Jan. 00 -  
Nov. 17  
  (Bearish)   (Bullish)   (Bearish)   (Bullish)   (Total period)   
SP500 0.03  0.59 *** 0.83 *** 0.46 *** 0.56 *** 
SP500exret 0.51 *** 0.14  0.57 ** -0.07  0.35 *** 
Russell 3000 0.03  0.59 *** 0.83 *** 0.47 *** 0.60 *** 
Russell 3000exret 0.51 *** 0.15  0.55 ** -0.04  0.35 *** 
 
today's aggregated news sentiment on the next month’s market excess returns. A one-standard-
deviation change in the aggregated sentiment score results on average in a 1.3% (or about 130 
basis points) market excess return movement in the following month. Furthermore, we observe 
a mutual Granger-causality relationship with the aggregated sentiment score as the regressand. 
Taking both directions into account, one can subsume that the aggregated news sentiment is 
somehow associated with market excess returns from the previous month as well as the 
previous three months aggregated media sentiment (p-values of 0.024 and 0.043 for the Chi2-
tests with SP500 and Russell 3000 market excess returns, respectively). This adumbrates a 
positive short-term correlation and thus a short-term momentum of news sentiment in a three 
months period. 
In summary, news sentiment seems to be associated with future returns on the aggregated 
level. We also find indications for a short-term momentum of news sentiment. It is, therefore, 
This table shows the results for the LAG-order tests for the VAR analysis according to distinct 
criterion. * indicates the lag order selected by each criterion. Following criterion are applied: 
FPE = Final prediction error, AIC = Akaike information criterion, SBIC = Schwarz information 
criterion, and HQIC = Hannan-Quinn information criterion.  
Lag Likelihood-Ratio DoF p-Value FPE  AIC   HQIC   SBIC   
0   0.001640  -0.737439  -0.724372  -0.705129  
1 218.582089 4 0.0000 0.000590  -1.759682  -1.720481  -1.662753  
2 35.457902 4 0.0000 0.000516  -1.892973  -1.827637  -1.731425  
3 87.176535 4 0.0000 0.000352 * -2.277325 * -2.185855 * -2.051158 * 
4 2.621815 4 0.6230 0.000361  -2.251217  -2.133614  -1.960432  
Table 5-3. Correlation between Sentiment and Market Variables 
Table 5-4. LAG-Order Selection Statistics for VAR (Russell 3000) 
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This table reports the VAR results with three lags for each endogenous variable (market ex-
cess return and news sentiment). The news sentiment score is weighted by relevance and 
market capitalization and normalized with zero-mean and unit-variance. ***, **, and * de-
scribe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: 
  Mkt-RfSP500 CSS Mkt-RfRussell CSS 
Mkt-Rft-1 0.056 2.534*** 0.068 2.293*** 
 (0.768) (3.036) (0.932) (2.824) 
Mkt-Rft-2 -0.116 -0.171 -0.110 -0.204 
 (-1.626) (-0.208) (-1.540) (-0.255) 
Mkt-Rft-3 0.067 -0.081 0.057 -0.080 
 (0.935) (-0.099) (0.793) (-0.101) 
CSSt-1 0.013** 0.300*** 0.013** 0.302*** 
 (2.405) (4.971) (2.370) (4.993) 
CSSt-2 -0.003 0.057 -0.004 0.057 
 (-0.607) (0.892) (-0.628) (0.902) 
CSSt-3 0.000 0.573*** -0.000 0.573*** 
  (0.015) (9.626) (-0.021) (9.559) 
χ2-stat Mkt-Rf (all lags)  9.405  8.133 
p-Value Mkt-Rf  0.024  0.043 
χ2-stat CSS (all lags) 10.323  9.778  
p-Value CSS 0.016   0.021   
 
plausible at this point to assume that news sentiment moves market returns. The next sections 
will further examine the return predictability of news sentiment from the cross-sectional per-
spective. 
 News Sentiment and the Cross-section of Stock Returns 
In this section, we examine in detail the cross-sectional relationship between news sentiment 
and stock returns. First, we examine raw return differentials in a univariate analysis. We then 
examine excess returns in multivariate spanning regressions while controlling for widely ac-
cepted risk factors. 
 
Table 5-5. Excess Market Return Prediction with Aggregate Sentiment Score 
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5.6.1. Return Differentials in Univariate Analysis 
Table 5-6 represents the average monthly returns in the next months of stocks sorted by firm-
characteristics and news sentiment. Our firm characteristics are chosen according to well-ac-
cepted factors such as size, book-to-market or momentum. Since firm characteristics might be 
subject to skewed distributions, we divide each firm into tercile groups to ensure a reliable 
sample size for each group.41 However, the sentiment sorting does not follow tercile groups in 
this section but we sort the sample stocks according to true positive (CSS > 50), neutral (CSS 
= 50), and negative sentiment (CSS < 50). We conjecture that if sentiment affects individual 
asset returns and subsume to a possible market-wide systematic component, we independently 
from percentile distributions, should expect return differentials between positive and negative 
sentiment related portfolios. Stocks that do not experience any news media coverage are as-
signed a neutral media sentiment score. The equal-weighted average returns are computed for 
the portfolios for the subsequent month. Former studies (Diether et al., 2002; Chan, 2003; 
Kumar and Lee, 2006; Fang and Peress, 2009) also reported equal-weighted average returns. 
The main motivation for our use of equal-weighted returns results from common findings of 
the sentiment related literature that especially smaller stocks are sensitive to changes in 
sentiment. The overall measurement of sentiment, therefore, favors the usage of equal-
weighted returns to prevent the overweighting of possibly less sentiment sensitive large capi-
talization stocks.  
The first row of Table 5-6 presents the unconditional average next month returns for negative, 
neutral and positive media sentiment portfolios with values of 0.51%, 0.70%, and 1.38%, re-
spectively. Therefore, the average monthly return differential for an equal-weighted long-short 
portfolio, that goes long on positive sentiment stocks and shorts negative sentiments stocks 
equals 0.87% (corresponds to an annual return of 10.44%). The difference is highly significant 
with t-statistics of 20.45 and of high economic importance. For comparison, in a related study 
on media coverage, Fang and Peress (2009) identified a monthly return differential of 0.39% 
between stocks that are not covered by news media compared to stocks with high media atten-
tion.42    
                                                 
41 Terciles 1 and 3 refer to the lowest and highest values. 
42 Fang and Peress (2009) describe their finding as the no-media premium. 
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This table shows the average monthly raw returns sorted by negative, neutral and positive 
sentiment. Average raw returns are denoted in percentages. In each month, we divide our 
sample stocks into negative, neutral or positive sentiment bins. Sentiment is measured by the 
Ravenpack Composite Sentiment Score (CSS) based on categories developed according to 
more than 330 market moving events. Return differentials of positive and negative sentiment 
bins are calculated based on equal-weighted average next month returns of the sentiment 
portfolios. Return differentials are also computed for subsamples of firms sorted by size, 
book-to-market, momentum, volatility, operative profitability, investments, and liquidity. 
 Average monthly returns (%)   Share of sent. in obs. (%)          
 Sentiment  t-Statistics Sentiment 
  Neg. Neut. Pos. Pos - Neg. Pos - Neg. Neg. Neut. Pos. 
All stocks 0.51 0.70 1.38 0.87 20.45 0.15 0.55 0.30 
Panel A: Size               
1 -0.97 -0.14 -0.09 0.88 7.03 0.11 0.72 0.17 
2 1.03 1.20 1.47 0.44 5.77 0.16 0.55 0.29 
3 1.22 1.40 1.77 0.55 11.80 0.20 0.37 0.43 
SMB (1-3) -2.19 -1.55 -1.85           
Panel B: Book-to-Market             
1 1.41 1.84 2.14 0.73 7.00 0.20 0.29 0.50 
2 0.76 0.82 1.32 0.57 6.46 0.21 0.31 0.48 
3 -0.36 -0.24 0.14 0.51 4.54 0.17 0.52 0.31 
HML(3-1) -1.77 -2.08 -1.99           
Panel C: Momentum               
1 -0.04 0.50 1.70 1.74 17.71 0.18 0.56 0.26 
2 0.57 0.63 1.14 0.57 10.58 0.12 0.60 0.28 
3 1.12 1.01 1.34 0.22 3.79 0.15 0.49 0.36 
WML(3-1) 1.16 0.51 -0.36           
Panel D: Volatility               
1 0.72 0.71 1.01 0.29 8.10 0.11 0.61 0.28 
2 0.42 0.81 1.17 0.75 14.84 0.18 0.46 0.36 
3 0.62 0.85 2.17 1.55 14.25 0.19 0.54 0.27 
RMS(3-1) -0.10 0.14 1.16           
Panel E: Profitability in t-1             
1 -0.70 -0.23 0.45 1.16 8.18 0.19 0.55 0.27 
2 0.83 1.29 1.37 0.54 6.03 0.20 0.39 0.40 
3 2.10 2.30 2.08 -0.02 -0.27 0.20 0.36 0.45 
RMW(3-1) 2.80 2.53 1.62           
Panel F: Investment in t-1             
1 2.30 2.34 2.31 0.01 0.14 0.17 0.45 0.38 
2 1.03 1.06 1.31 0.29 4.64 0.18 0.45 0.36 
3 -0.60 -0.49 0.31 0.91 9.73 0.20 0.49 0.30 
CMA(1-3) 2.90 2.83 2.00           
Panel G: Liquidity               
1 0.23 0.55 0.79 0.56 6.24 0.10 0.71 0.19 
2 0.83 0.63 1.16 0.33 4.32 0.16 0.54 0.30 
3 0.66 0.86 1.68 1.02 16.45 0.21 0.39 0.40 
IML(1-3) -0.43 -0.31 -0.89           
  
Table 5-6. Stock Returns and Sentiment: Predictive Return Differentials 
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Consequently, only sorting stocks by news sentiment produce cross-sectional return differen-
tials. In one of the most accepted studies on news sentiment, Tetlock (2007) argues that only 
media pessimism is reliably related to stock asset prices. The return differential for our 
unconditional sentiment groups, however, imply that positive short-term premiums are associ-
ated with positive news sentiment stocks which we refer to a “premium on optimism”. The 
unconditional results are generally supported by our findings on double-sorted portfolios in 
Panels A – G. With the exceptions for two portfolios, the return differentials between positive 
and negative news sentiment stocks are all positive and highly significant (t-statistics ranging 
from 4.32 and 17.71). Thus, independently from firm characteristics, return differentials seem 
to be persistently existent in the cross-section. Interestingly, monthly returns do not signifi-
cantly differ for profitable or so-called robust firms (tercile 3) amongst each news sentiment 
group, all averaging slightly above 2%. Additionally, firms with low investments seem to be 
less sensitive to sentiment. These firms are likely attributed as value firms with lower growth 
ambitions. Most interestingly, “loser stocks” with low momentum are highly sensitive to pos-
itive news sentiment. An equally-weighted long-short portfolio for this subsample generates 
significant annual returns of 21% which underpins the economic importance of our results. 
High momentum stocks, on the other hand, are less sensitive to news sentiment in our analysis. 
Our momentum related findings, therefore, differ to the findings by Hillert et al. (2014). The 
authors report a stronger momentum effect for a portfolio of winner and loser stocks with high 
news coverage and matching media tones in the medium- to long-term perspective.  
Overall, our results are highly consistent with the general view of the common behavioral 
literature that especially lower capitalization stock, high volatility, and unprofitable stocks are 
more sensitive to sentiment (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2007). The return differentials in this 
section are mostly driven by positive news sentiment, further denoted as a premium on opti-
mism. This finding differs from most media sentiment related literature, which predominantly 
documents return predictability of media pessimism. 
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5.6.2. Factor Spanning Regressions for Long-Short Portfolios 
To formally analyze the explanatory power of long-short-portfolio returns by controlling for 
well-accepted risk factors, we apply factor spanning regressions as used in the standard asset 
pricing related literature (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Fang and Peress, 2009; Hirshleifer 
and Jiang, 2010). Each month, we assign a stock into a positive, neutral, and negative sentiment 
group according to the average monthly news sentiment score. We then create zero-investment 
portfolios which go long on stocks with positive and shorts stocks with negative news senti-
ment and calculate the average next month return. Repeating this approach, we obtain a time-
series of portfolio returns. We define this portfolio return as the PNM (positive minus negative) 
factor forth on. Before conducting spanning tests by regressions of our PNM returns against 
other widely-accepted risk factors, we first examine the Spearman rank correlations between 
all factors. The results are reported in Table 5-7. This table reveals significant correlations 
between PNM and five out of seven widely-accepted risk factors. At this point, we are specif-
ically concerned about the high correlation between our sentiment-based PNM and the Carhart 
momentum factor, since momentum until now is the most prominent widely-accepted risk fac-
tor associated with the behavioral literature. If momentum already captures part of potential 
systematic sentiment elements, then one would expect insignificant Alpha coefficients in the 
subsequent spanning regressions. The same also applies to the other risk factors.  
Thus, our spanning regression model is specified as follows:   
𝑃𝑁𝑀𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑿 + 𝑢𝑡 (35) 
where PNM is the equally-weighted portfolio return for going long on positive and short in 
negative sentiment stocks. X represents a vector of widely-accepted risk factors including 
SMBt, HMLt , MOMt , CMAt, RMWt,
43
 and  PS LIQt.
44
.  Table 5-8 summarizes the baseline results 
of our spanning regressions for the full sample period. The multivariate analysis confirms the 
premium on optimism even after controlling for common risk factors. We also extend the tra-
ditional five-factor models (incl. Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity, profitability, and investment) and 
use all seven factors, since the correlation analysis revealed high correlations amongst PNM 
                                                 
43 SMB (small minus big), HML (high minus low), MOM (Carhart momentum), CMA (conservative minus ag-
gressive) and RMW (robust minus weak) downloaded from Kenneth R. French website. 
44 Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor downloaded from https://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research/. 
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This table summarizes the Spearman rank correlations between widely accepted risk factors. 
The risk factors include premiums based on market (MkrRf), size (SMB), book-to-market 
(HML), Carhart momentum (MOM), Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity (PS LIQ), profitability 
(RMW), investments (CMA) and news sentiment (PNM). ***, **, and * describe significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  PMN   MktRF   SMB   HML   MOM   PS LIQ   RMW   
MktRF -0.30 *** 1.00 *** 0.31 *** -0.01  -0.30 *** 0.06  -0.57 *** 
SMB -0.24 *** 0.31 *** 1.00 *** 0.11  0.06  0.22 *** -0.39 *** 
HML -0.18 *** -0.01  0.11  1.00 *** -0.16 ** -0.07  0.13 * 
MOM 0.34 *** -0.30 *** 0.06  -0.16 ** 1.00 *** 0.13 * 0.23 *** 
PS LIQ -0.03  0.06  0.22 *** -0.07  0.13 * 1.00 *** -0.07  
RMW 0.37 *** -0.57 *** -0.39 *** 0.13 * 0.23 *** -0.07  1.00 *** 
CMA -0.06  -0.09  0.10   0.51 *** 0.02  -0.13 * 0.07   
 
and most of the widely-accepted risk factors. The alpha coefficient continuously decreases 
from 91 to 63 basis points per points with increasing number of explaining risk factors, yet 
remains highly significant at the 1%-level for all specifications. Widely-accepted risk factors, 
therefore, only capture about 25% of the alpha compared to the basic market model. For com-
parison, Fang and Peress (2009) only reported a no-media premium of 23 basis points using 
the Carhart four-factor model extended by the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor. Our results 
remain robust for Newey-West adjusted standard errors. The loadings in Table 5-8 are quite 
intriguing. The zero-investment strategy that longs stocks with positive and shorts stocks with 
negative sentiment has a negative exposure to small stocks but a positive exposure to momen-
tum and profitable stocks according to coefficients of the size (SMB), momentum (MOM), and 
the profitability (RMW) factors. 
Panels B and C of Table 5-8 separately document the intercepts for the long and short leg of 
the zero-investment portfolio. The alpha intercept only remains significant for the long (posi-
tive sentiment) leg of the portfolio and confirms the results of the univariate analysis that pre-
miums mainly result from the premium on optimism. These findings support the hypothesis 
that investors tend to react to confirming public signals which are potentially biased towards 
positive sentiment whereas investors hold on potential losers.  
   To further assess the importance of firm characteristics in cross-sectional return patterns 
along with news sentiment, we repeat the spanning regression tests for different subsamples 
Table 5-7. Spearman Rank Correlations of Risk Factors 
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This table reports the results of the factor-based time-series regressions on equal-weighted 
average returns of portfolios that go long on stocks with average positive and shorts stocks 
with average negative sentiment in the previous month. In each month, a stock’s sentiment is 
classified as positive (negative) if the average Ravenpack Composite Sentiment Score ex-
ceeds 50 (is lower than 50). The equally-weighted portfolios are formed at the beginning of 
the month and held for one month. The long-short portfolio returns are regressed on different 
widely accepted risk factors. T-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * describe signifi-
cance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.       
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 CAPM FF 3-Factor Carh. 4-Factor PS 5-factor FF 5-Factor All 7-Factor 
  PMN PMN PMN PMN PMN PMN 
Panel A: Full sample 
Mkt - rf -0.1656*** -0.1170*** -0.0597** -0.0710** -0.0182 0.0070 
 (-5.5282) (-4.1607) (-2.0310) (-2.3544) (-0.5899) (0.2196) 
SMB  -0.2614*** -0.2935*** -0.2939*** -0.1266*** -0.1665*** 
  (-6.7254) (-7.7940) (-7.5144) (-3.0140) (-3.8233) 
HML  0.0322 0.0649* 0.0796** -0.1123** -0.0491 
  (0.8673) (1.8034) (2.1535) (-2.3302) (-0.9741) 
MOM   0.1093*** 0.1047***  0.0877*** 
   (4.7305) (4.4546)  (3.8916) 
PS LIQ    0.0526  0.0246 
    (1.6088)  (0.7926) 
RMW     0.3453*** 0.3002*** 
     (6.5440) (5.5704) 
CMA     0.0466 0.0197 
     (0.6799) (0.2833) 
Intercept 0.0084*** 0.0091*** 0.0086*** 0.0079*** 0.0069*** 0.0063*** 
  (6.4316) (7.5475) (7.5161) (6.5553) (5.9723) (5.4193) 
Observations 215 215 215 204 215 204 
Adj. R2 0.12 0.28 0.34 0.35 0.39 0.43 
Panel B: Only positive sentiment 
Intercept 0.0095*** 0.0075*** 0.0082*** 0.0079*** 0.0080*** 0.0080*** 
 (5.9378) (6.7373) (8.6410) (8.1279) (6.8374) (7.7801) 
Panel C: Only negative sentiment 
Intercept 0.0011 -0.0016 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0011 0.0016 
  (0.4603) (-1.0116) (-0.3627) (0.0601) (0.7108) (1.3137) 
 
based on firm characteristics matching common risk factors. Results are tabulated in Table 5-9. 
Interestingly, the premium on equity effect is not concentrated among small stocks, but alpha 
intercepts are highly significant in both tercile groups. The premium for small stocks, however, 
is slightly exceeding the premium on optimism for large stocks. Prior literature often docu-
mented that return anomalies often occur among small firms (e.g., Fang and Peress, 2009). 
Table 5-8. Factor-Based Time-Series Regressions for Zero-Investment-Portfolios 
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This table reports the intercepts (alphas) of the factor-based time-series regressions on equal-
weighted average returns of portfolios that go long on stocks with average positive and shorts 
stocks with average negative sentiment in the previous month sorted by different firm char-
acteristics. The zero-investment portfolios are regressed on excess market returns (CAPM), 
the Fama-French (1993) three-factor, Carhart (1997) Momentum-factor, the Pastor-Stam-
baugh (2003) liquidity-factor, the Fama-French (1995) five-factor and the combination of all 
factor-models. The equally-weighted portfolios are formed at the beginning of the month and 
held for one month. T-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. For brevity, we exclude the mid tercile results but are shown 
in Appendix A3.      
CAPM FF 3-Factor Carh. 4-Factor PS 5-factor FF 5-Factor All 7-Factor 
Panel A: Firm Size 
Small 
0.0089*** 0.0094*** 0.0090*** 0.0089*** 0.0069*** 0.0069*** 
(5.4852) (6.0605) (5.9718) (5.8487) (4.6035) (4.6626) 
Big 
0.0054*** 0.0062*** 0.0058*** 0.0055*** 0.0047*** 0.0046*** 
(4.7612) (5.6585) (5.6444) (5.4080) (4.3452) (4.4415) 
Panel B: Book-to-Market 
Low 
0.0054** 0.0062*** 0.0059** 0.0056** 0.0040 0.0039 
(2.1904) (2.6410) (2.5009) (2.3781) (1.6513) (1.6332) 
High 
0.0001 0.0022 0.0021 0.0030 0.0002 0.0009 
(0.0167) (0.5523) (0.5311) (0.7488) (0.0506) (0.2264) 
Panel C: Momentum 
Loser 
0.0159*** 0.0166*** 0.0161*** 0.0156*** 0.0151*** 0.0146*** 
(10.6976) (11.2902) (11.3336) (10.5037) (9.9646) (9.5387) 
Winner 
0.0008 0.0010 0.0008 -0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0012 
(0.5142) (0.7543) (0.6020) (-0.0030) (-0.4502) (-0.8609) 
Panel D: Profitability 
Weak 
0.0097*** 0.0101*** 0.0100*** 0.0098*** 0.0086*** 0.0085*** 
(5.1063) (5.2878) (5.2051) (5.0435) (4.3575) (4.2777) 
Robust 
0.0023* 0.0030** 0.0025** 0.0026** 0.0017 0.0018 
(1.7455) (2.2902) (2.0740) (2.0767) (1.3029) (1.4220) 
Panel E: Investment 
Conservative 
0.0020 0.0024* 0.0022* 0.0020 0.0007 0.0007 
(1.4442) (1.8046) (1.6825) (1.5437) (0.5282) (0.4939) 
Aggressive 
0.0076*** 0.0082*** 0.0078*** 0.0075*** 0.0061*** 0.0060*** 
(5.0109) (5.5860) (5.4897) (5.2704) (4.2331) (4.2013) 
        
 
Table 5-9. Spanning Regression by Firm Characteristics 
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We, therefore, provide new evidence that news sentiment conceivably impacts on firms inde-
pendently from size. The potential refutation that news sentiment effects are only another meas-
ure for size effects can thus be antagonized.  
Most strikingly, the premium on optimism is highly significant and of major significant im-
portance for low momentum stocks with an alpha intercept of 146 basis points per month, 
confirming the results from the univariate analysis while controlling for widely-accepted risk 
factors. It also becomes evident that the premium on equity effect is closely related to unprof-
itable but high-growth firms. To put our results into other words, investors carefully choose 
their stocks amongst past losers which fundamentally also generated low profits in the past. 
Firm commitments in growth, namely investments, and an underlying positive news sentiment 
are thus strategically anchor points for investors to earn significant returns. Altogether, the 
subsample spanning regressions, for the most part, confirm the results from our previous uni-
variate analysis.  
5.6.3. Robustness Tests with Quintiles-Based Long-Short Portfolios 
In this section, we repeat our univariate analysis from Section 5.6.1 but divide the sentiment 
groups by quintiles instead of three groups according to the monthly average Ravenpack sen-
timent score (>50 = positive, 50 = neutral, missing = neutral, <50 = negative). Table 5-10 
presents the results of the robustness test. Overall, the quintile-based analysis confirms and 
moreover underpins our previous results. The return differentials between the lowest and the 
highest news sentiment quintiles are even larger for every single panel and the overall sample. 
For example, the lowest momentum tercile group in Panel C generates an average monthly 
return differential of 1.94% between high and low news sentiment firms (compared to 1.74% 
if sentiment groups are divided according to average positive, neutral, or negative monthly 
news sentiment). The results in  Table 5-10 also document that return differentials are mostly 
driven by positive sentiment and thus support the hypothesis of premiums on optimism.  
Additionally, we create an equally-weighted zero-investment portfolio which buys the high-
est news sentiment quintile and sells the lowest news sentiment stocks and calculate the average 
next month’s return. We then conduct spanning regressions on the portfolio returns and control 
for widely-accepted risk factors as described in the previous sections. Table 5-11 summarizes 
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the results of the spanning regression test. The alpha intercept in Model 6 remains highly sig-
nificant at the 1%-level with an average return of 6.8 basis points per month. Thus, extending 
the three-factor model by the momentum, liquidity, profitability and investment factors does 
not fully capture the explanatory power on return differentials for news sentiment based zero-
investment portfolios.  The findings in Panel B and C, furthermore, substantiate that the return 
differentials mainly result from positive news sentiment and thus underpin our premium on 
optimism hypothesis.    
In summary, both sentiment group classifications, either by absolute average monthly news 
sentiment or by news sentiment quintiles, support the premium on optimism hypothesis.   
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This table shows the average monthly raw returns sorted by sentiment quintiles. Average raw 
returns are denoted in percentages. In each month, we divide our sample stocks according to 
sentiment quintile bins. Sentiment is measured by the Ravenpack Composite Sentiment Score 
(CSS) based on categories developed according to more than 330 market moving events. Re-
turn differentials between the highest and lowest sentiment quintile bins are calculated based 
on equal-weighted average next month returns of the sentiment quintile portfolios. Return dif-
ferentials are also computed for subsamples of firms sorted by size, book-to-market, momen-
tum, volatility, operative profitability, investments, and liquidity.  
 Average monthly returns (%)   Share of sent.  (%)              
 Sentiment  t-Stats Sentiment 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5-Q1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
All stocks 0.52 0.17 0.90 1.24 1.46 0.94 19.43 15.08 15.28 40.15 10.02 19.47 
Panel A: Size                 
1 -0.93 -0.80 0.04 -0.54 0.06 0.99 7.27 10.93 16.21 55.54 4.30 13.01 
2 1.05 0.36 1.48 1.19 1.59 0.55 6.48 15.68 14.07 40.82 8.93 20.51 
3 1.21 0.73 1.71 1.60 1.87 0.66 12.58 19.93 11.55 25.99 16.03 26.49 
SMB -2.13 -1.53 -1.67 -2.14 -1.81             
Panel B: Book-to-Market                
1 1.40 1.45 2.07 1.96 2.25 0.85 7.10 20.08 10.93 18.52 20.09 30.38 
2 0.73 0.28 1.17 1.18 1.42 0.69 6.95 21.18 11.46 19.71 19.30 28.34 
3 -0.37 -0.90 0.16 0.05 0.21 0.58 4.52 16.92 19.52 32.78 12.30 18.47 
HML -1.78 -2.35 -1.91 -1.92 -2.05             
Panel C: Momentum  
1 -0.04 -0.55 0.79 1.29 1.90 1.94 17.44 18.06 11.85 44.36 8.46 17.27 
2 0.56 0.40 0.75 1.12 1.14 0.58 9.76 12.23 20.45 39.70 9.67 17.95 
3 1.15 0.46 1.20 1.29 1.36 0.21 3.27 15.20 13.27 36.13 12.07 23.33 
WML 1.19 1.01 0.42 0.01 -0.54             
Panel D: Volatility                 
1 0.72 0.48 0.86 0.95 1.04 0.32 8.35 10.43 24.11 37.56 10.19 17.72 
2 0.41 0.23 1.01 1.13 1.19 0.78 14.13 17.71 11.51 34.68 12.82 23.29 
3 0.65 -0.59 1.14 1.81 2.32 1.67 13.77 18.76 9.27 45.05 8.10 18.83 
RMS -0.07 -1.07 0.27 0.86 1.28             
Panel E: Profitability in t-1                
1 -0.68 -1.22 0.07 0.26 0.56 1.23 7.60 18.73 12.97 41.70 9.08 17.52 
2 0.84 0.15 1.62 1.21 1.46 0.62 6.14 19.85 8.99 30.69 13.74 26.72 
3 2.08 0.96 2.65 1.81 2.20 0.12 1.32 19.26 7.15 28.77 13.95 30.87 
RMW 2.75 2.18 2.58 1.55 1.64             
Panel F: Investment in t-1                
1 2.30 1.00 2.67 2.13 2.39 0.08 0.98 17.19 8.94 35.88 11.63 26.36 
2 1.03 -0.12 1.39 1.14 1.40 0.37 5.26 18.07 10.12 35.36 12.33 24.11 
3 -0.58 -1.33 -0.28 0.14 0.39 0.98 9.08 20.24 10.14 39.47 10.12 20.03 
CMA 2.89 2.34 2.95 1.99 2.00             
Panel G: Liquidity                 
1 0.24 0.03 0.70 0.70 0.82 0.58 5.88 10.29 15.88 54.84 4.56 14.42 
2 0.84 -0.03 0.86 1.00 1.23 0.38 4.50 15.67 14.05 39.79 9.39 21.09 
3 0.65 0.03 1.21 1.39 1.86 1.20 16.77 20.58 11.86 27.88 15.28 24.41 
IML -0.41 0.00 -0.51 -0.70 -1.03             
  
Table 5-10. Stock Returns and Sentiment: Predictive Return Differentials by Quintiles 
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This table reports the results of the factor-based time-series regressions on equal-weighted av-
erage returns of portfolios that go long on stocks within the highest average sentiment quintile 
and shorts stocks within the lowest average sentiment quintile in the previous month. The 
equally-weighted portfolios are formed at the beginning of the month and held for one month. 
The long-short portfolio returns are regressed on different widely accepted risk factors. T-sta-
tistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respec-
tively.       
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 CAPM FF 3-Factor Carhart 4-Factor PS Liq. 5-factor FF 5-Factor All 7-Factor 
  PMN PMN PMN PMN PMN PMN 
Panel A: Full sample           
Mkt - rf -0.1822*** -0.1304*** -0.0653** -0.0778** -0.0303 -0.0019 
 (-5.7036) (-4.3524) (-2.1001) (-2.4479) (-0.9114) (-0.0565) 
SMB  -0.2835*** -0.3199*** -0.3160*** -0.1495*** -0.1925*** 
  (-6.8449) (-8.0332) (-7.6609) (-3.3003) (-4.1432) 
HML  0.0120 0.0492 0.0665* -0.1364*** -0.0592 
  (0.3028) (1.2922) (1.7065) (-2.6250) (-1.1011) 
MOM   0.1242*** 0.1192***  0.1026*** 
   (5.0829) (4.8092)  (4.2650) 
TradeLiq    0.0485  0.0214 
    (1.4068)  (0.6467) 
RMW     0.3461*** 0.2913*** 
     (6.0847) (5.0643) 
CMA     0.0558 0.0213 
     (0.7538) (0.2869) 
Intercept 0.0089*** 0.0097*** 0.0092*** 0.0083*** 0.0075*** 0.0068*** 
  (6.3929) (7.5833) (7.5842) (6.5961) (6.0351) (5.4956) 
Observations 215 215 215 204 215 204 
Adj. R2 0.13 0.28 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.43 
Panel B: Only positive sentiment (Q5)         
Intercept 0.0099*** 0.0081*** 0.0087*** 0.0084*** 0.0086*** 0.0085*** 
 (6.3322) (7.2000) (8.8875) (8.2165) (7.2728) (7.9148) 
Panel C: Only negative sentiment (Q1)         
Intercept 0.0010 -0.0016 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0011 0.0016 
  (0.4475) (-1.0301) (-0.3810) (0.0422) (0.6981) (1.3034) 
   
Table 5-11. Time Series Regressions for Zero-Investment-Portfolios by Quintiles  
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 In Explanation for the News Sentiment Effect 
In the following, we propose different explanations for the news sentiment effect: Overreac-
tion to news sentiment, the persistence of noise trader risk, and momentum of news sentiment. 
5.7.1. Overreaction and Return Reversal 
One potential explanation for the news sentiment effect is that we observe a short-term over-
reaction of stock prices to a streak positive news sentiment with subsequent return reversals 
and the underestimation of negative news due to a feeling of cognitive dissonance to previous 
actions. 
As argued by Daniel et al. (1998), overreaction results from the confirmation of private ac-
tions by following public signals and thus increase the (over-)confidence of investors. How-
ever, disconfirming public signals on prior private signals (e.g., bullish sentiment based on 
private balance sheet analysis followed by negative news sentiment) only cause confidence to 
fall moderately. Both patterns are referred to the self-attribution theory. If news sentiment tends 
to be more bullish on average, then one should expect stock returns to be more sensitive against 
positive news sentiment ultimately.45 This circumstance can be confirmed by our descriptive 
statistics in Table 5-2. Even in alleged bearish macroeconomic time periods (2000 or 2008) the 
share of positive exceeded the share of negative news stories about a firm by far (31.7% vs. 
18.2% and 35.6% vs. 19.2%, respectively). From the momentum perspective, a sustained streak 
of positive news will, therefore, let prices overshoot and cause a long-term return reversal 
(Hong and Stein, 1999).  
To provide further evidence for this explanation, we analyze the impact of variation in 
formation and holding periods on zero-investment PNM portfolio returns and report the results 
in Table 5-12. We generally find that stocks overreact to news sentiment and experience return 
reversals after a holding period of up to 24 months. We find that short-term portfolio rebalanc-
ing based on news sentiment generally generates superior excess returns up to 24 months. The 
alpha intercepts for all factor models remain significant at the 1%-level for formation periods 
                                                 
45 Antweiler and Frank (2004) report on their study that investor sentiment expressed on internet message boards 
is on average more bullish then bearish. Out of 1,000 hand-coded messages, they find 25% of messages to be 
bullish (buy) whereas only 5.5% of messages are classified as bearish (sell). 
A News Sentiment Risk Factor in the Mass Media Zoo | 180 
 
 
 
up to 3 months and holding horizons of up to 24 months. Yet, the economic relevance of the 
portfolio returns diminishes with increasing holding horizon. When investors base their deci-
sions on mid-term news momentum (formation period of 6-12 months), we even find stronger 
evidence for return reversals. Alphas for our long-short strategy become insignificant after 24 
months with formation periods of 6 or 12 months. At first glance, this is in line with theoretical 
models on overreaction and unconditional momentum (if only based on past returns). Let us 
suppose that a streak of positive news will let prices overshoot. Price correction will take place 
and reverse prices near its fundamentals. Thus, one can assume that positive sentiment will be 
attributed to overconfidence and bad news may be neglected as a consequence of cognitive 
dissonance. Figure 5-3 summarizes the previous results for the Fama-French three-factor alpha 
intercepts of our long-short strategy and depicts a return reversal for all formation periods after 
24 months.  
To assess the mechanisms behind the portfolio returns, we divide the analysis into the long 
and short legs of the portfolio and illustrate the three-factor alpha intercepts for different for-
mation and holding periods in Figure 5-4. The long-short premium diminishes within a 24 
months period due to a reversed drift of negative sentiment stocks while positive stock premi-
ums remain remarkably stable (results are similar when we apply the four-factor model). 
Referring to prior literature, our results provide a tendency to support the hypothesis that media 
optimism on individual firms can subsume persistent and systematic risk factors in asset pric-
ing. Media pessimism, on the other hand, does not drive return premiums for long-short port-
folios. Stocks experiencing media pessimism seem to be less sensitive to sentiment in a 3 
months horizon, but then generate a significant positive premium in the longer run. Supporting 
the theory stated by Tetlock (2007), that if media pessimism follows investor sentiment, one 
should expect high future returns. We, therefore, find an asymmetric media sentiment effect. 
An explanation for the observed media pessimism result can also be provided by the theory by 
Barber and Odean (2008). Stocks are less sensitive to negative sentiment because investors 1) 
rather hold to losers and do not want to realize losses or 2) investors usually only possess a 
small number of stocks and won’t engage in short selling activity due to their risk aversion. 
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This table shows the compound and mean returns for the zero-investment portfolio that buys 
stocks with an average positive and sells stocks with an average negative sentiment during the 
formation period (N=1, 3, 6, 12). Average monthly alphas are reported for holding periods 
between 1 and 24 months. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.      
 
Returns Alphas
Holding 
period
Compound 
returns
Average 
return
CAPM FF 
3-Factor
Carhart 
4-Factor
PS Liq. 
5-factor
FF 
5-Factor
All 
7-Factor
Panel A: Formation period = 1 Month
1 month 0.0087 *** 0.0087 *** 0.0084*** 0.0091*** 0.0086*** 0.0079*** 0.0069*** 0.0063***
3 months 0.0485 *** 0.0162 *** 0.0163*** 0.0165*** 0.0164*** 0.0161*** 0.0159*** 0.0157***
6 months 0.0517 *** 0.0086 *** 0.0084*** 0.0084*** 0.0083*** 0.0081*** 0.0082*** 0.0080***
9 months 0.0494 *** 0.0055 *** 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0053*** 0.0052*** 0.0052*** 0.0052***
12 months 0.0478 *** 0.0040 *** 0.0038*** 0.0038*** 0.0037*** 0.0036*** 0.0037*** 0.0037***
24 months 0.0373 *** 0.0016 *** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0018*** 0.0018***
Panel B: Formation period = 3 Months
1 month 0.0252 *** 0.0252 *** 0.0270*** 0.0278*** 0.0271*** 0.0263*** 0.0251*** 0.0245***
3 months 0.0492 *** 0.0164 *** 0.0175*** 0.0177*** 0.0174*** 0.0169*** 0.0170*** 0.0165***
6 months 0.0509 *** 0.0085 *** 0.0090*** 0.0090*** 0.0087*** 0.0085*** 0.0086*** 0.0085***
9 months 0.0468 *** 0.0052 *** 0.0057*** 0.0057*** 0.0055*** 0.0053*** 0.0053*** 0.0053***
12 months 0.0394 *** 0.0033 *** 0.0038*** 0.0037*** 0.0035*** 0.0033*** 0.0035*** 0.0033***
24 months 0.0018 0.0001 *** 0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 0.0011*** 0.0013*** 0.0013***
Panel C: Formation period = 6 Months
1 month 0.0158 *** 0.0158 *** 0.0181*** 0.0188*** 0.0177*** 0.0170*** 0.0156*** 0.0150***
3 months 0.0314 *** 0.0105 *** 0.0118*** 0.0120*** 0.0115*** 0.0111*** 0.0111*** 0.0107***
6 months 0.0317 *** 0.0053 *** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0057*** 0.0055*** 0.0056*** 0.0054***
9 months 0.0254 *** 0.0028 *** 0.0036*** 0.0035*** 0.0032*** 0.0030*** 0.0031*** 0.0030***
12 months 0.0121 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0019** 0.0018** 0.0015** 0.0013* 0.0014* 0.0013*
24 months -0.0379 *** -0.0016 *** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
Panel D: Formation period = 12 Months
1 month 0.0100 *** 0.0100 *** 0.0124*** 0.0131*** 0.0119*** 0.0114*** 0.0097*** 0.0093***
3 months 0.0199 *** 0.0066 *** 0.0080*** 0.0082*** 0.0077*** 0.0073*** 0.0072*** 0.0069***
6 months 0.0180 *** 0.0030 *** 0.0039*** 0.0039*** 0.0034*** 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 0.0032***
9 months 0.0083 *** 0.0009 *** 0.0020** 0.0019** 0.0015* 0.0014* 0.0015* 0.0014*
12 months -0.0083 *** -0.0007 *** 0.0006 0.0005 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000
24 months -0.0660 *** -0.0028 *** -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0008* -0.0006 -0.0006
Table 5-12. Variation of Formation and Holding Periods 
A News Sentiment Risk Factor in the Mass Media Zoo | 182 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In summary, our results in this section propose that the news sentiment effect is not caused by 
overreactions to positive news and the underestimation of negative news. Instead, we find a 
persistent premium on positive news sentiment and a return reversal pattern for stocks associ-
ated with negative news sentiment, which confirms our premium on optimism hypothesis. 
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Figure 5-3. Time Horizon Analysis of News Sentiment Effect – Long-Short Portfolio 
Figure 5-4. Time Horizon Analysis of News Sentiment Effect – Long and Short Legs 
A News Sentiment Risk Factor in the Mass Media Zoo | 183 
 
 
 
5.7.2. Limits in Arbitrage and Noise Trader Risk 
Another possible explanation for the news sentiment effect is the limitation of arbitrage for 
rational investors to correct the mispricing of assets caused by irrational trades. In one of the 
most influential studies on noise trading, De Long et al. (1990) argue that short-term investors 
dealing with arbitrage trades against noise traders face the potential risk that a noise trader’s 
opinion might even further change away from the mean (also if there is no fundamental risk) 
for a longer time horizon, so a rational investor must  consider this unjustified divergence when 
taking a position against the noise trader. They refer this risk as noise trader risk.  
In a figurative meaning to our study, when irrational investors and relatedly news sentiment 
are predominantly bullish in the long-term, then risk-averse and short-horizon orientated ra-
tional investors would not trade against the noise trader’s position. As a result, one must expect 
a persistent return premium on stocks associated with positive sentiment. Corroboratively, this 
stable premium on optimism, or potential noise trader risk, could be observed in our previous 
analysis as shown in Figure 5-4.  
In this section, we thus analyze the impact of NYSE short selling activity on news sentiment 
exposed stocks to further understand the importance of short selling activity in a market with 
noise traders and traders with Bayesian beliefs. We hypothesize that in times of high market 
sentiment total short sales should be independent of news sentiment. We, thus, perform a uni-
variate and multivariate spanning regression analysis on short sale volume and news senti-
ment.46 The results are reported in Table 5-13 and Table 5-14. The results show that long-short 
portfolios generate significant same-month premiums independently from the level of short 
selling activity. The more sophisticated implication, however, arises from next month return’s 
implications. In comparison to previous results, long-short premiums disappear in the subse-
quent month for stocks with high short selling activity. For low short-sale terciles, alpha inter-
cepts remain significant at the 5%-level ranging from 5.4 to 6.2 basis points depending on the 
model. However, alphas become insignificant for the Fama-French five-factor and the com-
bined seven-factor model.  
  
                                                 
46 We source short selling data from http://www.finra.org 
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This table shows the average monthly raw returns sorted by negative, neutral and positive 
sentiment and by short sale volume terciles. Average raw returns are denoted in percentages. 
In each month, we divide our sample stocks into negative, neutral or positive sentiment bins. 
Sentiment is measured by the Ravenpack Composite Sentiment Score (CSS) based on cate-
gories developed according to more than 330 market moving events. Return differentials of 
positive and negative sentiment bins are calculated based on equal-weighted average current 
and next month returns of the sentiment portfolios.  
  Average monthly returns (%)     Share of sent. in obs. (%) 
         
 
Sentiment  t-Statistics Sentiment 
  Neg. Neut. Pos. Pos - Neg. Pos - Neg. Neg. Neut. Pos. 
Panel A: Short sales volume and contemp. returns         
1 -1.12 0.15 1.63 2.75 26.08 0.12 0.59 0.29 
2 -1.11 0.98 2.87 3.99 43.35 0.17 0.44 0.40 
3 -1.96 1.04 3.09 5.04 59.47 0.18 0.32 0.50 
LMH (1-3) 0.84 -0.90 -1.46           
Panel B: Short sales volume and next month returns         
1 0.29 0.18 0.97 0.68 6.45 0.12 0.59 0.29 
2 0.91 1.00 2.00 1.10 11.84 0.17 0.45 0.39 
3 0.66 1.12 2.12 1.46 17.22 0.17 0.33 0.49 
LMH (1-3) -0.36 -0.93 -1.14           
 
In conclusion, we only find slight evidence that short selling activity reduces the impact of 
news sentiment after controlling for widely-accepted risk factors. The former section under-
pinned that media optimism seem to be persistent and therefore a systematic character in asset 
pricing. It is yet unclear whether media optimism transfers value-relevant information which 
is not yet incorporated in asset prices or whether impediments to short selling systematically 
prevent rational investors from correcting mispricing which then results in a systematic devia-
tion from the firm’s fundamentals. The truth will be an element of both explanations. The next 
section further examines, whether media optimism is more persistent compared to media pes-
simism, we analyze unconditional and conditional sentiment transition matrices in the follow-
ing section. 
 
  
Table 5-13. Stock Returns and Sentiment: Short Sale Volume 
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This table reports the intercepts (alphas) of the factor-based time-series regressions on 
equal-weighted average returns of portfolios that go long on stocks with average positive 
and shorts stocks with average negative sentiment in the previous month sorted by short-
sale volume. The zero-investment portfolios are regressed on excess market returns 
(CAPM), the Fama-French (1993) three-factor, Carhart (1997) Momentum-factor, the Pas-
tor-Stambaugh (2003) liquidity-factor, the Fama-French (1995) five-factor and the combi-
nation of all factor-models. The equally-weighted portfolios are formed at the beginning 
of the month and held for one month. T-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * describe 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
CAPM FF 3-Factor Carhart 4-Factor PS Liq. 5-factor FF 5-Factor All 7-Factor 
Panel A: Short sale volume with contemp. monthly returns 
Low short sale volume 
0.0280*** 0.0277*** 0.0274*** 0.0289*** 0.0277*** 0.0289*** 
  
(21.8697) (21.7063) (21.7414) (22.5347) (21.1655) (22.1024) 
  
High short sale volume 
0.0483*** 0.0475*** 0.0470*** 0.0460*** 0.0476*** 0.0460*** 
  
(30.0586) (31.8922) (32.9408) (30.6393) (31.5183) (30.0684) 
  
Panel B: Short sale volume with next month returns 
Low short sale volume 
0.0054** 0.0062*** 0.0059** 0.0056** 0.0040 0.0039 
  
(2.1904) (2.6410) (2.5009) (2.3781) (1.6513) (1.6332) 
  
High short sale volume 
0.0001 0.0022 0.0021 0.0030 0.0002 0.0009 
  
(0.0167) (0.5523) (0.5311) (0.7488) (0.0506) (0.2264) 
  
  
5.7.3. Persistence of Sentiment and Crowd Momentum 
In the previous sections, we provided evidence on the persistence of a premium on optimism 
over a two-year time horizon. A stable premium on optimism implicitly conditions a directional 
continuity of investor or news sentiment. We, thus, examine unconditional (independently from 
previous news sentiment) and conditional (previous month news sentiment) news sentiment 
migration matrices to shed light on the persistence or momentum of positive news sentiment 
which possibly supports explaining the news sentiment effect. Hence, we conjecture that pos-
itive sentiment develops a stronger sentiment momentum (positive sentiment follows positive 
sentiment in the subsequent months) compared to negative news momentum and that the effect 
is even stronger for conditional sentiment momentum.   
Table 5-14. Spanning Regression for Short Sale Volume Subsample 
A News Sentiment Risk Factor in the Mass Media Zoo | 186 
 
 
 
This table shows the unconditional migration probability 
for the next months (T = 1,3,6,9,12).  
  Sentiment in t+1 
  Negative Neutral Positive 
Negative 39.34% 8.08% 52.58% 
Neutral 24.27% 30.62% 45.10% 
Positive 26.03% 7.12% 66.85% 
 Sentiment in t+3 
  Negative Neutral Positive 
Negative 45.69% 5.56% 48.75% 
Neutral 22.33% 34.22% 43.45% 
Positive 23.95% 5.45% 70.60% 
 Sentiment in t+6 
  Negative Neutral Positive 
Negative 43.60% 4.89% 51.52% 
Neutral 22.92% 32.52% 44.56% 
Positive 25.15% 4.55% 70.30% 
 Sentiment in t+9 
  Negative Neutral Positive 
Negative 42.37% 4.41% 53.22% 
Neutral 22.88% 32.24% 44.88% 
Positive 25.71% 4.01% 70.29% 
 Sentiment in t+12 
  Negative Neutral Positive 
Negative 43.33% 3.71% 52.96% 
Neutral 21.65% 34.89% 43.46% 
Positive 25.02% 3.51% 71.47% 
 
The probability loadings for the unconditional and conditional news sentiment transition ma-
trices are presented in Table 5-15 and Table 5-16. A characteristic of all matrices is the higher 
probability load on the matrix diagonals in particular for positive news sentiment. The uncon-
ditional probability that the current month's positive news sentiment remains positive in the 
next twelve months ranges between 67% and 71%, while probability loadings for negative 
sentiment only range between 39% and 46%. The momentum is even stronger for probability 
loadings in the conditional sentiment transition matrices in Table 5-16. If an average positive 
news sentiment month follows another average positive news sentiment month, it is more likely 
Table 5-15. Unconditional Sentiment Transition Matrices 
A News Sentiment Risk Factor in the Mass Media Zoo | 187 
 
 
 
that the next month’s (or the month in t+3, t+6, t+9, t+12) news sentiment about that firm is 
optimistic again. The probability loadings then range between 72% and 74%. In addition, it is 
then less likely that the current positive monthly news sentiment reverses into negative subse-
quently. Supplementary, we document similar findings for probability loadings associated with 
negative news sentiment. Previous month news pessimism, therefore, increases the probability 
that negative news sentiment persists in the following months. The probability loadings, how-
ever, are less pronounced compared to such related to positive news sentiment. 
In total, we find strong implications for the persistence of positive news sentiment which 
equalizes to a positive news momentum. It is more likely that positive sentiment persists in the 
short- to mid-term compared to negative news sentiment. The higher probability of positive 
news momentum, therefore, supports the hypothesis that stable premiums on optimism and 
limits on arbitrage are accompanied or fortified by the momentum of positive news sentiment. 
 
  
 
Panel A: Positive sentiment momentum  Panel B: Neutral sentiment momentum  Panel C: Negative sentiment momentum 
 Sentiment in t+1   Sentiment in t+1   Sentiment in t+1 
  Negative Neutral Positive    Negative Neutral Positive    Negative Neutral Positive 
Negative 33.95% 6.99% 59.05%  Negative 32.60% 21.88% 45.52%  Negative 47.88% 6.70% 45.43% 
Neutral 24.36% 20.79% 54.85%  Neutral 15.17% 53.88% 30.95%  Neutral 35.98% 18.27% 45.75% 
Positive 22.70% 5.71% 71.59%  Positive 24.19% 21.89% 53.91%  Positive 35.23% 6.33% 58.45% 
 Sentiment in t+3   Sentiment in t+3   Sentiment in t+3 
  Negative Neutral Positive    Negative Neutral Positive    Negative Neutral Positive 
Negative 41.60% 4.81% 53.59%  Negative 42.97% 14.73% 42.29%  Negative 51.65% 5.00% 43.35% 
Neutral 23.15% 24.58% 52.27%  Neutral 12.39% 59.47% 28.14%  Neutral 31.75% 22.94% 45.32% 
Positive 21.28% 4.51% 74.21%  Positive 21.64% 16.11% 62.24%  Positive 31.21% 5.30% 63.49% 
 Sentiment in t+6   Sentiment in t+6   Sentiment in t+6 
  Negative Neutral Positive    Negative Neutral Positive    Negative Neutral Positive 
Negative 39.56% 4.31% 56.13%  Negative 41.96% 13.55% 44.49%  Negative 49.21% 4.45% 46.34% 
Neutral 24.42% 21.72% 53.86%  Neutral 11.83% 61.14% 27.04%  Neutral 32.69% 19.30% 48.00% 
Positive 22.66% 3.72% 73.62%  Positive 23.21% 14.72% 62.07%  Positive 31.76% 4.65% 63.60% 
 Sentiment in t+9   Sentiment in t+9   Sentiment in t+9 
  Negative Neutral Positive    Negative Neutral Positive    Negative Neutral Positive 
Negative 38.83% 3.94% 57.23%  Negative 39.82% 12.26% 47.92%  Negative 47.30% 4.03% 48.67% 
Neutral 25.10% 20.42% 54.48%  Neutral 11.40% 62.29% 26.31%  Neutral 31.94% 18.14% 49.91% 
Positive 23.39% 3.30% 73.31%  Positive 24.52% 13.28% 62.19%  Positive 31.64% 4.10% 64.26% 
 Sentiment in t+12   Sentiment in t+12   Sentiment in t+12 
  Negative Neutral Positive    Negative Neutral Positive    Negative Neutral Positive 
Negative 40.89% 3.17% 55.94%  Negative 43.59% 10.85% 45.55%  Negative 46.43% 3.48% 50.09% 
Neutral 25.09% 21.93% 52.99%  Neutral 9.45% 66.79% 23.76%  Neutral 30.15% 20.93% 48.93% 
Positive 23.12% 2.87% 74.01%  Positive 23.03% 11.43% 65.53%  Positive 30.05% 3.58% 66.37% 
 
Table 5-16. Conditional Sentiment Transition Matrices 
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 Time Variation of Loadings and Systematic Risk 
So far, we have demonstrated that news optimism exhibits persistent characteristics through-
out all of our analysis. In this section, we test whether the news sentiment effect is uncondi-
tional on time variation and whether news sentiment captures systematic risk in replacement 
of the widely discussed momentum factor. First, we split our sample into four different time 
regimes and repeat the PNM factor spanning regressions to understand the time variation in 
factor loadings and alphas. The results are reported in Table 5-17. We find that the news sen-
timent effect is only significant in the bull market period between March 2009 and December 
2016 with an alpha coefficient of 115 basis points while controlling for seven risk factors.47 
One might argue that news sentiment in this study is only a timely limited factor which cannot 
be seen as a systematic risk factor. Classical studies on asset pricing often based their overall 
sample on time periods starting in 1960s until the early 2000s (e.g., Fama and French, 1992; 
Fama and French, 2015). Yet, behavioral aspects in asset pricing models became more popular 
in the late 1990’s for researchers.48 If researchers take into account that news media coverage 
increased dramatically with the expansion of the internet usage, one must accept the fact that 
variation in systematic risk is also conditional on advances in technology. Neglecting the rapid 
change in technological advances and investor research behavior, one would prefer to turn a 
blind eye to the acceptance of academic progress than adapting the general logic behind the 
financial market behavior. In our context, only the RPNA data set more than tripled their avail-
able overall news database between 2009 and 2017.  
To further elaborate on the topic of systematic risk components, we furthermore conduct a 
traditional Fama-MacBeth regression analysis on the firm-level. Momentum was so far and 
still is a widely discussed and accepted phenomenon and considered to bear a behavioral com-
ponent in asset pricing models. One weakness of this measure is, however, that researchers use 
                                                 
47 Market, SMB, HML, MOM, PS LIQ, RMW and CMA. Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor only available until 
2016. 
48 Hirshleifer and Jiang (2010) examine market mispricing associated with equity and debt financing (initial public 
offerings, seasoned equity offerings, debt offerings, equity repurchases and debt repurchases) for the period be-
tween 1970 and 2008. Kumar and Lee (2006) study on retail investor transactions and its relation to systematic 
risk over 1991 to 1996. In a longer time horizon between 1962 and 2001, Baker and Wurgler (2006) analyzed 
how investor sentiment (indirectly proxied by well-known market variables) is reflected in the cross-section of 
returns.   
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an output factor to measure its impact on another output variable. RPNA offers a direct measure 
of news sentiment and thus could replace an indirect measure, as return momentum, when pos-
sible. Table 5-18 shows the results of the Fama-MacBeth regression analysis which also exam-
ines potential differences of loadings in bullish (Sep. 2002 – Jul 2007 and Mar. 2009 – Nov. 
2017) and bearish market periods (Jan. 2000 – Aug. 2002 and Aug. 2007 – Feb. 2009). In the 
first step, we estimate the market excess loadings for each firm based on the previous year. We 
then apply the loadings as the independent variable in the second step to measure the market 
risk premium and the impact of additional independent control variables (size, book-to-market, 
momentum, average monthly news sentiment in the previous month). When including the short 
selling variable in our model, we find that the current month’s news sentiment is significantly 
associated with a firm’s excess returns in the next month.49 The results also suggest that growth 
firms are associated with positive returns. Momentum, however, does not exhibit any signifi-
cance as shown in the Table.50  
Overall, the results infer that a direct measure of investor sentiment, in our study more spe-
cifically news sentiment, should be taken into consideration as an elementary behavioral com-
ponent of asset pricing models. 
 
                                                 
49 NYSE short selling data is only available since August 2009 on www.finra.org. 
50 For robustness, we also conducted tests on fama French 25 size and book-to-market portfolios. Since portfolio 
loadings are expected to be more robust and stable compared to individual sentiment loadings, we would expect 
a positive risk premium for PMN portfolios. However, in intabulated results, we find no evidence on portfolio 
level. 
  
 
This table reports the results of the factor-based time-series regressions on equal-weighted average returns of portfolios that go 
long on stocks with average positive and shorts stocks with average negative sentiment in the previous month. In each month, a 
stock’s sentiment is classified as positive (negative) if the average Ravenpack Composite Sentiment Score exceeds 50 (is lower 
than 50). The equally-weighted portfolios are formed at the beginning of the month and held for one month. The long-short 
portfolio returns are regressed on different widely accepted risk factors. T-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * describe 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Panel A: Jan. 00 - Aug. 02  Panel B: Sep. 02 - Jul. 07  Panel C: Aug. 07 - Feb. 09  Panel D: Mar. 09 - Dez. 16 
 Bear market  Bull market  Bear market  Bull market 
            
 FF 5-Factor 7-Factor  FF 5-Factor 7-Factor  FF 5-Factor 7-Factor  FF 5-Factor 7-Factor 
  PMN PMN  PMN PMN  PMN PMN  PMN PMN 
Mkt - Rf -0.0950 -0.0749  -0.1033 -0.0663  -0.1771** -0.1670**  -0.0585 -0.0160 
 (-0.7342) (-0.5510)  (-1.5147) (-0.9875)  (-2.9480) (-3.0558)  (-1.4792) (-0.4513) 
SMB -0.1146 -0.0608  0.1800** 0.0379  0.3168** 0.3476***  -0.1313** -0.1415** 
 (-0.9837) (-0.4432)  (2.1016) (0.4068)  (2.5780) (3.2887)  (-2.1107) (-2.5078) 
HML 0.0800 0.1941  -0.0361 -0.0430  -0.2546*** -0.2399***  -0.3262*** -0.1205 
 (0.4497) (0.9559)  (-0.3099) (-0.3884)  (-3.6576) (-3.2670)  (-4.3851) (-1.5966) 
MOM  0.0459   0.1752***   0.1263**   0.1439*** 
  (0.7027)   (3.0237)   (2.6873)   (5.0838) 
LIQ  -0.1009   0.0302   -0.0123   0.0524 
  (-0.8684)   (0.4716)   (-0.2616)   (1.1592) 
RMW 0.3493** 0.3619**  0.2043 0.0380  0.1580 -0.0441  0.0664 0.1253 
 (2.2026) (2.2461)  (1.4400) (0.2636)  (0.8712) (-0.2634)  (0.6961) (1.4866) 
CMA -0.1489 -0.3052  0.0873 0.1291  -0.4743** -0.3596*  0.2180* 0.0328 
 (-0.6550) (-1.1093)  (0.4577) (0.7009)  (-2.3990) (-1.9882)  (1.7949) (0.2908) 
Intercept 0.0016 0.0026  0.0011 0.0012  -0.0002 0.0007  0.0116*** 0.0115*** 
  (0.3195) (0.4974)   (0.6298) (0.6655)   (-0.0530) (0.2598)   (8.0226) (9.1084) 
# Obs. 32 32  59 59  19 19  94 94 
Adj .R2 0.64 0.63   0.14 0.24   0.69 0.79   0.35 0.50 
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This table shows the Fama-MacBeth regression results on firm-level. The dependent variable 
is the monthly excess return of an individual stock. βMKT is estimated with the prior year ex-
cess market return. The month-end market capitalization is captured by ln(Size), ln(BE/ME) 
describes the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio with book value of equity from 
the year-end of the previous fiscal year, MOM-12;-2 is the past 12 to previous 2 months cumu-
lative raw return, CSS-1 is the average monthly composite news sentiment score, and ln(short) 
is the natural logarithm of the monthly short-sale volume of a firm. Robust Newey-West t-
Statistics are reported in parenthesis.  
Model / Period βMKT ln(Size) ln(BE/ME) MOM-12;-2 CSS-1 ln(Short) 
Jan.’00 – Nov.‘17 -0.010 0.006 -0.050 -0.049   
 (-0.14) (1.12) (-1.62) (-0.34)   
 -0.088 0.052 -0.451 -0.477 0.181  
 (-0.13) (1.1) (-1.57) (-0.39) (1.17)  
Jan.’00 – Aug.’02 &  0.090 0.059 -0.389 -0.026 0.164  
Aug.’07 – Feb.’09 (-0.04) (1.14) (-1.64) (-0.08) (1.34)  
Sep.’02 – Jul.’07 & -0.623 0.033 -0.635 -1.830 0.231  
Mar.‘09. – Nov.‘17 (-0.42) (1.03) (-1.36) (-1.26) (0.67)  
Jan.’10 – Nov.‘17 0.010 -0.015 -0.050 -0.058 0.034 0.016 
  (0.04) (-0.01) (-2.22) (-0.58) (2.29) (0.42) 
 
  
Table 5-18. Fama-MacBeth Regressions: Cross Section of Individual Stock Returns 
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 Conclusion 
We study the tone of news media and the cross-section of stock returns. Our results provide 
evidence that an equally-weighted long-short portfolio of stocks sorted by the tone of the news 
media coverage earns significant returns of 7.5% per year even after controlling for market, 
size, book-to-market, momentum, liquidity, profitability, and investment factors. Separating 
the effect of positive and negative news media tones reveals that results are mainly driven by 
positive news media tone which we refer to as a “premium on optimism”.  
We offer several explanations for this result. First, we find a persistent premium on positive 
news sentiment and a return reversal pattern for stocks associated with negative news senti-
ment. Hence, the short-term overreaction of investors does not serve as a possible explanation 
for short- and long-term premiums of news optimism. Second, we only find weak evidence for 
sentiment related arbitrage transactions by informed investors. This supports the view on lim-
itations of arbitrage in an environment of high investor sentiment which ultimately results in 
persistent mispricing or the premium on optimism. Third, we document a generally stronger 
manifestation of positive news sentiment on the firm-level even in bearish market environ-
ments. Finally, we find that news momentum is more likely for positive rather than negative 
news sentiment which favors the presence of a stable premium on optimism. 
  
Overall Summary and Conclusion | 194 
 
 
 
6. Overall Summary and Conclusion 
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to shed light on the role of investor attention and 
sentiment in financial markets. In order to achieve this, we employ a variety of empirical meth-
ods in different natural setups to specifically disentangle the fundamental and noisy compo-
nents conveyed by internet postings and news announcements on (social) media channels. In 
this context, we do not only apply standard methodologies but also enhance the empirical set-
ups with the comprehensive application of data sources from various innovative media chan-
nels, including social media platforms, media press releases and internet search queries. 
As described in the introduction, the research in this field gains more and more in importance 
since the way how information travels has changed significantly in recent decades. Social net-
works enable retail investors to interact and communicate in real-time, individuals have quick 
and easy access to publicly available information via the internet. Additionally, traditional me-
dia press, which used to reach a broad population on a daily base, experiences a digital trans-
formation with far-reaching consequences. For example, traditional media press circulation in 
the US dropped significantly from around 63 million in its peak time in the 1970s to around 31 
million in 2017. Concurrently, the number of social media users on the internet is expected to 
grow annually at 11% until 2021.51 Consequently, financial markets undergo an inevitable 
change in terms of information dissemination and processing (Puppis et al., 2017). 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation provides the basic foundation for our theoretical and empirical 
work. We introduce the reader to the main concepts of efficient markets, also called the neo-
classical finance theory. The transition to behavioral finance is then explained based on the 
concepts of limitations on arbitrage, noise trading, and investor sentiment. We also summarize 
the most important psychological concepts which help to explain cognitive biases, beliefs or 
preferences of investors that finally lead investors to trade on presumably noisy information. 
Seminal studies in the field of behavioral finance evolved in particular in the 1990s, yielding 
three constitutional behavioral theories. These theories aim to provide a comprehensive and 
unified  framework in order to explain market anomalies based on cognitive biases or as a result 
                                                 
51 Please refer to the introduction in Section 1 for figures and sources. 
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of the interaction between different agents in financial markets. Barberis et al. (1998) devel-
oped a parsimonious model of investor sentiment, which explains the two pervasive patterns 
of overreaction of stock prices to news and the underreaction of stock prices to news events, 
such as earnings announcements. The authors base their model on the psychological concepts 
of representativeness and conservatism to describe how investors form their beliefs and ulti-
mately trade on these. In the second cognitive-based model, Daniel et al. (1998) propose a 
model on market over- and underreaction based on two different behavioral biases compared 
to Barberis et al. (1998), namely investor overconfidence and self-attribution. In their findings, 
overconfidence of investors is related to an overreaction of stock returns, whereas biased self-
attribution drives short-term momentum and earnings drifts. The later finding is closely related 
to the underreaction of stock prices. In the third established model, Hong and Stein (1999) 
deviate from the cognitive approach and develop an interaction-based model in which two 
heterogeneous groups of agents, newswatchers and momentum traders, give reasons for under- 
and overreaction of stock prices to news signals. In this model, newswatchers slowly anticipate 
public news signals resulting in the underreaction of stock prices to news signals. Momentum 
traders follow the short-term signals of serial-autocorrelated returns and trade based on histor-
ical return information. Another group of momentum trader, who anticipate this short-term 
momentum at a later stage, will also trade based on past information and cause stock prices to 
overshoot. Stock returns will consequently reverse in the long-term in accordance to the market 
anomaly of market overreaction. Therefore, timing effects of market entries from momentum 
traders play an important role when practitioners aim to implement a trading strategy based on 
this model.  
Chapter 2 finally provides an overview of the information flow between different stakehold-
ers in financial markets. It becomes evident that different types of investors make their deci-
sions based on distinctive types of information depending on their resources and dedication. 
Individual or retail investors lack the resources to source costly information from brokers or 
analysts. Social media, therefore, provides a platform where investors can interact and ex-
change their opinions at low costs and in real-time.  
The first empirical work in this dissertation, hence, explores the role of investor sentiment 
expressed on internet message boards in financial markets. We analyze messages posted on the 
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Australian financial internet message board HotCopper. Our results show that bullish sentiment 
on social media is positively related to stock returns up to ten trading days, but the effect di-
minishes after a month. Furthermore, the event study results indicate that abnormal returns are 
positively related to bullish sentiment on the same day, but returns reverse on a subsequent 
day. Both results support the pattern of stock price overreaction to bullish investor sentiment. 
This presumably observed contemporaneous overreaction in firm’s abnormal return is reduced 
by short selling activities. We argue that only informed sellers initiate short selling activities 
when they believe that sentiment diverges far beyond a firm’s fundamentals. Hence, short 
sellers arbitrage against noisy sentiment traders.  
Contrarily, we find that negative sentiment incorporates value-relevant information about 
stock underperformances with a negative correlation of up to one month. Different to the im-
plications of positive sentiment postings, we find indications that negative sentiment predicts 
the underperformance of stocks in the short-term. Abnormal return reversals remain absent 
after days of abnormal high postings with negative sentiment. The impact of negative sentiment 
is much more economically meaningful compared to messages with positive sentiment. The 
later view is additionally supported by our last analysis in the first empirical work. In particular, 
we document that sentiment homogeneity (agreement amongst investors) predicts negative 
earnings surprises. This is in conformity with the perception that negative sentiment expressed 
on social media conveys value-relevant information not only in general but also around firm-
specific events, such as earnings announcements. The asymmetric role of investor sentiment in 
financial markets, thus, creates various avenues for further research in this field. 
To further understand how individual and institutional investors use information sources and 
how this translates to financial markets, we examine in our second empirical work the impact 
of media and internet coverage on target run-ups before bid announcements. Previous research 
relied on indirect measures of investor attention (e.g., news media, trading volume) to examine 
its relation to firm performances or specific events. New technologies and innovations, how-
ever, enable investors to participate and gather information in real-time and efficiently change 
their investment decisions. This also allows researchers to create direct measures of investor 
attention, such as posting activity on internet investment platforms or active internet search 
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queries. Our study provides evidence that institutional and (un-)sophisticated individual inves-
tors use preferred channels to gather and disseminate information before bid announcements. 
We find that smaller and underperforming stocks that only capture the attention of sophisticated 
individual investors on the internet message board HotCopper but no other media channel, 
experience a significantly stronger target run-up before bid announcements. In this connection, 
investor sentiment expressed on HotCopper fails to predict target run-ups. It is rather the atten-
tion or the social media coverage itself, which in the M&A context, significantly relate to target 
price run-ups before bid announcements. Firms with similar fundamental characteristics but 
missing (social) media attention do not experience a significant run-up before the bid an-
nouncement. On the other hand, large firms are especially sensitive to analyst opinions. Posi-
tive and negative analyst upgrades have significant influences on target run-ups in the respec-
tive directions. Merger signals in traditional media press only play a minor role for institutional 
investors. Also, Google search activity of unsophisticated investors does not explain target run-
ups.  
As we compare the role of investor sentiment in the first and second empirical of this disser-
tation, we find ambiguous implications. However, one explanation for the minor role of inves-
tor sentiment around bid announcements is the fact that M&A announcements are by nature 
related to positive returns, in particular for the target firm. The pure social media attention is 
in this case sufficient to predict a target price run-up before the actual bid announcement date. 
Traditional media press, on the other hand, is not found to be important in M&A settings and 
our results rather suggest that information disseminated via news media possesses stale char-
acteristics.  
The uttering surprise that news coverage does not seem of economic importance as opposed 
to prior findings in the literature (e.g., Fang and Peress, 2009), raised our interest to further 
explore the role of news sentiment within a broader context. Hence, we refer to the innovative 
and comprehensive RavenPack news database in our third empirical work to investigate the 
role of news sentiment and its explanatory power for cross-sectional returns. We first conduct 
a vector autoregressive analysis on news sentiment and its relation to market returns (S&P 500 
and Russell 3000 market indices) and find that an aggregated news sentiment score signifi-
cantly predicts the next month’s market return. We then perform a univariate analysis in the 
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spirit of the common asset pricing literature. To do so, we first double-sort stocks by common 
firm characteristics and news sentiment. Hence, we examine the average return differentials 
for firms with positive and negative news exposure according to various firm characteristics 
(e.g., size, book-to-market, momentum, profitability).  The unconditional zero-investment port-
folio that goes long on (shorts) stocks with positive (negative) news sentiment earns on average 
a return of 0.87% in the next month. This corresponds to an annual return of 10.44%. In par-
ticular, unprofitable stocks with smaller market capitalization, low return momentum, and 
higher investments are more sensitive to news sentiment.  
Furthermore, we conduct factor spanning regressions on the resulting positive-minus-nega-
tive factor (average return of positive news sentiment stocks minus the average return of neg-
ative news sentiment stocks) and find that our results remain robust. The zero-investment port-
folio yields annual returns of about 7.5% even after controlling for other widely-accepted risk-
factors, such as market, size, book-to-market, momentum, profitability, and investment. The 
separation of the portfolio according to positive and negative sentiment legs, however, reveals 
that our results are mainly driven by positive news sentiment, which we refer to as the premium 
on optimism. We repeat the regression on subsamples according to different firm characteris-
tics and find confirming evidence for our previous results. Hence, we again find evidence that 
unprofitable, smaller stocks, with low return momentum, and high investments exhibit a higher 
exposure to news sentiment than other subsamples. 
To better understand the long-term impact of news sentiment, we construct similar zero-in-
vestment portfolios based on different holding and formation periods. We find that return dif-
ferentials for zero-investment portfolios reverse after two years in accordance to the overreac-
tion theory. Separating the news sentiment effect, however, shows that the positive sentiment 
portfolio leg generates persistent positive returns, whereas the negative sentiment leg experi-
ences return reversals. The analysis of the unconditional and conditional transition matrices of 
news sentiment provides further evidence that positive news sentiment is more persistent than 
negative news sentiment in a twelve-month period. Thus, it is more likely that positive news 
occur if the firm experienced positive news signals in the previous months. Finally, our Fama-
MacBeth regression results show that news sentiment significantly predicts future returns on 
firm-level while, amongst others, controlling for market premiums and return momentum. This 
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finding, therefore, supports the hypothesis that news sentiment captures risk and thus partly 
explains the cross-section of returns. 
Hence, we can conclude that news sentiment plays a crucial role in the explanation of cross-
sectional returns. Positive news sentiment remains persistent in the long-term and is closely 
linked to a premium on optimism. However, stock markets overreact to negative news senti-
ment in a two-year horizon, causing returns to reverse in the long-term after experiencing a 
negative news shock. The premium on optimism is consistent with the traditional finance the-
ory. In this view, news sentiment reflects a risk component which ultimately translates into 
higher returns. Stock markets, on the other hand, overreact to negative news sentiment in ac-
cordance with the behavioral finance theory. Thus, we assert that the behavioral finance theory 
must be seen as a complementary element to the traditional finance view.   
 Comparing the later results with the findings of our second empirical work, it seems ambig-
uous whether news coverage does play a major role in financial markets. The asset pricing 
tests, however, provide stronger support for the hypothesis that news sentiment and coverage 
influence financial markets. 
Reviewing the leading research questions raised in the introduction of this dissertation, we 
can provide answers from different perspectives based on robust and comprehensive empirical 
test settings:  
1. What role does investor sentiment play in financial markets? Do investors solely follow 
the market or do opinions and beliefs of investors predict future returns? We can confirm 
that investor sentiment expressed on (social) media plays a significant role in financial markets, 
yet with different implications depending on the directional components of investor sentiment. 
For example, our empirical results support the view that bullish sentiment expressed on social 
media is closely related to the overreaction of stock prices. Previous studies in this field have 
already documented that investors on social media platforms, in particular, tend to express their 
bullish opinions. Hence, it becomes even more essential for rational investors to distinguish 
the fundamental from the noisy components in social media postings. 
On the other hand, negative sentiment expressed on social media seems to contain value-
relevant information and thus contributes to increasing market efficiency. Social media users 
on financial platform share opinions on own analysis, reports and market trends. It is thus 
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possible that the otherwise bullish investors on social media especially share value-relevant 
information if they feel that a firm’s fundamentals develop in negative directions. This assump-
tion is supported by the finding that negative sentiment homogeneity (investors agree on neg-
ative sentiment) particularly predicts negative earnings surprises 
The implications of media press sentiment compared to social media sentiment for financial 
markets, however, are mixed. Our asset pricing tests in our third empirical work in this disser-
tation, document a positive premium on optimism for news sentiment, which is also persistent 
in the long-term. However, negative news sentiment seems to be related to stock price overre-
actions with return reversals in the long-term. This raises the questions whether media senti-
ment merely captures a risk factor that is not observed otherwise or whether media sentiment 
reflects a behavioral bias which ultimately translates to stock price movements. Even though 
our results support the hypothesis that positive media sentiment incorporates a media risk fac-
tor, we cannot rule out the fact that there are other potential sources which release value-rele-
vant information preliminary. In total, our results support the noise trading theory that behav-
ioral biases and limitations on arbitrage can ultimately yield a noise-based risk factor.  
We also cannot preclude that some investors follow historical market performances which 
are partly reflected by investor sentiment. Our VAR analysis indicates a bilateral relationship 
of investor sentiment and stock returns. In summary, we can conclude that investor sentiment 
significantly impacts on financial markets. 
2. How does (social) media relate to financial markets in the general daily context and 
specifically around news events, such as earnings or M&A announcements? The results of 
our empirical analyses reveal a general pattern of stock price overreaction to internet message 
board sentiment. Also, we find that negative internet message board sentiment forecasts earn-
ings surprises. Hence, social media seemingly conveys fundamental information surrounding 
firm-specific events. This is not surprising since individual investors become more and more 
professionalized and share their analysis and valuable opinions in social media platforms. The 
convergence pattern of investor sentiment agreement potentially indicates that either investors 
get convinced by other’s opinions or just exit the discussion.  
Additionally, we find media coverage to help to identify target run-ups before M&A an-
nouncements. The effect is even stronger for firms that only experience social media coverage 
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but lack a traditional media press coverage. Our result that smaller and underperforming stocks 
do not experience run-ups in the absence of (social) media coverage supports the hypothesis 
that (social) media contributes to increasing market efficiency or somehow impacts on stock 
prices. The general positive premium on optimism found for media sentiment, however, con-
tradicts the findings on sentiment from internet message boards. Positive news sentiment pre-
miums are persistent over a two-year period, whereas firms tend to overreact to negative news 
sentiment.   
We can conclude that investor sentiment affects financial markets differently depending on 
the situation (general daily context vs. firm-specific events) and media channel (traditional 
media press vs. social media). General stock price overreaction of small-capitalization stocks 
to internet message board sentiment might be evidence for the tendency of bullish speculators 
to share their noisy opinion on social media platforms. The detailed analysis and discussions 
of financial reports and other available information, on the other hand, potentially help indi-
vidual investors to better understand a firm’s fundamental., which manifests itself in the pre-
dictability of earnings surprises from negative sentiment on internet message boards.  
3. What kind of firms are more sensitive to investor sentiment than others? We also learned 
from our empirical work that social media users especially focus their trades on smaller and 
underperforming stocks. Our panel regressions have also shown that large stocks are not sig-
nificantly affected by internet message board sentiment. Similar, we find that especially small 
stocks are prone to target run-up identification with social media coverage. Additionally, we 
find in our asset pricing setup, that smaller stocks are also more sensitive to news sentiment. 
Furthermore, the media sentiment analysis documents that especially growth stocks with high 
investments, low past return momentum, high return volatility, and low operational margins 
are sensitive to sentiment.  In total, all results of this work confirm the anecdotal evidence that 
smaller, riskier stocks are more sensitive to investor sentiment.  
4. Does arbitrage stabilize financial markets against noise traders? We find implications 
that arbitrage, more specifically short selling, mitigates the overreaction of stock prices to bull-
ish investor sentiment on internet message boards. The overreaction, however, does not fully 
diminish in the presence of short selling. Limitations on arbitrage seem to hinder informed 
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traders to fully exploit arbitrage opportunities. Another reason could be a risk-aversion of in-
formed traders because bullish investors could even further push prices away from fundamen-
tals so that they are facing a higher short-term risk, also referred to as the noise trader risk. In 
addition, we only find weak evidence that short selling reduces the impact of news sentiment 
on financial markets. This supports the view on the limitations of arbitrage for rational inves-
tors, who fail to take opposite positions, be it due to risk-aversion or limitations, such as trans-
action costs.  
Our findings have wide-ranging implications not only for investors but also for firms and 
regulators. Firms must actively learn to anticipate (social) media movements which potentially 
rest on spurious information. Hence, the firms’ investor relation departments increasingly need 
to deal with (un)justifiable disputes with the general public and can hence learn to early antic-
ipate social media activity in favor of the firm’s reputation. Regulators are also interested in 
identifying market manipulation to not only detect fraud activity but also stabilize financial 
markets. However, one must clearly distinguish the intention of influential individuals or the 
herding behavior of a crowd. Our empirical work is based on the most common methodologies 
in this field of research but, furthermore, combines different media perspectives to create a 
unified picture of investor sentiment. One main avenue for further researchers is the under-
standing of institutional and individual information sourcing. In this dissertation, it remains 
open to debate how and when investors source their information from different media channels. 
It is evident that investors will source their information in all available public channels covering 
media press, social media press or other sources from the internet. The mechanism on how 
investor beliefs are formed based on media channels remains elusive.  
Additionally, future research could further evaluate in which specific situations financial mar-
kets are more sensitive to investor sentiment disseminated via social media. It is, furthermore, 
open to debate why negative sentiment could be more reliable in conveying value-relevant 
information to the market compared to rather noisy information spread by bullish investors. It 
is thus an academic imperative to find a parsimonious but comprehensive theoretical frame-
work, which explains the asymmetric impact of investor sentiment on financial markets inde-
pendent from the question, whether cognitive biases or other market drivers cause the stock 
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price deviation from fundamentals in connection with investor sentiment. Despite the support-
ing evidence that (social) media attention significantly relates to target run-ups, future research 
could further investigate on the different roles of institutional and individual investors on target 
run-ups and its long-term impact. Our study only explores the short-term period of one to two 
months before the actual bid announcements. Future studies could additionally focus on the 
long-term horizon and the consequences of failed bid announcements. Furthermore, this ex-
tended analysis would help clarify whether (social) media coverage contributes in market effi-
ciency and whether media coverage captures valuable information or rather induces a noisy 
short-term overreaction in the light of a potential upcoming merger event.  
Finally, future research must, therefore, further explore the role of news sentiment in distinc-
tive ways. First, researchers can shed light on the limitations of arbitrage which explain why 
our observed premium on optimism can persist in the long-term. If limitations of arbitrage 
hinder informed traders to trade against noisy information, then researchers would find stronger 
support for the noise trader theory by DeLong et al. (1990). Second, it still remains unclear 
why positive sentiment should be more persistent than negative news sentiment. Since previous 
studies often documented a predominantly bullish (social) media presentation, the mechanism 
behind this observation remains unclear. We can conclude that news sentiment plays an im-
portant role in the explanation of the cross-section of returns. However, the mechanisms and 
limitations which might explain the persistence of the premium on optimism remain unsolved. 
In summary, we believe that the empirical findings of this dissertation contribute significantly 
to the elucidation of the role of investor sentiment in financial markets and extend the baseline 
for further research. Furthermore, this dissertation provides important insights and implications 
for practitioners, including investors, regulators and listed firms.   
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Appendix 
 
This table reports the summary statistics of the main internet message board (based on a 5 days 
formation period) and financial control variables. The observations are on a firm-day level. 
LogMessagesi,t is the log transformation (1+Mt), Bullishnessi,t is the standardized bullishness 
index defined in formula (10), PosSentimenti,t and NegSentimenti,t describe the positive and 
negative sentiment denoted in formula (11) and (12), Agreement is the agreement index de-
scribed in formula (13), AbReti,t describes the firm’s abnormal return, calculated as the differ-
ence of compound raw returns and value-weighted market return, Volatilityi,t-30,t-1 is the 30-
day-standard deviation of returns prior to day t,  Upgradei,t/Downgradei,t describe the number 
of analyst upgrade/downgrade recommendation on day t, PosMeanESi,t/NegMeanESi,t denote 
dummy variables for positive/negative mean earnings surprise on day t. 
 n Mean Median Std. Dev. 10th Pctl. 25th Pctl. 75th Pctl. 90th Pctl. 
AbReti,t-1 344,523 -0.003 -0.002 0.062 -0.054 -0.024 0.016 0.047 
AbReti,t-2 344,523 -0.002 -0.002 0.062 -0.056 -0.024 0.017 0.050 
LogMessagesi,t 344,523 1.297 1.099 0.703 0.693 0.693 1.609 2.303 
Bullishnessi,t 344,523 1.101 1.099 0.839 0.693 0.693 1.609 2.197 
PosSentimenti,t 344,523 1.223 1.099 0.733 0.693 0.693 1.609 2.197 
NegSentimenti,t 344,523 0.136 0.000 0.380 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.693 
Agreementi,t 344,523 0.925 1.000 0.247 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Volatilityi,t-30,t-1 344,523 0.046 0.038 0.035 0.017 0.025 0.055 0.079 
Upgradei,t 344,523 0.048 0.000 0.435 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Downgradei,t 344,523 0.082 0.000 0.661 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PosMeanESi,t 344,523 0.008 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NegMeanESi,t 344,523 0.002 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A-1. Summary Statistics on Firm/Trading Level - 5 Days Formation Period  
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This table reports the summary statistics of the main internet message board (based on a 10 
days formation period) and financial control variables. The observations are on a firm-day 
level. LogMessagesi,t is the log transformation (1+Mt), Bullishnessi,t is the standardized bull-
ishness index defined in formula (10), PosSentimenti,t and NegSentimenti,t describe the posi-
tive and negative sentiment denoted in formula (11) and (12), Agreement is the agreement 
index described in formula (13), AbReti,t describes the firm’s abnormal return, calculated as 
the difference of compound raw returns and value-weighted market return, Volatilityi,t-30,t-1 is 
the 30-day-standard deviation of returns prior to day t,  Upgradei,t/Downgradei,t describe the 
number of analyst upgrade/downgrade recommendation on day t, PosMeanESi,t/NegMea-
nESi,t denote dummy variables for positive/negative mean earnings surprise on day t. 
 n Mean Median Std. Dev. 10th Pctl. 25th Pctl. 75th Pctl. 90th Pctl. 
AbReti,t-1 331,655 -0.003 -0.002 0.061 -0.054 -0.024 0.016 0.047 
AbReti,t-2 331,655 -0.003 -0.002 0.062 -0.055 -0.024 0.017 0.050 
LogMessagesi,t 331,655 1.295 1.099 0.700 0.693 0.693 1.609 2.303 
Bullishnessi,t 331,655 1.099 1.099 0.837 0.693 0.693 1.609 2.197 
PosSentimenti,t 331,655 1.220 1.099 0.730 0.693 0.693 1.609 2.197 
NegSentimenti,t 331,655 0.136 0.000 0.379 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.693 
Agreementi,t 331,655 0.924 1.000 0.247 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Volatilityi,t-30,t-1 331,655 0.045 0.038 0.034 0.017 0.025 0.055 0.078 
Upgradei,t 331,655 0.049 0.000 0.441 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Downgradei,t 331,655 0.083 0.000 0.661 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PosMeanESi,t 331,655 0.008 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NegMeanESi,t 331,655 0.002 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  
Table A-2. Summary Statistics on Firm/Trading Level - 10 Days Formation Period  
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This table reports the summary statistics of the main internet message board (based on a 30 
days formation period) and financial control variables. The observations are on a firm-day 
level. LogMessagesi,t is the log transformation (1+Mt), Bullishnessi,t is the standardized bull-
ishness index defined in formula (10), PosSentimenti,t and NegSentimenti,t describe the positive 
and negative sentiment denoted in formula (11) and (12), Agreement is the agreement index 
described in formula (13), AbReti,t describes the firm’s abnormal return, calculated as the dif-
ference of compound raw returns and value-weighted market return, Volatilityi,t-30,t-1 is the 30-
day-standard deviation of returns prior to day t,  Upgradei,t/Downgradei,t describe the number 
of analyst upgrade/downgrade recommendation on day t, PosMeanESi,t/NegMeanESi,t denote 
dummy variables for positive/negative mean earnings surprise on day t. 
  N Mean Median Std. Dev. 10th Pctl. 25th Pctl. 75th Pctl. 90th Pctl. 
AbReti,t-1 283,585 -0.003 -0.002 0.060 -0.053 -0.023 0.015 0.046 
AbReti,t-2 283,585 -0.002 -0.002 0.061 -0.054 -0.023 0.017 0.049 
LogMessagesi,t 283,585 1.280 1.099 0.685 0.693 0.693 1.609 2.303 
Bullishnessi,t 283,585 1.082 1.099 0.826 0.693 0.693 1.581 2.079 
PosSentimenti,t 283,585 1.204 1.099 0.715 0.693 0.693 1.609 2.197 
NegSentimenti,t 283,585 0.136 0.000 0.378 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.693 
Agreementi,t 283,585 0.924 1.000 0.247 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Volatilityi,t-30,t-1 283,585 0.044 0.037 0.032 0.017 0.025 0.054 0.076 
Upgradei,t 283,585 0.056 0.000 0.474 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Downgradei,t 283,585 0.096 0.000 0.717 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PosMeanESi,t 283,585 0.008 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NegMeanESi,t 283,585 0.002 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A-3. Summary Statistics on Firm/Trading Level - 30 Days Formation Period 
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This table reports the summary statistics of the main internet message board (based on a 60 
days formation period) and financial control variables. The observations are on a firm-day 
level. LogMessagesi,t is the log transformation (1+Mt), Bullishnessi,t is the standardized bull-
ishness index defined in formula (10), PosSentimenti,t and NegSentimenti,t describe the positive 
and negative sentiment denoted in formula (11) and (12), Agreement is the agreement index 
described in formula (13), AbReti,t describes the firm’s abnormal return, calculated as the dif-
ference of compound raw returns and value-weighted market return, Volatilityi,t-30,t-1 is the 30-
day-standard deviation of returns prior to day t,  Upgradei,t/Downgradei,t describe the number 
of analyst upgrade/downgrade recommendation on day t, PosMeanESi,t/NegMeanESi,t denote 
dummy variables for positive/negative mean earnings surprise on day t. 
  N Mean Median Std. Dev. 10th Pctl. 25th Pctl. 75th Pctl. 90th Pctl. 
AbReti,t-1 224,285 -0.003 -0.002 0.059 -0.053 -0.023 0.015 0.046 
AbReti,t-2 224,285 -0.002 -0.002 0.061 -0.054 -0.023 0.017 0.049 
LogMessagesi,t 224,285 1.259 1.099 0.663 0.693 0.693 1.609 2.197 
Bullishnessi,t 224,285 1.059 1.099 0.810 0.649 0.693 1.386 2.079 
PosSentimenti,t 224,285 1.182 1.099 0.695 0.693 0.693 1.609 2.197 
NegSentimenti,t 224,285 0.136 0.000 0.374 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.693 
Agreementi,t 224,285 0.925 1.000 0.248 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Volatilityi,t-30,t-1 224,285 0.044 0.037 0.032 0.016 0.025 0.053 0.075 
Upgradei,t 224,285 0.051 0.000 0.435 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Downgradei,t 224,285 0.091 0.000 0.700 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PosMeanESi,t 224,285 0.007 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NegMeanESi,t 224,285 0.002 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
 
  
 
This table shows the results of the lag-order selection tests for the VAR analysis and on the 
individual firm-level. * indicates the lag-order selected by each criterion, where LH-Ratio = 
Likelihood-Ratio, FPE = Final prediction error, AIC = Akaike information criterion, SBIC = 
Schwarz information criterion, and HQIC = Hannan-Quinn information criterion. 
Lag CD   J-stats   J p-Value MBIC   MAIC   MQIC  
1 0.5703  309.7144  0.0000 193.7194  285.7144  255.2670  
2 0.6340  186.6693  0.0000 109.3393  170.6693  150.3710  
3 0.6423 * 114.3946 * 0.0000 75.7296 * 106.3946 * 96.2455 * 
 
Table A-4. Summary Statistics on Firm/Trading Level - 60 Days Formation Period  
Table A-5. Lag-Order Selection Statistics for VAR – Individual Level  
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This table summarizes the descriptive statistics for section 3.5.2. SUEAFi,t is the difference in 
actual EPS and forecasted EPS using analyst forecasts 90 days prior to the earnings announcement 
date scaled by the stock price of the end of the year, LogMessagesi,7 is the log transformation of (1 + 
Mt) for the event window [-2,-1], Bullishnessi,7 is the cumulated bullishness index using formula (12), 
Agreementi,7 is the cumulated agreement index using formula (13). Return50 is the compounded return 
over the period of [-61,-12] and Return5 for the five-day return period [-6,-2] prior to the earnings 
forecasted EPS using analyst forecasts 90 days prior to the earnings announcement date scaled by the 
stock price of the end of the year. LogTurnover50 is the log-transformed average turnover over the 
time window [-61,-12] prior to the earnings announcement date, Volatilityi,10 is the standard deviation 
of daily returns in the time window [-11,-2] and LogSizei,t is the log-transformation of the market 
capitalization at the end of the financial year. 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. 10th Pctl. 25th Pctl. 75th Pctl. 90th Pctl. 
SUEAF 382 -0.010 0.000 0.198 -0.090 -0.011 0.010 0.060 
LogMessagesi,t-1 ,t-2 382 1.631 1.386 0.803 0.693 1.099 2.197 2.833 
Bullishnessi,t-1, t-2 382 1.351 1.386 0.944 0.462 0.693 1.946 2.565 
Agreementi,t-1, t-2 382 0.856 1.000 0.319 0.200 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Return50 382 -0.032 -0.024 0.370 -0.376 -0.182 0.121 0.298 
Return5 382 -0.003 0.000 0.088 -0.100 -0.045 0.038 0.095 
LogTurnover50 382 13.870 13.550 2.133 11.240 12.270 15.490 16.840 
Volatilityt-2, t-11 382 0.030 0.025 0.018 0.012 0.017 0.037 0.052 
LogSizei,t 382 24.450 24.110 1.764 22.530 23.310 25.460 26.970 
         
This table summarizes the descriptive statistics for section 3.5.2. SUEAFi,t is the difference in 
actual EPS and forecasted EPS using analyst forecasts 90 days prior to the earnings announcement 
date scaled by the stock price of the end of the year, LogMessagesi,7 is the log transformation of (1 + 
Mt) for the event window [-30,-1], Bullishnessi,7 is the cumulated bullishness index using formula 
(12), Agreementi,7 is the cumulated agreement index using formula (13). Return50 is the compounded 
return over the period of [-61,-12] and Return5 for the five-day return period [-6,-2] prior to the earn-
ings forecasted EPS using analyst forecasts 90 days prior to the earnings announcement date scaled 
by the stock price of the end of the year. LogTurnover50 is the log-transformed average turnover over 
the time window [-61,-12] prior to the earnings announcement date, Volatilityi,10 is the standard devi-
ation of daily returns in the time window [-11,-2] and LogSizei,t is the log-transformation of the market 
capitalization at the end of the financial year. 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. 10th Pctl. 25th Pctl. 75th Pctl. 90th Pctl. 
SUEAF 568 -0.014 0.000 0.179 -0.090 -0.011 0.008 0.045 
LogMessagesi,t-1, t-30 568 2.976 3.045 1.318 1.099 1.946 3.998 4.663 
Bullishnessi,t-1, t-30 568 2.450 2.436 1.515 0.693 1.386 3.496 4.362 
Agreementi,t-1, t-30 568 0.727 1.000 0.356 0.109 0.425 1.000 1.000 
Return50 568 -0.017 -0.013 0.332 -0.327 -0.157 0.133 0.291 
Return5 568 -0.002 0.000 0.079 -0.088 -0.038 0.035 0.087 
LogTurnover50 568 13.830 13.550 2.064 11.330 12.240 15.310 16.780 
Volatilityt-2 ,t-11 568 0.028 0.024 0.016 0.012 0.016 0.034 0.050 
Sizei,t 568 24.440 24.190 1.690 22.530 23.340 25.430 26.870 
Table A-6. Summary Statistics  
Table A-7. Summary Statistics  
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Firm- and year-fixed regressions were conducted. T-statistics computed are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm and year and are denoted in parentheses. SUEAFi,t is the difference in actual EPS 
and forecasted EPS using analyst forecasts 90 days prior to the earnings announcement date scaled by 
the stock price of the end of the year, LogMessagesi,7 is the log transformation of (1 + Mt) for the event 
window [-30,-1], Bullishnessi,7 is the cumulated bullishness index using formula (12), Agreementi,7 is 
the cumulated agreement index using formula (13), High/LowAgreeDi,7 is a dummy variable indicat-
ing the cumulated agreement index to be in the top/bottom 20-percentile,  Return50 is the compounded 
return over the period of [-61,-12] and Return5 for the five-day return period [-6,-2] prior to the earn-
ings announcement date. LogTurnover50 is the log-transformed average turnover over the time win-
dow [-61,-12] prior to the earnings announcement date, Volatilityi,10 is the standard deviation of daily 
returns in the time window [-11,-2] and LogSizei,t is the log-transformation of the market capitalization 
at the end of the financial year. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respec-
tively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  SUEAFt0 SUEAFt0 SUEAFt0 SUEAFt0 SUEAFt0 
LogMesi,t-30,t-1 0.001 0.004 -0.005 -0.008  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013)  
BullInd i,t-30,t-1 -0.014** -0.013** -0.018** -0.019**  
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)  
PosSentiment i,t-30,t-1     -0.009 
     (0.009) 
NegSentiment i,t-30,t-1     0.010 
     (0.010) 
AgreeInd i,t-30,t-1 0.051*  0.025   
 (0.029)  (0.043)   
High_Agree_Di,t  0.051**  -0.013 0.055* 
  (0.024)  (0.050) (0.030) 
Low_Agree_Di,t  0.007  -0.025 0.012 
  (0.021)  (0.028) (0.021) 
BullInd x AgreeInd i,t-30,t-1   0.012   
   (0.012)   
BullInd x High_Agree_D i,t-
30,t-1    0.022  
    (0.016)  
BullInd x Low_Agree_D i,t-
30,t-1    0.013  
    (0.014)  
Return50 -0.054** -0.053** -0.054** -0.052** -0.054** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
Return5 0.355* 0.334* 0.350* 0.322* 0.332* 
 (0.197) (0.188) (0.194) (0.187) (0.188) 
LogTurnover50 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.019 0.015 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Volatilityi,t-11,t-2 -1.574* -1.634* -1.488* -1.554* -1.671* 
 (0.880) (0.877) (0.862) (0.861) (0.894) 
Sizei,t 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.014 0.018 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Constant -0.626 -0.622 -0.606 -0.515 -0.646 
  (0.404) (0.397) (0.412) (0.409) (0.400) 
Observations 568 568 568 568 568 
Adjusted R-squared 11.5% 12.3% 11.5% 12.5% 12.0% 
Table A-8. Message Board Activity as Predictor of Earnings Surprise (SUEAF) 
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Firm- and year-fixed regressions were conducted. T-statistics computed are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm and year and are denoted in parentheses. SUEHISTi,t is the difference in actual EPS 
in year t and the previous year actual EPS scaled by the stock price of the end of the year, 
LogMessagesi,7 is the log transformation of (1 + Mt) for the event window [-30,-1], Bullishnessi,7 is 
the cumulated bullishness index using formula (3), Agreementi,7 is the cumulated agreement index 
using formula (4), High/LowAgreeDi,7 is a dummy variable indicating the cumulated agreement index 
to be in the top/bottom 20-percentile,  Return50 is the compounded return over the period of [-61,-12] 
and Return5 for the five-day return period [-6,-2] prior to the earnings announcement date. LogTurn-
over50 is the log-transformed average turnover over the time window [-61,-12] prior to the earnings 
announcement date, Volatilityi,10 is the standard deviation of daily returns in the time window [-11,-2] 
and LogSizei,t is the log-transformation of the market capitalization at the end of the financial year. 
***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  SUEHISTt0 SUEHISTt0 SUEHISTt0 SUEHISTt0 SUEHISTt0 
LogMesi,t-30,t-1 -0.158 -0.122 -0.150 -0.266  
 (0.155) (0.144) (0.163) (0.263)  
BullInd i,t-30,t-1 0.017 -0.045 0.022 -0.115*  
 (0.105) (0.080) (0.115) (0.060)  
PosSentiment i,t-30,t-1     -0.146 
     (0.089) 
NegSentiment i,t-30,t-1     -0.035 
     (0.184) 
AgreeInd i,t-30,t-1 -0.077  -0.041   
 (0.256)  (0.303)   
High_Agree_Di,t  -0.239  -0.980 -0.271 
  (0.315)  (0.975) (0.420) 
Low_Agree_Di,t  -0.442  -0.784 -0.391 
  (0.300)  (0.724) (0.275) 
BullInd x AgreeInd i,t-30,t-1   -0.016   
   (0.103)   
BullInd x High_Agree_D 
i,t-30,t-1    0.268  
    (0.253)  
BullInd x Low_Agree_D 
i,t-30,t-1    0.144  
    (0.307)  
Return50 -0.445* -0.424* -0.446* -0.400* -0.422* 
 (0.232) (0.232) (0.229) (0.227) (0.236) 
Return5 1.226** 1.326** 1.225** 1.213** 1.327** 
 (0.511) (0.571) (0.512) (0.503) (0.592) 
LogTurnover50 -0.134 -0.130 -0.135 -0.111 -0.134 
 (0.135) (0.136) (0.137) (0.126) (0.131) 
Volatilityi,t-11,t-2 11.054 12.028 10.973 13.028 12.238 
 (8.704) (9.001) (8.846) (9.522) (9.324) 
Sizei,t 0.220* 0.218* 0.220* 0.205* 0.224* 
 (0.120) (0.123) (0.120) (0.117) (0.122) 
Constant -3.443** -3.266** -3.462** -2.483 -3.379** 
  (1.398) (1.449) (1.421) (1.799) (1.477) 
Observations 667 667 667 667 667 
Adjusted R-squared 6.1% 7.2% 6.0% 8.2% 7.0% 
 
Table A-9. Message Board Activity as Predictor of Earnings Surprise (SUEHIST) 
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This table presents the average CARs based on the market model. We apply the standardized 
cross-sectional Boehmer-test to test for significance. ***, **, and * describe significance at 
0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
Window Panel A  Panel B  Panel C  Panel D  Panel E  
[-t] [+t] Full sample   News & HC   News only   HC only   No media   
-40 10 7.46% *** 7.75% ** -4.62%  8.23% *** 2.42%  
-20 10 6.34% *** 6.89% *** 0.31%  6.69% *** 2.62%  
-10 10 5.92% *** 6.99% *** -1.02%  5.85% *** 3.66%  
-3 3 3.27% *** 3.84% *** -1.98%  3.54% *** -0.17%  
-2 2 3.10% *** 2.93% *** -2.15%  3.57% *** 0.90%  
-1 1 2.70% *** 2.28% *** -3.04%  3.07% *** 2.35% ** 
0 0 1.49% *** 1.73% *** -1.92%  1.52% *** 1.03% ** 
-1 -1 0.56% *** 0.47% * -0.45%  0.60% *** 0.74%  
-2 -2 0.56% *** 0.64% ** 0.16%  0.56% ** 0.34%  
-3 -3 0.31%  0.41%  0.25%  0.27%  0.26%  
-4 -4 0.27%  0.66% ** -0.25%  0.16%  -0.18%  
-5 -5 0.40% * 0.42%  0.53%  0.44% * -0.05%  
1 1 0.65% ** 0.08%  -0.67%  0.95% ** 0.58%  
2 2 -0.16%  0.01%  0.73% *** -0.05%  -1.79% ** 
3 3 -0.14%  0.49%  -0.08%  -0.30%  -1.33% ** 
4 4 0.23% ** 0.41% ** 0.73%  0.09%  0.57%  
5 5 -0.04%  0.07%  0.29%  0.07%  -1.40% ** 
-10 -1 3.36% *** 3.48% *** 1.20%  3.06% *** 5.73% *** 
-20 -11 0.42%  -0.11%  1.33%  0.83%  -1.04%  
-30 -21 0.50%  0.95%  -5.44%  0.53%  -0.28%  
-40 -31 0.62%  -0.08%  0.50%  1.01%  0.08%  
-40 -1 4.90% *** 4.23%  -2.40%  5.44% *** 4.49%  
#Events 352   103   5   217   27   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A-10. Average CARs Around Bid Announcements – Takeover Subsample  
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This table provides an overview of the variables applied to the empirical analysis conducted 
in chapter 4.  
Category Variable Description Source 
Attention FullMedia-40 Indicator variable: one if any news article and mes-
sages on the investment platform HotCopper occurred 
about the target firm on the investment platform 
HotCopper in the period beginning 40 days until 1 day 
before the bid announcement date 
Thomson Reuters News 
Analytics; HotCopper 
 
News-40 Indicator variable: one if any news article and no other 
messages on the investment platform HotCopper 
occurred about the target firm on the investment plat-
form HotCopper in the period beginning 40 days until 
1 day before the bid announcement date 
Thomson Reuters News 
Analytics 
 
SocialMedia-
30 
Indicator variable: one if at least 10 messages and no 
other news article occurred about the target firm on the 
investment platform HotCopper in the period begin-
ning 30 days until 1 day before the bid announcement 
date 
HotCopper 
 
ASX-30 Indicator variable: one if any official ASX announce-
ment occurred in the period beginning 30 days until 1 
day before the bid announcement date 
HotCopper 
 
AnUp-30 Indicator variable: one if any analyst upgrade occurred 
in the period beginning 30 days until 1 day before  the 
bid announcement date 
I/B/E/S 
 
AnDown-30 Indicator variable: one if any analyst downgrade 
occurred in the period beginning 30 days until 1 day 
before the bid announcement date 
I/B/E/S 
 
Google1i,t Indicator variable: one if any daily change in Google 
search volume fulfills the outlier criteria in the period 
beginning 30 days until 1 day before the bid announce-
ment 
 
 
Google2i,t Indicator variable: one if any daily abnormal Google 
search volume fulfills the outlier criteria in the period 
beginning 30 days until 1 day before the bid announce-
ment 
 
Target LnSizei,t Natural logarithm of the target's market capitalization 
at the beginning of the month 
Compustat 
 
Market-to-
booki,t 
Firms market capitalization at the beginning of the 
month divided by the firm's book value of equity 
Compustat 
 
EBITDAi,LTM Firm's EBITDA of last twelve months scaled by latest 
total assets  
Compustat 
Deal International Indicator variable: one if the acquirer's and target's 
headquarters are located in different countries, zero 
otherwise 
SDC Platinum 
 
Diversifica-
tion 
Indicator variable: one if acquirer and target do not 
share the same 2-digit SIC code, zero otherwise 
SDC Platinum 
Table A-11. Description of Main Variables  
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Hostile Indicator variable:one if the bid is hostile, zero other-
wise 
SDC Platinum 
 
Toehold Indicator variable: one if the acquirer owns a non-zero 
percentage of the target’s stock prior to announcement 
date,zero otherwise 
SDC Platinum 
 
Takeover Indicator variable: one if acquirer's ownership would 
exceed 50% after the deal , zero otherwise 
SDC Platinum 
 
Tender Indicator variable: one for tender offers, zero otherwise SDC Platinum 
Acquirer PublicAcq Indicator variable: one if the acquirer is publicly listed SDC Platinum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table summarizes the Pearson rank correlations between widely-accepted risk factors. The 
risk factors include premiums based on market (MkrRf), size (SMB), book-to-market (HML), 
Carhart momentum (MOM), Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity (PS LIQ), profitability (RMW), in-
vestments (CMA) and news sentiment (PNM). ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
  PMN   MktRF   SMB   HML   Mom   
Trade-
Liq   RMW   
MktRF -0.34 *** 1.00 *** 0.26 *** -0.03  -0.34 *** 0.10 ** -0.48 *** 
SMB -0.49 *** 0.26 *** 1.00 *** -0.07  0.04  0.18 *** -0.54 *** 
HML 0.08  -0.03  -0.07  1.00 *** -0.12 ** -0.11  0.42 *** 
Mom 0.32 *** -0.34 *** 0.04  -0.12 ** 1.00 *** 0.06  0.15 * 
TradeLiq 0.00  0.10 ** 0.18 *** -0.11  0.06  1.00 *** -0.08  
RMW 0.59 *** -0.48 *** -0.54 *** 0.42 *** 0.15 * -0.08  1.00 *** 
CMA 0.09  -0.24 *** 0.05  0.59 *** 0.16  -0.11 * 0.24 *** 
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This Table extends Table 5-6 and shows the average monthly raw returns sorted by negative, 
neutral and positive sentiment. Average raw returns are denoted in percentages. In each 
month, we divide our sample stocks into negative, neutral or positive sentiment bins. Senti-
ment is measured by the Ravenpack Composite Sentiment Score (CSS) based on categories 
developed according to more than 330 market moving events. Return differentials of positive 
and negative sentiment bins are calculated based on equal-weighted average next month re-
turns of the sentiment portfolios. Return differentials are shown for subsamples of firms 
sorted by operative profitability and investments in the fiscal year after the formation period.  
 Average monthly returns (%)   Share of sent. in obs. (%)          
 Sentiment  t-Statistics Sentiment 
  Neg. Neut. Pos. Pos - Neg. Pos - Neg. Neg. Neut. Pos. 
All stocks 0.51 0.70 1.38 0.87 20.45 0.15 0.55 0.30 
Panel F: Profitability in t+1             
1 0.37 0.81 1.64 1.27 8.67 0.19 0.51 0.30 
2 0.86 1.25 1.61 0.75 9.07 0.19 0.38 0.43 
3 0.75 1.20 1.47 0.72 10.21 0.20 0.35 0.46 
RMW(3-1) 0.37 0.38 -0.17           
Panel H: Investment in t+1             
1 0.23 0.48 1.05 0.82 11.92 0.18 0.41 0.40 
2 0.63 0.99 1.35 0.72 12.83 0.18 0.43 0.39 
3 1.09 1.47 2.10 1.01 10.52 0.20 0.46 0.34 
CMA(1-3) -0.86 -0.98 -1.05           
         
 
  
Table A-13. Stock Returns and Sentiment: Predictive Return Differentials   
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This table reports the results of the factor-based time-series regressions on portfolios that only 
go long on stocks with average positive sentiment in the previous month. In each month, a 
stock’s sentiment is classified as positive if the average Ravenpack Composite Sentiment 
Score exceeds 50. The portfolios are formed at the beginning of the month and held for one 
month. The long-only portfolio returns are regressed on different widely-accepted risk-fac-
tors. T-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively.       
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 CAPM FF 3-Factor 
Carhart  
4-Factor 
PS Liq.  
5-factor FF 5-Factor All 7-Factor 
  PMN PMN PMN PMN PMN PMN 
Mkt - rf 1.1036*** 1.0085*** 0.9176*** 0.9078*** 0.9840*** 0.9067*** 
 (30.2424) (38.7141) (37.8141) (36.9815) (31.5824) (32.2689) 
SMB  0.5479*** 0.5988*** 0.5785*** 0.5413*** 0.5765*** 
  (15.2158) (19.2712) (18.1655) (12.7488) (15.1061) 
HML  0.1017*** 0.0496* 0.0531* 0.1582*** 0.0546 
  (2.9591) (1.6695) (1.7637) (3.2483) (1.2357) 
MOM   -0.1736*** -0.1786***  -0.1784*** 
   (-9.1023) (-9.3311)  (-9.0341) 
TradeLiq    0.0958***  0.0963*** 
    (3.5982)  (3.5376) 
RMW     -0.0456 -0.0046 
     (-0.8543) (-0.0965) 
CMA     -0.1015 0.0008 
     (-1.4639) (0.0136) 
Intercept 0.0095*** 0.0075*** 0.0082*** 0.0079*** 0.0080*** 0.0080*** 
 (5.9378) (6.7373) (8.6410) (8.1279) (6.8374) (7.7801) 
Observations 215 215 215 204 215 204 
R2 0.81 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.94 
 
  
Table A-14. Factor Time Series Regressions - Only Positive Sentiment   
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This table reports the results of the factor-based time-series regressions on portfolios that only 
short stocks with average negative sentiment in the previous month. In each month, a stock’s 
sentiment is classified as negative if the average Ravenpack Composite Sentiment Score is 
lower than 50. The portfolios are formed at the beginning of the month and held for one 
month. The short-only portfolio returns are regressed on different widely-accepted risk-fac-
tors. T-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively.       
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 CAPM FF 3-Factor 
Carhart 4-Fac-
tor 
PS Liq. 5-fac-
tor FF 5-Factor All 7-Factor 
  PMN PMN PMN PMN PMN PMN 
Mkt - rf 1.2692*** 1.1255*** 0.9773*** 0.9787*** 1.0021*** 0.8996*** 
 (24.2829) (30.9898) (31.2349) (30.6695) (24.6769) (26.3397) 
SMB  0.8093*** 0.8922*** 0.8724*** 0.6679*** 0.7429*** 
  (16.1212) (22.2707) (21.0703) (12.0689) (16.0155) 
HML  0.0695 -0.0153 -0.0265 0.2705*** 0.1037* 
  (1.4509) (-0.4002) (-0.6775) (4.2612) (1.9308) 
MOM   -0.2829*** -0.2833***  -0.2661*** 
   (-11.5051) (-11.3849)  (-11.0845) 
TradeLiq    0.0432  0.0717** 
    (1.2481)  (2.1663) 
RMW     -0.3909*** -0.3047*** 
     (-5.6241) (-5.3077) 
CMA     -0.1481 -0.0189 
     (-1.6393) (-0.2547) 
Intercept 0.0011 -0.0016 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0011 0.0016 
  (0.4603) (-1.0116) (-0.3627) (0.0601) (0.7108) (1.3137) 
Observations 215 215 215 204 215 204 
R2 0.73 0.88 0.93 0.93 0.90 0.94 
 
  
Table A-15.  Factor Time Series Regressions - Only Negative Sentiment 
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This Table extends Table 5-9 and reports the intercepts (alphas) of the factor-based time-series 
regressions on equal-weighted average returns of portfolios that goes long on stocks with average 
positive and shorts stocks with average negative sentiment in the previous month sorted by dif-
ferent firm characteristics. The zero-investment portfolios are regressed on excess market returns 
(CAPM), the Fama-French (1993) three-factor, Carhart (1997) Momentum-factor, the Pastor-
Stambaugh (2003) liquidity-factor, the Fama-French (1995) five-factor and the combination of 
all factor-models. The equally-weighted portfolios are formed at the beginning of the month and 
held for one month. T-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * describe significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively.       
CAPM FF 3-Factor Carh. 4-Factor PS 5-factor FF 5-Factor All 7-Factor 
Panel F: Trading Volume 
Illiquid 
0.0056*** 0.0059*** 0.0058*** 0.0056*** 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 
(4.5741) (5.0583) (4.9708) (4.7914) (3.7166) (3.6423) 
Medium 
0.0031* 0.0040*** 0.0035** 0.0032** 0.0019 0.0017 
(1.9646) (2.7351) (2.5454) (2.3102) (1.3113) (1.2629) 
Liquid 
0.0095*** 0.0101*** 0.0098*** 0.0095*** 0.0082*** 0.0081*** 
(6.0716) (6.8292) (6.7631) (6.5752) (5.5428) (5.5658) 
 
This table extends Table 5-10 and shows the average monthly raw returns sorted by sentiment 
quintiles. Average raw returns are denoted in percentages. In each month, we divide our sample 
stocks according to sentiment quintile bins. Sentiment is measured by the Ravenpack Compo-
site Sentiment Score (CSS) based on categories developed according to more than 330 market 
moving events. Return differentials between the highest and lowest sentiment quintile bins are 
calculated based on equal-weighted average next month returns of the sentiment quintile port-
folios. Return differentials are shown for subsamples of firms sorted by operative profitability 
and investments for the fiscal year after the formation period. 
 Average monthly returns (%)   Share of sent.  (%)              
 Sentiment  t-Stat. Sentiment 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5-Q1 Q5-Q1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
All stocks 0.52 0.17 0.90 1.24 1.46 0.94 19.43 15.08 15.28 40.15 10.02 19.47 
Panel F: Profitability in t+1                
1 0.38 -0.32 1.25 1.24 1.89 1.51 8.85 19.01 13.85 37.50 11.20 18.45 
2 0.84 0.30 1.61 1.52 1.67 0.83 9.01 19.26 10.41 27.89 15.59 26.84 
3 0.74 -0.04 1.62 1.25 1.58 0.85 10.79 19.44 8.77 26.32 15.79 29.67 
RMW 0.36 0.27 0.37 0.01 -0.31             
Panel H: Investment in t+1                
1 0.21 -0.20 0.75 1.00 1.07 0.86 11.38 17.89 11.06 30.81 14.61 25.62 
2 0.62 0.19 1.33 1.27 1.39 0.77 12.12 17.59 12.57 31.06 14.63 24.15 
3 1.08 0.30 1.90 1.78 2.30 1.22 10.95 20.09 12.17 34.18 12.76 20.80 
CMA -0.87 -0.50 -1.15 -0.78 -1.23             
 
Table A-16.  Time Series Regressions by Firm Characteristics 
Table A-17. Stock Returns and Sentiment: Predictive Return Differentials by Quintiles  
